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Abstract 
Daniel Clayton Adams 
University of Cape Town, South Africa 
This thesis seeks to take Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s prison experience seriously as a spiritually and 
theologically formative journey through liminal displacement. Using the anthropological theory 
of liminality as a lens for analysis, it offers a close reading of Bonhoeffer’s prison writings, 
examining the porous nature of the sociocultural and metaphorical boundaries of the prison space 
as expressed in notes, letters, essays, prayers, poetry, and theological letters. In doing so, the 
thesis suggests that Bonhoeffer’s dramatic transition into the prison space results in an “in-
between-ness” (Palmer et al. 2009) that suspends the prisoner “betwixt and between” (Turner 
1967) light and dark, inside and outside, above and below, sacred and profane space, dislocation 
and located-ness, suffering and hope, life and death. Chronologically examining distinct phases 
of liminality – separation, transition, anticipation – the study shows a cumulatively 
transformative movement in which the prisoner is drawn ever more deeply into the reality of his 
own life, and an ever increasing relationality with others, with God, and with the suffering of 
those who inhabit the view from below. It is observed that by taking an active role in navigating 
liminality, Bonhoeffer encounters multiple turning points at the heart of betwixt space, which 
break up “default modes of perception,” (Wannenwetsch 2012) transforming the prison cell into 
a privileged place of insight that ultimately catalyses a transformative new vision of reality and 
the Christian life. Within liminality the borderlines and boundaries of the prison space remain 
just porous enough to create the possibility for alternative ways of viewing reality. Through 
theological, poetic, and polyphonic anticipation, Bonhoeffer risks imaginative resolve by 
reframing liminality as a Gethsemane-like displacement, stations on the way to freedom, and 
participation in the polyphonic nature of life. In it is concluded that Bonhoeffer’s prison 
experience represents a uniquely formative space in which he was drawn into participation in the 
life, sufferings, and death of Jesus Christ.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction to the Problem 
“It remains an experience of incomparable value that we have for once learned to see the 
great events of world history from below, from the perspective of the outcasts, the 
suspects, the maltreated, the powerless, the oppressed and reviled, in short from the 
perspective of the suffering. If only during this time bitterness and envy have not 
corroded the heart; that we come to see matters great and small, happiness and 
misfortune, strength and weakness with new eyes; that our sense for greatness, 
humanness, justice, and mercy has grown clearer, freer, more incorruptible; that we 
learn, indeed, that personal suffering is a more useful key, a more fruitful principle than 
personal happiness for exploring the meaning of the world in contemplation and action. 
But this perspective from below must not lead us to become advocates for those who are 
perpetually dissatisfied. Rather, out of a higher satisfaction, which in its essence is 
grounded beyond what is below and above, we do justice to life in all its dimensions and 
in this way affirm it (DBWE 8:52).1 
Bonhoeffer wrote this now famous fragment entitled The View from Below, sometime near the 
end of 1942, shortly before he was arrested and imprisoned by the Gestapo on the charge of 
“subversion of the armed forces” (de Gruchy, 2007:18). In the final section of his essay, entitled 
“After Ten Years” (DBWE 8:52, Prologue), Bonhoeffer exhorts his fellow conspirators and 
family of the need and privilege of learning to view the events of world history, not from the 
commanding position of the noble and privileged, but from below, from the perspective of the 
victims of world history.  
This “new epistemological principle,” as Wannenwetsch (2012:355) calls it, represents a 
perspective that Bonhoeffer discovered, as his involvement in the conspiracy movement located 
                                                
1 From Bonhoeffer’s essay “After Ten Years” (DBWE 8:52, Prologue). In a footnote of DBWE 8, it is indicated that 
this final paragraph of the essay was initially part of an “incomplete sketch that Bonhoeffer did not include in the 
final text” of the essay (DBWE 8:52, Prologue).  
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him, his family, and his fellow conspirators, no longer among the privileged of society, but 
among the threatened, the suspect, and the marginalised. As Bonhoeffer suffered in solidarity 
with the underprivileged in Barcelona, in Harlem, in Bethel, in the resistance movement, and 
then in Tegel prison, he experienced a shift in perspective that he came to cherish and value, as it 
transformed his own life and thought in crucial ways.  
This perspective, which he named the “incomparable… view from below,” allowed a level of 
access to spheres of reality and insight not available to those who had not learned wisdom 
through the personal experience2 of suffering or through communion with Christ’s suffering3 
(Wannenwetsch 2012:356; Dahill 2001:197; DBWE 8:48-50, Prologue). This perspective offers 
privileged access and insight, as Wannenwetsch (2012:356) indicates, by breaking up “default 
modes of perception from within,” allowing space for a new way of viewing and experiencing 
reality to emerge in the wake of this break.  
The view from below, written just before Bonhoeffer’s arrest, is now positioned as the final 
section of the prologue to his Letters and Papers from Prison (here after referred to as LPP or 
DBWE 8); it prefigures what became the embodied reality of Bonhoeffer’s lived experience of 
institutional confinement.4 What the prison experience meant for Bonhoeffer might best be 
captured in terms of the view from below,5 a concept he discovered most fully in the intense “test 
                                                
2 Under the heading Sympathy in his essay ‘After Ten Years’, Bonhoeffer reflects on the reality that “most people 
learn wisdom only through personal experience” and that minus the experience of personal suffering, most people 
lack the ability to “take any kind of preventive action” because they otherwise have a “dull sensitivity toward the 
suffering of others” (DBWE 8:48, Prologue).  
3 Bonhoeffer’s reflection on suffering, under the heading Suffering in ‘After Ten Years’ (DBWE 8:49-50, Prologue) 
should be read in connection with his epistemological principle ‘the view from below.’ Suffering in “freedom, in 
solitude, in the shadow, and in dishonour, in body and in spirit” is what paradoxically connects a Christian to the 
suffering of Christ. This reflection on suffering in many ways foreshadows Bonhoeffer’s experience of 
imprisonment. See also DBWE 6:88-91, for Bonhoeffer’s understanding of comformation to the crucified One.  
4 Bethge most likely placed ‘After Ten Years’ as the prologue to Letters and Papers from Prison, because it 
functioned as a transitionary document, bridging “the gaps between Bonhoeffer’s final months of freedom, and his 
arrest and imprisonment” (de Gruchy 2010:11). Written as a reflection upon “the events and issues of the past 
months as the conspiracy had gathered momentum,” the essay revisits particular themes from Bonhoeffer’s Ethics, 
but it also prefigures Bonhoeffer’s prison experience, suggesting that he may have at least had an inkling that his 
involvement in the resistance movement would lead to imprisonment (de Gruchy 2010:11).  
5 Suggesting that Bonhoeffer’s prison experience was an embodied view from below is, however, held in tension 
with a very real sense that Bonhoeffer remained a privileged prisoner, quite unlike main military and political 
prisoners of the Third Reich. Appendix A of the this thesis seeks to trace the contours of Bonhoeffer’s privilege. 
This portrait of Bonhoeffer as A Privileged Prisoner was not included in the body of this thesis as it offered more of 
a biographical approach to Bonhoeffer’s imprisonment rather than a close reading of his texts. I have included it as 
an Appendix to further contrast the betwixt space Bonhoeffer experienced in Tegel, as both a privileged prisoner and 
an outcast and suspect criminal.  
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and trails of living a faithful life under the Nazi regime;” a path which eventually ranked him 
among the outcast and reviled himself (Wannenwetsch 2012:355).  
In Berlin’s military interrogation prison – Tegel – Bonhoeffer delved deeply into the reality of 
the below, participating in the “underside of history” in solidarity with his fellow prisoners and 
ultimately with God’s own vulnerability (Kelly & Nelson 2003:84). Cut off from his family, 
friends, and his fiancé, isolated, interrogated, deprived of former privileges, risking the shame 
and guilt of being condemned as a traitor, the prison context became a concrete view from below. 
Life in prison represents Bonhoeffer’s final “turning from the phraseological to the real” view 
from below (DBWE 8:358, 3/135).   
This study seeks to offer a portrait of Dietrich Bonhoeffer the prisoner-theologian,6 
chronologically tracing the contours of his prison experience from his arrest and imprisonment 
on April 5, 1943, to the failure of the coup on July 20, 1944. In so doing, I to take the prison 
experience seriously as a place of spiritual and theological formation; a distinctive era in the 
formational narrative of Bonhoeffer’s life and work. Employing the theoretical framework of 
liminality, I suggest that the dramatic transitional event of imprisonment resulted in an “in-
between-ness” intensified by separation and detachment from former structures of identity and 
order. Amidst this disorienting state of liminality, Bonhoeffer came to discover a privileged 
spiritual depth afforded by the perspective of an awaiting trial prisoner; the view from below.  
Having lived and written almost entirely from a position of privilege and authority, 
imprisonment represented the first time that he had truly experienced forced submission, where 
his usual freedom, his societal and familial privilege, as well as his “dominating ego,” were 
curtailed by force (Dahill 2001:190). This disorienting transition thrust Bonhoeffer into a 
repetitive state of liminality that threatened a depersonalising sense of fragmentation, yet 
promised a uniquely formative and theologically generative space. Within this space Bonhoeffer 
                                                
6 Haynes (2004:99-103) book The Bonhoeffer Phenomena: Portraits of a Protestant Saint presents a compelling 
description of the many portraits of Bonhoeffer that have emerged over the more than half a century sense his death. 
While Haynes includes a section titled “Prisoner of Conscience and Modern Martyr” in his portrait of the Universal 
Bonhoeffer, this section focuses more significantly on his image as a modern day martyr than it does on Bonhoeffer 
as a prisoner. This is not, however, Haynes’ fault, as he seeks simply to work with material that has emerged from 
academic and popular images of Bonhoeffer. The stark absence of this image within Bonhoeffer studies points to the 
tendency to jump straight to his theology or poetry, or even to his death as the most compelling example of his life 
and witness. 
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assumed an active role in navigating the disorienting tensions of prison life. Seeking to preserve 
his experience he sought to “come to terms with it, let it become fruitful, and not push it away” 
(DBWE 8:201, 2/29). This active participation in the prison experience invites us to follow 
Bonhoeffer in exploring the meaning and potential fruitfulness of his prison experience. It 
provokes certain questions for inquiry. How does he come to terms or respond to his experience 
of life in prison? In what way can this experience be considered fruitful or formative? And if it 
can, what is the structure and content of this formational period? Finally, what connections 
remain to be uncovered between Bonhoeffer’s personal formation and his theological writings 
from prison? 
In examining Bonhoeffer’s prison experience, I hope to fill a gap in Bonhoeffer studies that 
remains relatively unexamined. Although Bonhoeffer research has long been interested in 
particular features of his prison writings; his fictional endeavours, his poetry, his use of musical 
metaphors, and most prominently his prison theology, no work to my knowledge, exists 
pertaining to a comprehensive examination of the prison context as a formative motif in his 
prison writings.7 By focusing on texts pertaining to the prison experience, I aim to understand 
not only the theologically productive elements of his writings, but more importantly, the 
spiritually and theologically formative journey he encountered in cell 92 of Tegel Prison, that 
gave birth to his fragmentary prison writings.  
The primary thesis of this study is that when Bonhoeffer’s social status fundamentally shifted as 
a result of his imprisonment, he experienced a period of liminality, which changed his view of 
self, the other, of God, and the world in significant ways. In prison, Bonhoeffer underwent a 
significant and unique period of formation as a result of his lived experience that opened him up 
to a fresh encounter with God and a liberating participation in the life of Jesus Christ (Incarnate, 
Crucified, Resurrected). This final view from below represents a process of becoming that, 
although he was in many ways prepared for, ultimately catalysed a transformation of selfhood 
that had not yet been afforded because of his familial and cultural privilege.  
                                                
7 The primary exception (outside of strictly biographical texts) relates to studies that have focused on specific issues 
or themes emerging from Bonhoeffer’s prison experience. Studies of this nature worthy of mention include Millies’ 
(2011: 113-134) enlightening comparison between Bonhoeffer and Delp’s prison writings; and Martin’s (2005:206) 
compelling comparison between Bonhoeffer’s strategy of rhetorical misdirection during his interrogation and the 
literary genre of “trickster narratives”; 
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This study focuses on the prison experience as a central factor for understanding Bonhoeffer’s 
life and work; it was clearly significant for Bonhoeffer himself. The meaning that he attributes to 
his prison experience can be seen in the perspective and access that it grants to spheres of reality 
and insight not afforded “outside” the prison walls. In the world of Tegel, Bonhoeffer turns 
towards the here of his prison experience. Following his lead, this study seeks to preserve his 
experience; examining his keen observation of his new social situation and the way in which he 
develops remarkably new insights intimately associated with his existence as a prisoner. In this 
context Bonhoeffer discovers insights that help him to cope with imprisonment and reframe his 
experience; understanding what it means to be human as well as a Christian in the prison context 
(DBWE 8:79, 1/17). Rigorous observation of self, his fellow prisoners, and the spatial and 
temporal context of the prison itself, prompt Bonhoeffer to reconsider how to deal with reality 
(spiritually and theologically) from the perspective of the below. 
Background and Rationale 
Before discussing the theoretical framework and research methodology of this study, let me first 
sketch the background to Bonhoeffer’s prison writings, their posthumous publication, and the 
four characteristic approaches to Bonhoeffer research and the interpretation of LPP in particular. 
Rather than repeating the work of other’s here, I will offer a brief presentation of this history, 
pointing to important studies of the subject, while seeking to locate my own research within the 
larger landscape of Bonhoeffer studies and the study of LPP (DBWE 8). Following this 
background I will explain the rationale underling the present research study and why further 
research is needed in terms of Bonhoeffer’s prison experience and his prison writings.  
Bonhoeffer was arrested by the Gestapo on the 5th of April 1943, and incarcerated in Berlin’s 
military interrogation prison (Tegel) on the charge of “subversion of the armed forces” (de 
Gruchy 2007:18). He spent eighteen months in Tegel prison until on October 8, 1944, when he 
was transferred to the “detention center in the cellar of the Reich Central Security Office 
building on Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse” (de Gruchy 2007:18). He was later taken to Flossenbürg 
Concentration Camp and hung on April 9, 1945; sentenced to death for his involvement in the 
conspiracy plot to kill Hitler (Bethge 2000:799; de Gruchy 2007:18). While in Tegel, Bonhoeffer 
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wrote occasional letters, essays, reports, prayers, sermons, poems, and an outline for a book. 
Some of this material, as de Gruchy (2005:69) recounts, was kept by family members, some 
(particularly from the illegal correspondence) was “preserved during the war years in gas mask 
containers in the Schleichers’ garden at Marienbyrger Alle 42, so they could be retieved 
afterwards,” and some was lost along the way “having never reached their destination in the first 
place,” or having been misplaced or “destroyed for security reasons.”   
After Bonhoeffer’s death, Bethge posthumously published some of this archival material in 
1950.8 Only later did Bethge realise the impact that these “theological letters” would have, 
causing a “theological sensation, and by a book which Bonhoeffer had not intended to write, 
consisting as it does of excerpts from letters… and addressed as it is to a friend, not to the world 
in general” (Bethge 1975:20-21). Later a more substantial edition of Widerstand und Ergebung 
(Resistance and Submission) was published (1951) including selections of the familial 
correspondence. It was further translated and published in the English language as Letters and 
Papers from Prison in 1953 (de Gruchy 2005:119).9  
Despite being incomplete, occasional, fragmented, and not intended as a “theological 
monograph” (de Gruchy 2005:69), Bonhoeffer’s prison writings have continued to invite serious 
engagement by theologians, philosophers, and popular interest from a wide diversity of Christian 
communities and thinkers.10 In fact of all Bonhoeffer’s works, none has contributed more to his 
status as a major figure in twentieth-century Christianity, than his LPP (de Gruchy 2010:1). 
While tracing the lines of this interpretive history11 is not within the present scope of this 
                                                
8 The first edition contained only Bonhoeffer’s most explicitly theological letters, which Bethge wanted to share 
with a close circle of friends, including “former Finkenwaldian colleagues” (de Gruchy 2005:119). 
9 Regarding the remarkable story of the editing and publishing of Bonhoeffer’s prison writings see Bethge, E. 1959. 
“The Editing and Publishing of the Bonhoeffer Papers.” The Andover Newton Bulletin, 52 (December):1-24; and de 
Gruchy, J.W. 2005. Daring, Trusting Spirit: Bonhoeffer’s Friend Eberhard Bethge. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 68-
69, 118-120. 
10 de Gruchy (1999:94) also notes that Bonhoeffer’s life and work (not limited to but including LPP) “continually 
attracts biographers, novelists, dramatists, and film-markers, just as his poetry has inspired composers.” 
11 For more on the influence and reception of Letters and Papers from Prison, see de Gruchy, J.W. (1999). The 
Reception of Bonhoeffer’s Theology. In: The Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer. de Gruchy, J.W. (ed.) 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; de Gruchy, J.W. (2010). Editor’s Introduction to the English Edition. 
In: Letters and Papers from Prison. DBWE 8. de Gruchy, J.W. (ed.) Minneapolis, MA: Fortress Press, p.1-34; de 
Gruchy, J.W. (2005). Daring, Trusting Spirit: Bonheoffer’s Friend Eberhard Bethge. Minneapolis: Fortress, p.69-
70, 118-120; and Marty, M.E. (2011). Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Letters and Papers from Prison: A Biography. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
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research study, I will seek to locate my own interpretive approach within the wider landscape of 
four characteristic approaches to Bonhoeffer research that have come to define the field.  
Drawing on the earlier work of Feil, de Gruchy (1999:99) has attempted to categorise four 
distinctive characteristics within the scholarly study of Bonhoeffer’s life and work. Although 
these four characteristics refer to Bonhoeffer’s life and work as a whole, they also bear 
importance for the interpretive history of LPP. These four characteristics, as de Gruchy 
(1999:99-100) summarises them,12 can be listed as follows. The first concerns studies offering a 
“comprehensive approach to Bonhoeffer’s theology” (Godsey 1960; Feil 1985; Dumas 1971; 
Marsh 1994).13 The second highlights studies concerned with tracing the “different phases in 
Bonhoeffer’s development,” progressing through his ecclesiology (Harvey 2010:102123), to his 
Christology (Philips 1967; Pangritz 1999: 134-153), and finally focusing on various phrases or 
notions in his prison theology, such as a “world come of age” or a “religionless Christianity” 
(Wüstenberg 1998; Selby 1999: 226-245). The third approach focuses on studies of particular 
topics within Bonhoeffer’s theology, such as his biblical hermenuetics (Wüstenberg & 
Zimmermann 2013), his use of musical metaphors (Kemp 1976; Ford 1999; Pangritz 2002:28-
41; Smith 2006:195-206), his anthropology (Green 1972; Green 2010:71-90), his philosophical 
foundations (Marsh 1994), or specific issues within his ethics (Rasmussen 1972), such as the role 
of the Bible in his view of the mandates and the ethical life (Brock 2005:7-29; Guth 2013:131-
150) or discernment of the will of God (Dahill 2002:42-49; Dahill 2007: 68-76). The fourth and 
finally characteristic de Gruchy (1999:100) notes, focuses on issues concerning “practical 
theology,” such as Bonhoeffer’s understanding and “approach to preaching or pastoral care.” 
More recent engagements with this final approach are studies concerned with spiritual formation 
and Christian spirituality (Kelly & Nelson 2003; Kelly 1999:246-268; Dahill 2003:1-15; Dahill 
2006:1-19), as well as contextual studies that offer critical and creative dialogue with 
                                                
12 Here I rely on de Gruchy’s summary of Feil’s four characteristics because I lack access to Feil’s German text. 
See, Feil. E. 1992. Aspekte der Bonhoefferinterpretation. Theologische Literaturezeitung, 117(January-February). 
p.1-2. 
13 The references that follow each characteristic approach, point primarily to studies produced or translated in the 
English language. These references are not intended to be comprehensive of the field but to point to past and more 
recent studies that have taken each characteristic approach. For a more comprehensive list of past studies on each 
approach, see de Gruchy (1999:99-100). 
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Bonhoeffer’s theology, such as studies that interpret Bonhoeffer’s life and work through the lens 
of feminist criticism  (Dahill 2009; Dahill 2010:176-190; Guth 2013:131-150).  
The present study, while seeking to bring a number of these approaches and voices into dialogue, 
falls more specifically within the approach common amongst Bonhoeffer research in the English-
speaking world, that of focusing on contextual issues (de Gruchy 1999:102). By focusing on the 
specific context of imprisonment as a place of formation, this study is in line with other studies 
that have sought to interpret Bonhoeffer’s writings in light of his life and work (Bethge 1961),14 
seeking to distil life experiences in places of struggle and otherness, that were ultimately 
formative for Bonhoeffer and his theology.15 Rather than tracing phases of his theological 
development throughout his life, as in the second characteristic, I will trace the phases of his life 
in prison as places of spiritual and theological formation. I seek to contribute to a portrait of the 
“historical” Bonhoeffer and his experience of prison. This approach will be explored further 
below in outlining the research methodology of this study. I mention it here, however, to draw 
attention to a gap in Bonhoeffer research regarding Bonhoeffer’s life in prison and his prison 
writings.  
The rationale for further research in relation to Bonhoeffer’s prison experience and his LPP 
(DBWE 8) can be explained in terms of three different streams of influence. Firstly, with the 
publication of the new English translation of LPP (DBWE 8), new historical as well as reference 
material has been made available to the Anglo-Saxon world. This publication has made available 
to interpreters, a more comprehensive picture of the context of Bonhoeffer’s life and work 
(before and during his imprisonment), “revealing how he is driven and shaped, both in his 
thought and his decisions, by his conversation partners and the challenges he confronts” (Calvin 
2009). In this way, the publication of the 16 volume DBWE provides, as Robert Vosloo 
(2013:15) indicates, an ideal opportunity and invitation for “a new generation of interpreters to 
bring their own questions and insights to the interpretation of Bonhoeffer’s life and writings.” 
Published in 2010, containing new material, DBWE 8 continues to prompt further investigation 
                                                
14 This approach insists that Bonhoeffer’s writing cannot be separated from his life, as Bethge (1961:22-88) first 
suggested in his Aldin Tuthill Lectures given at Chicago Theological Seminary in January 1961. 
15 Such studies include, but are not limited to, Williams’ (2014) study of Bonhoeffer’s encounter with Harlem’s 
black Jesus; Steiner’s (2004; 2007:22-42) enlightening study on Bonhoeffer’s early travel experiences and his notion 
of the boundary; and Root’s (2014) study of Bonhoeffer as Youth Worker. 
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into the significance of Bonhoeffer’s prison experience and its impact on his life and theology. 
My research is a response to this invitation and seeks to bring a different set of questions and a 
new body of material to the interpretations of Bonhoeffer’s LPP.  
Secondly, many interpreters of Bonhoeffer’s prison writings, both past and present, have largely 
focused their attention on those letters usually referred to as the “theological letters,” 
commencing with his letter to Bethge April 30, 1944.16 Regarded by many readers and 
interpreters as the essential piece of Bonhoeffer’s prison writings and “the core of its contents” 
(de Gruchy 2010:2), the “theological letters” have received the most attention, provoking 
considerable scholarly and popular interest. However, the publication of new historical and 
reference material in DBWE 8 related to Bonhoeffer’s prison experience, demonstrates that while 
the “theological letters” remain central to this collection, they represent a small portion of 
Bonhoeffer’s prison writings. There is, as de Gruchy (2010:2) has suggested “a great deal more” 
to Bonhoeffer’s prison writings than what is reflected in the “theological letters,” just as there is, 
“a range of genres other than letters: poetry, meditations, prayers, reports, a book outline, and 
some pithy, cryptic notes.”  
There remains, however, a considerable gap in the study of Bonhoeffer’s prison experience, thus 
justifying a need for further research pertaining to LPP (DBWE 8). Starting from a contextual 
analysis of Bonhoeffer’s formation in prison, rather than a major theological theme or particular 
concept, the present study seeks to fill a gap in Bonhoeffer research and contribute to our 
historical picture of Bonhoeffer the prisoner-theologian. Thus having surveyed the broad terrain 
within which the present research project has materialised and the necessity for further research, 
I now turn to an assessment of its general shape and framework.  
                                                
16 This is particularly the case in the English-speaking world, where until the 1971 publication of Letters and Papers 
from Prison, a great deal of Bonhoeffer’s prison writings remained unavailable. Interest in his “theological letters” is 
not surprising, due to the fact that these letters contain Bonhoeffer’s most evocative and mysterious phrases, such as 
‘a world come of age’, ‘the religious a priori’, ‘non-religious interpretation’, and ‘religionless Christianity.’ 
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Theoretical Framework 
Imprisonment represented a dramatic transitional event that shaped the direction and quality of 
Bonhoeffer’s life, thought, and spiritual formation. I argue that the nature of this dramatic event 
induced a period of liminality (van Gennep 1960), defined as “the instability, ambiguity, and 
suspended identity that can occur in the transition from one significant role to another” (Noble & 
Walker 1997:30). This disorienting state of liminality induced a time of contextual and inner 
dissonance that Bonhoeffer came to value as it facilitated considerable personal growth and 
transformative change. Using the anthropological theory of liminality as a lens of analysis, I will 
distil patterns of thought and experience, as expressed in Bonhoeffer’s prison writings, that 
indicate a process of formation or transformation taking place amidst the transitional context of 
an awaiting trial prisoner. My contention is that Bonhoeffer underwent distinct transitional 
phases within the prison space that ultimately correspond not only to common experiences of 
prisoners documented elsewhere, but also to the distinct stages of liminality as proposed by van 
Gennep (1960), Turner (1967), among various other scholars. I will briefly outline the 
conceptual framework of this study, regarding the liminal transitions at the heart of Bonhoeffer’s 
experience and the formative and transformative space that this creates for the inmate of cell 92.  
Before moving to a discussion of how I intend to make use of this theoretical tool in 
understanding the various stages of Bonhoeffer’s prison experience I will sketch the conceptual 
development of liminal theory and the wide landscape in which it is now applied. The terms 
“liminal” or “liminality” are derived from the Latin word “limen” meaning “threshold” (Moore 
1991:20). The conceptual theory of “liminality” was first developed in 1909 by Arnold van 
Gennep (1960), who worked in the context of rituals and ritual performance in small-scale 
societies. Extending van Gennep’s work on the concept of liminality, Victor Turner (1967) 
expanded the concept for a wider application in “complex societies” (Moran 2013:342). 
Although the concept was originally grounded within the ethnographic context of Anthropology, 
it is now commonly applied within various disciplines, to denote any “object, social group or 
subject in a state of transition, no matter how temporary or permanent” (Fiol 2010:139). Boland 
(2013:231) notes that “Turner’s theories have enjoyed widespread popularity, especially amongst 
theorists who celebrate the freedom, creativity and potentially subversive or transformative 
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powers of liminality.” To some extent, this broader application of liminality is “justified by 
Turner’s own expansion of the concept in his later publications” (Fiol 2010:139).17  
In spite of this wide range of application,18 liminality continues to denote significant life 
transitions in which an individual or group passes through three distinctive phases. van Gennep 
(1960) described these phases as separation, liminality (sometimes also referred to as transition), 
and aggregation (also referred to as incorporation). The initial preliminal phase (accompanied 
by separation) is distinguished by a social “state” in which an individual or group is detached 
from a “relatively fixed or stable condition” within the formal structures of society (Turner 
1967:95). The middle phase of this transitional process, the liminal period (accompanied by 
transition), is marked by a state in which the liminar (the liminal subject) “is ambiguously 
separated from prior relationships and roles and has not yet acquired the attributes of a future 
state” (Noble & Walker 1997:31). This phase of liminality represents an ambiguous 
“interstructural situation,” in which the liminar is “betwixt and between” all sociocultural points 
of classification (Turner 1967:94-97). The final post-liminal phase (accompanied by 
incorporation) marks the passage through liminality as “consummated” and the individual our 
groups is “incorporated” back into the structure of society or culture, yet with a newly 
transformed status (Turner 1967:94).  
Drawing on the theoretical framework of liminality, the present study chronologically structures 
the distinctive phases of Bonhoeffer’s imprisonment in relation to the three distinct phases of 
liminality; liminality as separation (the interrogation period), liminality as transition (the 
                                                
17 Turner and Turner (as cited by Cody & Lowlor 2011:209) characterise this development as follows: “By 
identifying liminality, Van Gennep discovered a major innovative, transformative dimension of the social . . . for 
liminality cannot be confined to the processual form of the traditional rites of passage in which he first identified it. 
Nor can it be dismissed as an undesirable (and certainly uncomfortable) movement of variable duration between 
successive conservatively secure states of being, cognition, or status-role incumbency. Liminality is now seen to 
apply to all phases of decisive cultural change . . . Van Gennep made his discovery in relatively conservative 
societies but its implications are truly revolutionary.” 
18 The theoretical framework of liminality has now been evoked in a wide range of analysis, from political and 
spatial geography (Bhungalia 2010), organisational and institutional politics (Bar-Lev & Vitner 2011), marketing 
theory and liminal consumption as a negotiation of threshold selves (Cody & Lawlor 2011), symbolic consumption 
and the “extended self” (Noble & Walker 1997), transitional experiences of first year University students (Palmer, 
Kane, and Owens 2009), psychoanalysis (Moore 1991), liminal subjectivities and religious change (McCloud 2010), 
prison visiting rooms as liminal carceral spaces (Moran 2013), carceral topography in prison literature (Fludernik 
1999), to the role of liminality in spiritual formation (Rohr 1999:132; Frank & Meteyard 2007), just to name a few.  
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awaiting trial period), and liminality as anticipation of incorporation (holding out for the coup).19 
There is, I believe, some justification for this kind of division and structure, in relation to 
Bethge’s editorial division of the 1971 edition of LPP.20 The theoretical framework of liminality, 
however, helps to illuminate further reasoning for the distinctive divisions of LLP, as it marks 
particular transitions at the heart of Bonhoeffer’s prison experience in relation to previously 
acknowledged landmarks in the legal proceedings of his case. These transitions indicate a 
process, a becoming, and a transformation, as Bonhoeffer passes through distinctive phase of a 
liminal displacement, separation, transition, and anticipation. Further characteristics of 
liminality will be explored at the beginning of each chapter and as they are employed throughout 
the study. 
Research Methodology 
I have composed this text around three formative periods in Bonhoeffer’s life in prison and will 
trace the contours of his life and work as they develop chronologically. Here my method draws 
on Bethge’s (1961:22-88) narrative approach, which insists that his life and work cannot be 
separated and that his theology must be read alongside his biography. Methodologically this will 
involve a circular hermeneutical process. In the first place it will involve paying close attention 
to selected features of particular texts and passages of LPP that foreground the contours and 
discontinuities of Bonhoeffer’s prison experience and give expression to prominent themes, 
motifs, images, and impressions that emerge from this context. Secondly, it will involve an 
inductive interpretive process, moving from observations of the particular details and contours of 
the text, towards interpretive conclusions. What patterns or subterranean connections emerge 
                                                
19 My reasoning for interpreting the third phase of liminality as anticipation rather than incorporation will be 
described below.  
20 De Gruchy (2010:12) indicates that when Bethge was editing the 1971 edition of LPP he “restructured the volume 
into four chronological periods determined by the decisive points in Bonhoeffer’s legal investigation, interrogation, 
and trial.” These breaks between sections function as a way of bracketing off particular turning points and 
conveying a chronological development in Bonhoeffer’s experience and in the themes of his writing. While these 
breaks remain in many ways artificial, they help to indicate distinctive landmarks in the legal proceedings of his case 
and within his prison experience as a whole. As readers move from one section to the next, they encounter new 
themes and experiences. And while there is a great deal of continuity between the sections, there are also significant 
breaks and developments. 
 18 
from these details, giving meaning to the whole? Here the interpretive process seeks 
understanding of the formative nature of the prison experience and dialogue with other 
interpreters as well as primary literature in drawing conclusions about Bonhoeffer’s experience, 
before returning to the text to trace the ever-developing expression of this experience. This 
hermeneutical circle is clearly evident in Bonhoeffer’s own attempt to make sense of his prison 
experience and its formative nature. In fidelity to Bonhoeffer’s own meaning making process, 
however, it is important to make an analytical distinction between expressions that emerge from 
Bonhoeffer’s text and themes that are externally imposed upon the text or brought into dialogue 
with the text in the interpretive process. Therefore, I will seek to further outline the 
hermeneutical process, while also defining key terminology and concepts that help to externally 
frame Bonhoeffer’s experience and highlight its formative nature.  
It terms of a “responsible hermeneutic” (Vosloo 2013:132) it must be noted that interpretation of 
experience is always highly problematic in that “[w]e can never know completely another’s 
experience, even though we have many clues and make inferences all the time” (Bruner 1986:5). 
Therefore, it is important to define what I have referred to as Bonhoeffer’s “prison experience” 
and address certain interpretive limitations in examining “experience” and its relation to 
“expressions” of experience. Here it must be acknowledged that the text of LPP is already 
removed from the actual “raw” experience that Bonhoeffer faced in the historical reality of his 
cell (Ellis & Flaherty 1992:5). In putting his thoughts to paper, Bruner (1986:6) reminds us that 
there is a clear distinction between “reality” (what happened in Tegel prison), his “experience” 
(how that reality presented itself to his consciousness), and his “expressions” (how his 
experience is framed and articulated). This progressive flow of reality, experience, expression, is 
further suspended in an interconnected web of past memory, present experience, and future 
anticipation linked to “expectation and potentiality” (Bruner 1986:8). In this light we lack any 
means of accessing the reality or even the actual experience Bonhoeffer encountered in Tegel, 
regardless of the fact that he himself was not always “fully aware of or able to articulate, certain 
aspects of what has been experienced” (Bruner 1986:5). 
Dilthey’s (as cited by Bruner 1986:5) answer for overcoming these interpretive limitations is that 
we must “trancend the narrow spheres of experience by interpreting expressions.”  By this he 
meant to focus on “understanding, interpretation, and the methodology of hermeneutics” (Bruner 
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1986:5) in analysing expressions of experience in cultural texts, which in Bonhoeffer’s case are 
represented in the form of notes, letters, essays, narratives, fiction, drama, poetry, musical and 
artistic references, and theological texts. This broad array of cultural material is given to us in 
Bonhoeffer’s text (DBWE 8) and represents the encapsulations of his experience, or as Turner 
(1982:17) wrote, “the crystallized secretions of once living human experience.”  
Bruner (1986:6) insists that the relationship between experience and its expressions “is clearly 
dialogic and dialectical, for experience structures expression” and in turn “expressions also 
structure experience,” further enriching and clarifying experience by establishing limits, framing 
or reframing experience, and there by constructing it. In this sense Bonhoeffer’s “prison 
experience” is encapsulated in his expressions contained in LPP. These expressions are 
structured by his raw experience and yet they also reframe, construct, and give structure his 
experience. In seeking to interpret Bonhoeffer’s prison experience and its formative nature, I will 
be interpreting this hermeneutic circle, which takes place in the texts of LPP and gives 
expression to his experience. While this means that we can never fully capture the rich 
complexity of Bonhoeffer’s fragmentary prison experience, it does not limit us from interpreting 
his expressions, articulations, and representations of his experience. Like his experience, his 
expressions are correspondingly fragmented and incomplete, and thus interpretation of such will 
be at times fragmented. However, it is precisely within this liminal fragmentation that we can see 
a process of formation taking place. 
This leads us to a discussion of formation and how it will be interpreted throughout the study. 
The question of formation immediately points to a wide diversity of personal and social factors, 
in which space, time, history, memory, spiritual practices and ritual, human development, and 
experience, all play an important role, impacting the development of identity, selfhood, and 
relationality with others; concepts which Bonhoeffer demonstrated an interest in from the very 
first of his published writings.21  In the context of this study I make use of Bonhoeffer’s own 
                                                
21 See Sanctorum Communio (DBWE 1), Act and Being (DBWE 2), and Creation and Fall (DBWE 3), for primary 
material relating to Bonhoeffer’s interest in human selfhood. In addition, the following secondary studies are of 
importance for understanding the significance of the Christian community within the broader fabric of human 
personhood and relationality in Bonhoeffer’s theology. The most extensive study of Bonhoeffer’s conception and 
lived experience of selfhood is Lisa Dahill’s (2009), The Underside of Seflhood, upon which my study will rely 
heavily. See also, Green (1972), Marsh (1992), and Zimmermann & Gregor (2010). 
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conception of formation to trace the contours of his prison experience. Bonhoeffer developed this 
notion of formation in a manuscript titled “Ethics as Formation,” which later became part of his 
Ethics (DBWE 6). Green (2005:7) notes that in this manuscript, Bonhoeffer was attempting to 
spell out “christological [sic] impulses in direct contradiction to the ethos of the Third Reich.” 
Bonhoeffer wrote:  
Formation occurs only by being drawn into the form of Jesus Christ, by being conformed to the 
unique form of the one who became human, was crucified, and is risen. This does not happen as 
we strive “to become like Jesus,” as we customarily say, but as the form of Jesus Christ himself 
so works on us that it molds us, conforming our form to Christ’s own (Gal 4:9[4:19]). Christ 
remains the only one who forms…. To be transformed into his form is the meaning of the 
formation that the bible speaks about (DBWE 6:93-94).22 
For Bonhoeffer, formation is not a process that a person can accomplish through self-
determination or through the “struggle to be heroic or a demigod” (DBWE 6:94). Formation is 
not something that a person can “do” through pious spiritual discipline, or by attempting to 
“form the world with their ideas” or elaborate plans (DBWE 6:93). Rather, authentic formation 
takes place as a person is drawn ever deeper into the reality of their own life, “whose centre and 
meaning, like that of all reality, is Jesus Christ” (Dahill 2009:93). For Bonhoeffer, “Formation 
happens only from and toward this form of Jesus Christ” (DBWE 6:97). 
This is the conceptual context within which Bonhoeffer’s own formation must be set, and in 
which I will seek to trace the contours of his formative engagement with the prison context.23 He 
envisaged formation taking place in stages, as a person is drawn into Gleichgestaltung with Jesus 
through the three-dimensional experience of Jesus’ own being: as the Incarnate, the Crucified, 
and the Risen One. These three-dimensions of conformation with Christ, accentuate important 
                                                
22 Emphasis is Bonhoeffer’s. The following extended quote, further illustrates Bonhoeffer’s understanding of 
conformation. For Bonhoeffer: “Christ remains the only one who forms. Christian people do not form the world with 
their ideas. Rather, Christ forms human beings to a form the same as Christ’s own. However, just as the form of 
Christ is misperceived where he is understood essentially as the teacher of a pious and good life, so formation of 
human being is also wrongly understood where one sees it only as guidance for a pious and good life. Christ is the 
one who has become human, who was crucified, and who is risen, as confessed by the Christian faith” (DBWE 6:93-
94). 
23 In terms of a hermeneutical approach to the study of Bonhoeffer’s spiritual formation and conformation to Christ 
in prison, I draw on the work of Sandra Schneiders (as cited by Dahill 2009:6) who insists that “Christian spirituality 
as an academic discipline studies the lived experience of Christian faith, the subjective appropriation of faith and 
living discipleship in their individual and corporate actualization(s).” In its most broad sense, she continues, the 
study of spiritual formation, seeks to examine “the experiences of conscious involvement in the project of life-
integration through self-transcendence toward the horizon of ultimate value one perceives” (as cited by Dahill 
2009:7).   
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existential elements of Bonhoeffer’s prison experience and contextualise the way in which the 
self is moulded or transformed in participation in the life of Jesus Christ (DBWE 8:501, 4/187).24 
In prison Bonhoeffer’s conceptual or phraseological understanding of conformation undergoes 
an embodied transformation to the real.25  
Social Location 
In analysing the prison context as a formative view from below, it must first be acknowledged 
that every view is a view from somewhere. Thus the context of my own social location on 
reading and interpreting Bonhoeffer’s prison writings must be acknowledged before outlining the 
methodological concerns of this study. It is now widely accepted that everyone’s understanding 
and therefore everyone’s discourse, reflects a limited perspective, depending, in part, on location 
and context. The myth and illusion of anonymous, objective, authoritative, and disinterested 
interpretations of written texts, and theological and academic ones in particular, have now been 
dispelled. It is not only inevitable, but also invaluable that interpreters bring something to their 
interpretation of written texts. Vosloo (2013:119) notes, in regard to Bonhoeffer studies, that 
every:  
reading of Bonhoeffer differs vastly depending on where a person is situated intellectually, 
culturally, economically, geographically and so on. This obvious but often neglected 
insight reminds us that the interpretation of Bonhoeffer cannot sidestep some important 
hermeneutical questions such as: “Who are we who interpret Bonhoeffer?” “Where are we 
situated?”  
                                                
24 While extensive research has probed the theological point of Bonhoeffer’s conception of selfhood and human 
sociality, as well as Bonhoeffer’s spirituality, little to my knowledge, has been done to trace his spiritual formation 
within the social location of imprisonment. The primary exception is Lisa E. Dahill’s (2009) study, which explores 
Bonhoeffer’s spiritual formation. Dahill’s study of Bonhoeffer’s spiritual formation in prison, however, focuses 
primarily on the popular texts of the third and fourth periods of his imprisonment. Dahill’s work will thus function 
as an important starting point for my own research; however, I hope to take her findings further in understanding the 
specific social location of imprisonment, in the life of Bonhoeffer. Other important studies of Bonhoeffer’s 
spirituality that inform my work are: Kelly and Nelson (2003); Kelly (1999); Nelson (1980); and “Northcott (2009). 
25 For Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the “turning from the phraseological to the real,” see DBWE 8:358, 3/135. 
 22 
The acknowledgement of a situated reading is an important hermeneutical issue and plays an 
important part in a responsible hermeneutic. It is therefore important to disclose my particular 
historical development and social location, highlighting particular limitations, interests, and 
inevitable blind spots that I bring to my reading of Bonhoeffer. As a white, middle class, 
European educated, American, who is a member of a United Congregational/Presbyterian 
congregation (Rondebosch United Church in Cape Town, South Africa), a theology student, and 
a Youth Pastor engaged in both congregational ministry, as well as prison ministry, my approach 
to the admittedly vast subject matter of reading Bonhoeffer and his LPP is inevitably 
perspectival and interested. Though every aspect of social location influences the reading of a 
text, I will call to attention two important areas that effect this text and are instructive regarding 
methodological concerns. In turn my own social location draws attention to what Vosloo has 
described as a responsible hermeneutic and as such his suggestions will be interwoven in the 
following discussion. 
The first is that I read Bonhoeffer in the 21st-century, as an English-speaking American. I am, 
therefore, once or even twice removed from the linguistic and cultural world in which 
Bonhoeffer lived and thought. Lacking a working knowledge of the German language, I am 
privileged to work with the new English translation of the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Werke (DBW). I 
still lack access, however, to a vast quantity of monographs, journal articles, conference papers, 
and books, which have been written and/or published over the past decades in the German 
language. I also lack access to the original German text of Bonhoeffer’s letters and papers, a 
detail most acute in relation to interpreting and understanding Bonhoeffer poetry. In addition, my 
access to Bonhoeffer’s social location within the cultural milieu of the educated elite bourgeoisie 
of Germany and the Protestant Bildungsbürger during the period of World War II is limited and 
relies entirely on historical material as a guide. Acknowledging these limitations, I will do my 
best to make use of primary and secondary material in understanding important cultural and 
linguistic factors that bear significance for this study. 
This social location, however, draws attention, as Vosloo (2013:133) indicates, “to the 
vulnerability entailed in the interpretive process because of the discontinuity between Bonhoeffer 
and us, between his time and ours.”  As such, it require that we “take seriously the strangeness of 
the past” and the fragility of historical memory (Vosloo 2013:133-135). This point highlights the 
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fallacy of historical objectivity and the importance of approaching the past with “the necessary 
combination of suspicion and trust” (Vosloo 2013:135). Examining Bonhoeffer’s prison 
experience, I seek to do just that by offer a fresh portrait of the continuity and discontinuity of 
his life and work. The reader of this thesis will discover a combined sense of familiarity with 
specific texts (trust), as well as a surprisingly fresh perspective of this period of Bonhoeffer’s life 
and work (suspicion).   
The second significant factor relating to my own social location is that I read Bonhoeffer as a 
spiritual care-worker engaged in the work of prison ministry at Pollsmoor Prison (Correctional 
Facility) in Cape Town, South Africa. I have been part of a team offering spiritual care and 
rehabilitation services to male awaiting-trial juveniles for the past three years. In addition, I have 
engaged in both the communal practice and the academic study of contextual bible study with 
awaiting trail juveniles. In this work I have become acutely aware of the incredibly disorienting 
and often traumatic transitions that young men face upon entering the prison for the first or even 
second or third time. This sense of disorientation is particularly pronounced during the awaiting 
trial period. Anticipating their sentence or release functionally suspends these young men in an 
in-between state of liminality, caught between despair and hope, guilt and liberation. Yet I have 
also observed the power of reframing this liminality as a spiritual displacement and an 
opportunity for formative and transformative experiences. In this regard I have experienced the 
transformative power of bible study, the spiritual practice of prayer and meditation, and the role 
of music26 in fostering a formative resiliency in the face of profound discomfort and personal 
challenges. My study of Bonhoeffer’s prison experience greatly informed this work and I hope to 
in reverse bring something of this work to bear on my interpretation of Bonhoeffer. My interest 
in approaching LPP from the angle of Bonhoeffer’s lived experience of institutional confinement 
is obviously influenced by my own vocational interests and I intend, as consciously as possible, 
to allow my experience of working with awaiting trial prisoners to form part of my own 
                                                
26 Taking a note from Bonhoeffer’s own biography, we made use of the Afro-Spirituals in our sessions; playing 
guitar and singing song of lament and liberating hope.  
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responsible hermeneutic in interpreting Bonhoeffer prison experience and formation within the 
space of the prison.27  
As part of my methodology, I intend, as consciously as possibly, to allow my own experience of 
working with awaiting trial prisoners, to form part of my own responsible hermeneutic in 
interpreting Bonhoeffer’s prison experience and formation within the space of the prison; to be 
part of “re-awakening the text’s meaning” and bringing areas of Bonhoeffer’s experience into 
sharper focus through the historically and culturally situated lens of my own perception and 
experience, as well as observations of the social and experiential matrix of the prison 
environment.  
This hermeneutical approach is part of the creative interpretation of Bonhoeffer’s words and 
texts, in which I, as the interpreter will play an active role in exploration of the phenomena. 
Gardiner (1999:63) highlights that for the active interpreter, “[t]he goal is not objective 
explanation or neutral description, but rather a sympathetic engagement with the author of a text, 
utterance or action and the wider socio-cultural context within which these phenomena occur.” 
While my sympathetic engagement with “Bonhoeffer the prisoner” will inevitably offer a limited 
perspective of Bonhoeffer and of his prison writing, a complete explication of any of his texts is 
ultimately impossible and all interpretations of his texts, however critically focused and 
potentially rigorous, are also necessarily partial, selectively highlighting or emphasising certain 
features of his text or legacy which may be important to one interpreter or stream of 
interpretation, while down playing or completely silencing other features.  
Sources 
The above discussion brings into focus the task of selecting relevant source material and texts for 
examining Bonhoeffer’s prison experience. Throughout the course of this study I will make use 
                                                
27 For some this kind of interpretation poses a hermeneutical inaccuracy. Gadamer (1996:388), however, has 
indicated that in reading a text: “One intends to understand the text itself. But this means that the interpreter’s own 
thoughts too have gone into re-awakening the text’s meaning. In this the interpreter’s own horizon is decisive, yet 
not as a personal standpoint that he maintains or enforces, but more as an opinion and a possibility that one brings 
into play and puts at risk, and that helps one truly to make one’s own what the text says.” 
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of the new critical edition of the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works in English (hereafter referred to as 
DBWE) to analyse and interpret Bonhoeffer’s experience and theological reflections from prison. 
Amongst the 16 volumes of this new edition, the primary focus will remain on the text of LPP 
(DBWE 8). Offering a close reading of this primary text will remain the focus of this study.  
Other primary texts dealing with Bonhoeffer’s experience during the same time period will be 
consulted to provide further layers of texture as well as important background information 
regarding this time period. Of special note are Conspiracy and Imprisonment: 1940-1945 
(DBWE 16), Fiction from Tegel Prison (DBWE 7), as well as Love Letters from Cell 92 (1944), 
not included in the DBWE. Other volumes of the DBWE, not related directly to Bonhoeffer’s 
prison experience, will be consulted where necessary to trace out the development of earlier lines 
of thinking or to show the impact of his experience of prison upon the development of his “new 
theology” (de Gruchy 2010:20). The primary area of focus, however, will remain on 
Bonhoeffer’s experience of prison and his reflections, thinking, and ministry to others as 
expressed in LPP.  
Finally, I will consult various secondary sources for further biographical and historical material 
regarding Bonhoeffer’s time in prison. In terms of biographies, I will primarily use Bethge’s 
(2000) monumental biography, as well as Ferdinand Schlingensiepen’s (2010) more recent 
biography. I will also draw upon de Gruchy’s (2005) illuminating biography of Bethge. Other 
historical materials regarding the wider context of Bonhoeffer’s time in Tegel will include the 
Editor’s Introduction to the English Edition (de Gruchy’s 2010:1-34), the Editor’s Afterword to 
the German Edition (Gremmels 2010:565-596), as well as excerpts from I Knew Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer (Zimmerman & Smith 1964). Other secondary sources such as articles and books will 
be consulted as important interpretive partners for understanding Bonhoeffer’s spiritual and 
theological development in prison.  
Delimitations of Study 
Following the above discussion of important sources it is also necessary to describe the 
limitations and restrictions of this study. Although a close reading of Fiction from Tegel Prison 
(DBWE 7), Conspiracy and Imprisonment: 1940-1945 (DBWE 16), and Love Letters from Cell 
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92: Dietrich Bonhoeffer-Maria von Wedemeyer, 1943-1945 (Bonhoeffer et al. 1994) would add 
incomparable value to a comprehensive understanding of Bonhoeffer’s life in prison, the scope 
of the present research project demands obvious limitations, and will, therefore, not focus on 
these rich and important documents. Limiting the material also takes seriously the contribution 
that the recent publication of DBWE 8 makes to our understanding of the “historical Bonhoeffer” 
and his time spent a Tegel. Needless to say, at 750 pages, DBWE 8 demands detailed and careful 
analysis, thus requiring the exclusion of other material except where this is essential to the task at 
hand. Texts from these three volumes that closely relate to Bonhoeffer’s prison experience will 
therefore only be brought into dialogue where they either critically challenge or open up new 
potential ways of reading and interpreting it. 
Delimination of material within DBWE 8 is also necessary. For the purposes of the present study 
I will focus primarily on the first three periods of Bonhoeffer’s life in prison, from April 1943 
through July 18, 1944. My rational for doing so is threefold. Firstly, this period has been the 
most widely neglected in Bonhoeffer studies, particular in regard to the interrogation and 
awaiting trial periods, and thus requires detailed attention. Secondly, it is clear that with the 
failure of the coup attempt on July 20, 1944, Bonhoeffer realised that his fate was sealed and that 
his imprisonment would most certainly end in death. This realisation in many ways thrust 
Bonhoeffer (if only in his own knowledge and not yet in legal status) into a newly distinctive 
social status within prison – the death row prisoner. This transition clearly gave Bonhoeffer 
renewed vigour for his theological work, freeing him from the disorienting space of liminality 
and allowing him to construct a new vision of the Christian life and the church from the material 
of liminal separation, transition, and anticipation. The third and final reason for not including the 
period after the failure of the coup in this study, is that the period following the coup (in obvious 
connection with the theological material from April 30, 1944, onward), has received the most 
attention from Bonhoeffer scholars over the years, with volumes and volumes of journal articles, 
book chapters, and entire works devoted to understand the fragmentary pieces of his “new 
theology.” This section would require an entire thesis of its own and would likely stretch the 
bounds of this present work. My intention, however, is that the present study might lead to 
further research in this regard, offering a new lens for interpreting Bonhoeffer’s prison theology 
within the context of his prison experience. 
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In addition to limiting the broader scope of material, I will also limit material within the first 
three section of LPP (DBWE 8) based on its relevance in relation to Bonhoeffer’s prison 
experience. I will confine my attention to those sections, ideas, and themes that impinge most 
directly upon our theme and that have received stark attention, like Bonhoeffer’s fragmentary 
notes on the “sense of time” (DBWE 8:70-74, 1/11 & 1/12), his essay “What does it mean to tell 
the truth?” (DBWE 16:601-608, 2/19), texts relating to his temporal, ethical, and spatial 
engagement with the prison space, as well as his prison reports (DBWE 8:205-206, 2/80; DBWE 
8:343-347, 2/131). I will also focus on texts which specifically foreground the prison experience, 
texts which indicate transitions and turning points in his experience, texts which characterise his 
liminal pastor role within the prison, as well as texts that express what he came to view as the 
fruitfulness of suffering and imprisonment. Finally, I will focus on texts which draw attention to 
Bonhoeffer’s anticipation of resolve within liminality; this will include pertinent theological 
texts, poetic texts, and texts relating to Bonhoeffer’s use of musical metaphors. In short, I will 
focus this study on texts that highlight the social location of the prison context and express the 
formative nature of his liminal passage through separation, transition, and anticipation.   
As a way of introducing the study and guiding the reader through Bonhoeffer’s fragmentary 
prison experience, I want to point out five central motifs to pay attention to as we trace the 
contours of his experience in the first three sections of LPP. Subsequent to a rigorous process of 
examination, these motifs repeatedly emerged as core elements of Bonhoeffer’s formative 
encounter with liminality: discipline, sociality, suffering, death and freedom, and 
wholeheartedness. I do not intend to limit or confine my analysis to these motifs, but rather to 
offer them as a way of making the finer details of Bonhoeffer’s journey of formation more 
accessible. Bonhoeffer’s formational experience in prison interweaves with these five motifs, 
shaping the trajectories of his encounter with the below and with the life of Jesus Christ. They 
are deeply rooted in his theology and life. As part of his personal formation and what he brings 
to his experience of prison, they undergo intensification in prison, in which they are reformed 
and rethought in light of his experience of liminality. Through the process of intensification they 
become more grounded in reality and the view from below. In Bonhoeffer’s own words, the 
trajectories of these motifs undergo a “turning from the phraseological to real” (DBWE 8:358, 
3/135). Although this popular phrase of Bonhoeffer’s is usually understood in the context of his 
own emphasis, on his “first impressions abroad, and under the first conscious influence of Papa’s 
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personality” (DBWE 8:358, 3/135), the fact that his reflections come to the fore during his 
imprisonment, should highlight the reality of a final turning toward the real. As this study 
progresses through the phases of Bonhoeffer’s life in prison, close attention will be paid to the 
development and transformation of these motifs in relation to Bonhoeffer’s formational 
encounter with the prison context.   
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Chapter 2: Liminality as Separation 
Discipline 
If you set out to seek freedom, then you must learn above all things 
discipline of your soul and your senses, lest your desires 
and then your limbs perchance should lead you now hither, now yon. 
Chaste be your spirit and body, subject to yourself completely, 
in obedience seeking the goal that is set for your spirit. 
Only through discipline does one learn the secret of freedom.28 
 
I am now learning daily how good my life with you has always been, and besides, I now have to 
practice myself what I have told others in my sermons and books.29 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will offer a close reading of the interrogation period, which encapsulates the 
letters and papers written between April 11 and July 30, 1943, and details Bonhoeffer’s initial 
response to imprisonment and interrogation. It is clear from this material that his initial exposure 
to the carceral space is marked by a profound sense of separation. This sense of separation is 
characterised by a leaving behind of old structures of identity and order, functionally plunging 
him into an utterly alien and disorienting experience, filled with admission procedures, 
interrogations, insults, isolation, and a loss of autonomy. Having lived and written almost 
exclusively from a privileged social location, from the position of those who are “above,” 
Bonhoeffer now faced a temporal, ethical, and spatial disjunction brought on by forced 
submission; the “below” of the prison cell. During this period he is forced “to come to terms and 
put up with a completely new situation” (DBWE 8:56, 1/2); a situation in which he is dislodged 
from his previous status-role and no longer in control of his own time, space, or fate. In this 
space he is forced to be disciplined and practice what he has in the past taught others from a 
position of authority, from “above.” The prisoner’s own portrayal of separation, can, I believe, 
be characterised as the initial stage of liminality (separation), in which the liminar wrestles with 
the dissolution or suspension of familiar cultural and social structures of identity and order, and 
experiences an inversion of previously held beliefs, values, and meaning.  
                                                
28 First stanza of Bonhoeffer’s poem ‘Stations on the Way to Freedom’ (DBWE 8:512, 4/191). 
29 Letter to Karl and Paul Bonhoeffer, May 4, 1943 (DBWE 8:66, 1/9). 
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Aiming to distil the subterraneous themes of his prison experience, I will examine three 
distinctive arenas of Bonhoeffer’s transition into prison life: temporality, telling the truth, and 
the transformation of space. Each of these sections will seek to highlight his initial exposure to 
and awareness of liminality within the prison environment. By foreground Bonhoeffer’s 
experience of separation I intend to show his early response to the disorientation of 
imprisonment and the forms that his response takes. Examining how the prison space is a place 
of formation for Bonhoeffer provides the underlying guide in the following analysis. Its answer 
will involve firstly a detailed look at Bonhoeffer’s own writings during this period. What does he 
communicate about his initial experience of imprisonment and interrogation? How does he 
respond to this experience and what resources does he use to both conceal and transform his 
experience of liminality? The approach I will take, which I contend is intrinsic to Bonhoeffer’s 
own process, will then draw together the themes of these particular responses and attempt to 
distil the subterraneous threads of the formative and transformative possibilities of being thrust 
into the “below.” 
I will look closely at two early essays as well as various thematic threads of his official letters; 
each in turn highlighting significant aspects of his experience of separation, his response, and the 
production of emerging new possibilities. Four guiding motifs permeate these writings and bear a 
particular relation to his experience of separation: time, life, death, and sociality. The last of 
these, sociality, remains hidden in language of separation, yet comes to the fore in combination 
with the other motifs. These reoccurring motifs (which are prevalent in Bonhoeffer’s earlier 
writings) undergo intensification due to the “below” of the prison cell, ultimately binding him to 
the life of Jesus Christ in and amidst a repetitively disorienting experience of liminality. In 
countering the temporal, ethical, and spatial disjunction of forced submission Bonhoeffer sought 
to instil a strict inner discipline, transforming the prison cell into a monastic enclosure, and 
thereby submitting to life in the face of death, while also consciously constructing a place of 
resistance to the dehumanizing forces of the prison system.  
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Separation and Temporality 
I will begin my analysis of Bonhoeffer’s experience of liminality by offering a close reading of a 
set of fragmentary comments and notes pertaining to the theme of temporality. This is a logical 
starting point in as much as it sets the framework for understanding his prison experience as a 
liminal one. Although Bonhoeffer never used the terms liminal, liminal space, or liminality, the 
phraseology of his notes on the experience of time in a prison cell, point to the transitional 
phenomena that scholars like Moore (1991), Fludernik (1999), and Moran (2011) describe as an 
experience of liminality. Following a brief introduction to Bonhoeffer’s notes on temporality in 
relation to the theoretical framework of liminality, I will discuss what he experiences as a certain 
intensification of temporality, brought on by disorientation in his prison cell. Building upon this, 
I will argue that, for Bonhoeffer, time bore a particular relationship to personhood and death, 
ultimately drawing God’s relation to his life and death into sharper focus.  
While there is little disagreement among Bonhoeffer scholars regarding the disorientation 
Bonhoeffer experienced during the interrogation period, the substance of this disorientation 
remains largely unexamined in relation to his notion of temporality. The one exception is 
Vosloo’s (2008) insightful article exploring Bonhoeffer’s notion of temporality and the fully 
human life. Vosloo’s (2008) analysis of the prison period, however, is quite brief and simply 
states that he experienced an intensification of time. While I will draw on Vosloo’s article in 
regard to Bonhoeffer’s notion of temporality, I hope to take his argument further in exploring the 
themes of sociality and death that arise within the prison cell. In what follows, I intend to lay the 
groundwork for understanding his fragmentary notes on time within the context of liminality. 
This is vitally important for understanding Bonhoeffer’s prison experience as a whole, as well as 
the personally and theologically formative possibilities that emerge from this context.  
It is clear that upon returning from the War Court interrogation room,30 Bonhoeffer found little 
solace in the solitude of his cell. Concrete and steel marked the new boundary and limit of his 
existence and represented both a material and a symbolic disjunction from his familiar world. 
                                                
30 DBWE 8:560 indicates that Dohnanyi was interrogated for the first time on April 12, just 8 days after he was 
arrested along with his wife Christine and brother-in-law Dietrich. It is therefore likely that Bonhoeffer was also 
interrogated for the first time on April 12.  
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The coerced alteration of his life and world initially gave way to a crisis of spatial and temporal 
meaning, the earliest stages of which he recorded on the back of a few scrap pieces of paper in 
May 1943 (DBWE 8:70-74, 1/11 & 1/12).31 These fragmentary notes correspond to a small study 
Bonhoeffer had told his parents (on May 15, 1943) he was working on, called a “sense of time” 
(DBWE 8:79, 1/17). Although this study is lost, a few fragments of his thinking remain in his 
notes (DBWE 8:70, 1/11). These indicate that while confined within his cell twenty-three-and-
half hours a day, he experienced an overwhelming and tormenting sense that his life and past 
were no longer within his grasp and that all possible futures were growing dark.  
The salient themes of these notes relate to separation, memory, the past, and the emptiness of 
time. These themes are undoubtedly intensified by the admission procedures (material separation 
and humiliation), his interrogations (in which the past was questioned, distorted, misinterpreted, 
and alternatively presented by Bonhoeffer himself), and through the material reminder of 
subjugation and the impermanence of his temporal existence. These carceral factors must have 
triggered a certain intensification of time for Bonhoeffer and brought about a period of 
disorientation.  
The particular nature of this disorientation, however, must be understood within the context of 
the prison procedures he is likely to have undergone. The admission procedures32 of institutional 
prison function as a process of “mortification” and “structured humiliation” of an inmate’s sense 
of self; striping the prisoner of personal belongings and identity, replacing them with institutional 
belongings and identity (Casella 2007:68). This process functions as a “form of initiation into the 
institutional world,” in which a separation from personal property and a “defacement of self-
identity” takes place (Casella 2007:68). Goffman (as cited by Casella 2007:68) characterises this 
initiation as a practice of “leaving off and taking on.” Like other initiation rites, the first stage is 
a separation from one’s former world, transitioning the initiate into an unfamiliar time and space 
often termed liminality or liminal space.  
                                                
31 Footnote [1] of the ‘Notes 1, May 1943’ (DBWE 8:70, 1/11) indicates that these notes were written on the back of 
a piece of paper, on which Karl Bonhoeffer had “listed the contents of a package that had been dropped off for 
Dietrich.” 
32 The key elements of which are present in Bonhoeffer’s own description, as cited in the introduction. 
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Bonhoeffer’s use of the word separation during this period, points to the effectiveness of this 
approach to carceral production. While Bonhoeffer shows an incredible resilience in the face of 
this kind of institutional initiation, evidence from his notes signify that he experienced it as 
particularly disorienting.33 As a pre-trial prisoner, however, it is important to note that he was not 
fully initiated into the institutional identity of Tegel, but was consigned to a temporary holding 
space in-between his former status and his new life as a prisoner.34 Remaining a pre-trial prisoner 
throughout his time at Tegel functionally suspended him in time and space between two possible 
worlds. He was imprisoned and under investigation, but not yet convicted of transgressing the 
law or subverting the state. This transient social and legal status heightened his experience of 
liminality, intensifying his sense of “Separation – from what is past and what is to come” 
(DBWE 8:73, 1/12).35 Moreover, this state of betweenness was intensified by continual 
postponements of his trial, a feeling that legal matters were not being handled properly, and six 
months of waiting before he received the warrant for his arrest (DBWE 8:434, 2/131). These 
factors heightened his sense of separation, dominating his reality and threatening to become a 
permanent state of liminality from which he could not emerge.  
Faced with the loss of his social status and vocation, his network of relationships, and a growing 
awareness of his own mortality, Bonhoeffer’s is detached from former structures as he 
transitioned into the ambiguity of his prison cell. The physical and psychological effects of this 
transition submerged Bonhoeffer in a foreign spatial and temporal reality, which he described as 
a “[s]eparation from people, from work, from the past, from the future, from honor, from God” 
(DBWE 8:70, 1/11). Here he refers to the “experience of time” as an “experience of separation,” 
most pronounced in his separation from Maria and his friend Bethge (DBWE 8:72, 1/11). For 
Bonhoeffer, time is embedded within relational and social meaning structures. As his sense of 
                                                
33 Bethge (2000:51) recounts an apocryphal story from Bonhoeffer’s time at Tübingen University, which indicates 
“something about how hard his contemporaries found it to imagine him subjecting himself to someone else’s will,” 
particularly in cases of ritual humiliation. Bethge (2000:51) writes, on the second day of “his two week service in 
the Ulm Rifles Troop as a member of the so-called Black Reichswehr,” Bonhoeffer “was ordered to clean out the 
barracks with a toothbrush as punishment for throwing his washwater out the window; instead, however, he 
immediately returned to Tübingen.” Although Bethge maintains the story is apocryphal, it shows something of how 
people perceived Bonhoeffer in relation to forced submission, humiliation, and ritual initiation. 
34 Moran (2011:331), as we will see in a later section of this study, contest Goffman’s theory of a linear and total 
“leaving off and taking on” of institutional identity, for as he claims, the prison boundary is much more permeably 
than Goffamn proposes in his theory of a “total institution.” 
35 Emphasis is Bonhoeffer’s. 
 34 
time broke free from the anchor of these relationships and his place within them, he began to 
experience the emptiness of time as a perpetual separation from his own life.  
The initial stage of liminality (separation) threatens a perpetual state of limbo, if integration back 
into society is restricted (Moore 1991:20). For Bonhoeffer this threat was particularly real. Yet, 
from this early stage, he could see that the prison cell held the potential for transformative new 
ways of viewing the world. Although he wrestled with the impact of his new spatial and 
temporal reality, he also realised that “boundary situations” (DBWE 8:180, 2/73) such as this, 
“may be good and necessary in order to learn to understand human life better” (DBWE 8:79, 
1/17). Within his prison cell he was learning “how much joy and sorrow the human heart is able 
and forced to contain at the same time” (DBWE 8:63, 1/6), and he believed that this indeed 
would have an outcome. Though he was unsure what it would be at this early stage.  
These fragments from Bonhoeffer’s notes on time illustrate the relational character of time and 
the need to reframe separation as a place of insight and learning, in order to weather the liminal 
space between joy and sorrow, presence and separation. One senses that he is trying to find a 
way through the sorrow and separation toward a newly formed relationality with others.  
Although he sought the fruitfulness of this experience, it is clear that temporal ambiguity brought 
on a certain crisis of meaning. 
Serving Time 
Unfolding the content of this crisis let me first offer a brief and somewhat crude sketch of 
Bonhoeffer’s notion of temporality as it relates to his experience of imprisonment.36 Vosloo 
(2008:341) indicates that from Sactorum Communio (DBWE 1) onward, Bonhoeffer continually 
sought to ground his theology in a “concrete and timeful understanding of personhood and 
community.” Bonhoeffer argued throughout his Ethics (DBWE 6) against a timeless or abstract 
ethic that detaches the truth or the ethical from “particular persons, definite times and concrete 
                                                
36 Here I rely heavily on Vosloo, R. 2008. The Feeling of Time: Bonhoeffer on Temporality and the Fully Human 
Life. Scriptura, 99:337-349.  
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places and relations” (Vosloo 2008:346).37 His understanding of temporality and of the task of 
“the moment” was thus shaped by an endeavour to live responsibly as a person of the present, in 
the midst of time, and in response to the concrete other and “the will of God” through “kairotic 
engagement with reality” (Vosloo 2008:341-346).  
To “Serve the Time” (Dienen der Zeit)38 – the theme of one of Bonhoeffer’s sermons in 
Barcelona – meant to serve God’s time, by discerning one’s course of action as a people of the 
present, who derive their power from having both feet firmly on the ground, much like the giant 
Antaeus (DBWE 10:527). This understanding of “serving time” had ultimately been part of 
Bonhoeffer’s decision to engage in political resistance. In the early period of his imprisonment, 
however, this conception of time seems to be disconnected from fixed points of orientation.39 
Stripped of personal belongings, vocation, and identity, detached from community, and separated 
from home and God, Bonhoeffer experiences time without its familiar anchors, intensifying the 
theme of ‘After Ten Years,’ “Who Stands Firm?” (DBWE 8:38, prologue).  
In connection with Bonhoeffer’s own metaphor, the transitional phenomena of liminal space can 
be understood as an experience of goundlessness, involving certain impressions of discontinuity, 
frustrations and anger, and the destabilisation of previously held ethical constructs and personal 
coping mechanisms. No longer grounded in action and communion, time becomes survival, 
intensifying the “horrific nature of time” in its continual movement “toward death” (Vosloo 
2008:342).40 Whereas his earlier conceptions of “serving time” had been forged in action and 
resistance, he was now forced into a position of groundless submission to time, from which he 
could not escape: incarcerated time.  
One of Bonhoeffer’s initial responses to this intensification of time was to regard it as 
“characterizing pretrial detention” (DBWE 8:79-80, 1/17). For one thing, it was represented 
                                                
37 He makes a similar argument in his essay on “telling the truth,” written from his prison cell in Tegel (DBWE 
16:601-608, 2/19). This essay will be the focus of the next major section of Chapter 2. 
38 In this sermon, Bonhoeffer had preached that “(T)he present is sacred, it stands under God’s eyes, it is 
consecrated, it is permeated by eternal light… Whoever flees the present is fleeing God’s hour; whoever flees time 
is fleeing God. Serve time!” (DBWE 10:528-529). 
39 In the confines of his prison cell, where he had nothing but endless and empty time, he began to question, as he 
wrote in his first letter to Bethge, whether or not it was “really for the cause of Christ” that he was now suffering and 
for who’s sake he was now inflicting distress on his family and friends (DBWE 8:180, 2/73). This question, which 
Bonhoeffer would later dismiss as a temptation, plagued his conscious in the early phase of his imprisonment. Was 
he really a prisoner for Christ’s sake or simply a prisoner?  
40 Here Vosloo (2008:342) is commenting on Bonhoeffer’s August 26, 1928, sermon in Barcelona, on 1 John 2:17. 
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materially in the work of his predecessor, who had scribbled above the cell door: “In one 
hundred years everything will be over” (DBWE 8:79-80, 1/17). While Bonhoeffer did not share 
his predecessor’s particular interpretation of time, he understood the need to find a means of 
coping with the emptiness of time (DBWE 8:80, 1/17).  
Part of his coping strategy was to explore the theme of time through writing, for “[o]ne writes 
more fluently from direct experience and feels liberated” (DBWE 8:98, 1/25). In this way he 
sought to find peace and stability by engaging groundlessness head on. As a navigation tool, his 
notes indicate a certain loss of fixed points of orientation that threatened to become a dangerous 
space and time without end. What he appears to fear most was not the prison cell itself, but rather 
a state of perpetual “between-ness,” which lacked any real transformation or resolution, as it had 
for his predecessor. Bonhoeffer called this experience the “Emptiness of time” (DBWE 8:73, 
1/11).41 This emptiness reflects both a spatial and a temporal disjunction of time that threatened 
to envelop him: “no possession (that outlasts time, no task…,” no life giving action or telos, just 
empty time. (DBWE 8:72, 1/11).42 He feared that this emptiness would result in “[d]ifferent 
mental patterns of behavior toward the past… forgetting… caesura experiences43 […] Self 
deception, idealizing the past […] fading memories, self-pity, passing time – killing time…” 
(DBWE 8:72, 1/11). Experiencing the fragility of memory44 and the difficulty of reclaiming 
one’s past, Bonhoeffer feared that this emptiness was leading to an unhealthy “discontent – 
tension, impatience, yearning, and boredom,” which he considered an “expression of despair” 
(DBWE 8:73, 1/11). 
In a later note, presumably from 1944, Bonhoeffer refers to the emptiness of time as the “horror 
vacui [the abhorrence of the void]” (NL, A 86; DBWE 8:72, 1/11, fn. 13).45 The image here 
evoked of the empty void threatening to consume everything, shares a thematic likeness with 
                                                
41 Emphasis is Bonhoeffer’s. 
42 Emphasis is Bonhoeffer’s. 
43 “Caesura experiences” indicate an interruption or break in one’s life. Although Bonhoeffer will later argue against 
any such experience of caesura taking place, it appears that his early experience of prison had at least focused his 
attention on the possibility of such an interruption or break taking place.  
44 On June 4, 1943, Bonhoeffer requested that his parents send him “something good on the forms and functions of 
memory? I am interested in it in this connection” (DBWE 8:98, 1/25). He was referring to memory in relation to a 
“sense of time.” 
45 Bonhoeffer’s poem ‘The Past’ explicitly highlights this experience of the void: “Frenzied defiance and rage beset 
me, I sling wild, useless questions into the void. Why, why, why? I keep asking” (DBWE 8:420, 3/158).  
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what Eliade (as cited by Moore 1991:15) terms an experience of “profane space.”46 Profane 
space, is space and time with: 
“no fixed point or center from which one can gain orientation. There is no contact with the really 
real, with the power that alone can renew life and through which regeneration can occur. Profane 
space is a formless expanse, homogeneous in its fundamental unreality. It is a space essentially 
devoid of creativity… it is in fact the locus of the deterioration of the cosmos as ordinary temporal 
duration, profane time, runs its course” (Moore 1991:13).  
Within his prison cell Bonhoeffer’s language points toward the conceptualisation of time as a 
profane and destructive force: “the ravages of time – the gnawing of time,” in which time 
became “as torment, as enemy” (DBWE 8:73, 1/11). In this Bonhoeffer sensed a deterioration of 
the cosmos, which he described in a letter to his parents on May 15, 1943:  
The peace and serenity by which one had been carried are suddenly shaken without any apparent 
physical or psychological reason, and the heart becomes, as Jeremiah very aptly put it, an obstinate 
and anxious thing that one is unable to fathom. One experiences this as an attack from the outside, 
as evil powers that seek to rob one of what is most essential” (DBWE 8:79, 1/17).  
The temporal deterioration brought on by the liminality of profane space, appears to have 
presented Bonhoeffer with the true meaning of temptation [Anfechtung] (DBWE 8:79, 1/17) and 
a particular sadness of heart that he would later describe to Bethge, as tristitia and acedia: the 
“burdensome companions of his life” (Gremmels 2010:567; DBWE 8:180, 2/73). This existential 
articulation of despair reveals a certain disconsolate unease with “the intrusion of nothingness 
into a life aware of its impermanence and without any sure anchor” (Millies 2011:130).  
Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer seems to have recognized the potential threshold contained within this 
experience. Although human beings are inextricably caught within time that cannot be undone, 
freedom, even in prison can be found in love and in the “healing [of] time” (DBWE 8:72-73, 
1/11). Here Bonhoeffer foresaw a future healing of time, but knew that this only comes with the 
                                                
46 Liminality is often regarded as a profane space, as it represents marginality, difference, and possible 
contamination of sacred or even ordinary time and space. Prison particularly falls within societal conceptions of 
contamination and the profane. Evidence suggests that Bonhoeffer’s parents struggled to change their own 
conceptions of imprisonment as a social and cultural space of the profane. On April 28, 1943, Paula Bonhoeffer 
wrote to Bonhoeffer: “We are trying to come to terms with our old concepts of an arrest being a shameful thing. 
They only make life unnecessarily difficult, for one must understand that in these difficult times there is so much 
suspicion involved in the way people are judged, and how difficult it must be to remain unaffected by that” (DBWE 
8:64, 1/7). Emphasis is mine. 
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“scarring over” (DBWE 8:73, 1/11) or “cicatrized existence” (DBWE 6:88) of time.47 Indicating 
that the wounds of time would leave their mark in the formation of a scar.  
One final reference from Bonhoeffer’s official correspondence further highlights the liminal 
quality of separation and its potential formfulness. In a letter to his parents on 15 May 1943, 
Bonhoeffer makes reference to Psalm 31, “My times are in your hands” (Ps. 31:15; DBWE 8:80, 
1/17). Vosloo (2008:347) remarks that “[h]ere we see how Bonhoeffer does not merely reflect on 
the anxiety of time in the face of death, but also makes reference to the prayerful assertion of 
God’s relation to our life and times.” This truth, is held in tension with the question that seeks to 
dominate his experience of liminality: “Lord, how long?” (Ps. 13:1). Caught in the liminal space 
between these two biblical assertions, Bonhoeffer is suspended between profane space and 
sacred space, between despair and hope, between the ravages of time and the healing of time. 
With these two biblical assertions, Bonhoeffer joins the Psalmist in the in-between space of 
lament and praise, reframing liminality as a spiritual displacement. Looking forward to the 
healing of this rift, Bonhoeffer struggled to hold onto the past by practicing an active memory; 
“recollection of spiritual trials, musical pleasures, personal relationships, [and] travels” 
(Beaudoin 2002: 349). Although memory could not resolve liminality, it did hold off other 
alternative options. 
Time, Death, and Personhood 
One of these alternative options was death by suicide. Contemplating this final option (again in 
his notes) Bonhoeffer wrote: “suicide, not out of a sense of guilt, but because I am practically 
dead already, the closing of the book, sum total” (DBWE 8:74, 1/12). Gremmels (2010:567) 
notes that these handwritten notes themselves “show that Bonhoeffer retracted the thought of 
suicide” as he crossed “out the passage from ‘discontent’ to ‘closing of the book.’” This 
suggestion indeed corresponds to Bonhoeffer’s own rejection of suicide in his first letter to 
Eberhard Bethge (DBWE 8:180, 2/73). Bonhoeffer’s contemplation of suicide can be understood 
more out of fear of compromising his fellow conspirators’ safety if he was unable to stand up 
                                                
47 See Ethics (DBWE 6:88) regarding “scarring over” or “cicatrized existence.” 
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under interrogation, rather than his own despair. He had in fact conceptualised a justification for 
self-sacrifice in such instances in his Ethics (DBWE 6:200-201).48 Regardless of his motivations, 
however, it is clear that Bonhoeffer perceived that his life in the confines of his prison cell was 
now on a horrifying trajectory toward death (non-being): “Waiting – but with utter calm, for 
death” (DBWE 8:72, 1/11).49  
More important than Bonhoeffer’s rejection of suicide, however, is the emergence of death as a 
theme in his notes and later in his fictional writings. Here we could argue that secluded from 
ordinary spheres of everyday life, the walls of the prison cell symbolised invisibility and death of 
social connections; isolation severing the prisoner from former relationships and structures of 
meaning. In this context the prisoner experiences a sense in which he is “neither living nor dead 
from one aspect and both living and dead from another” (Turner 1967:96-97). It appears that the 
impermanence of time, held for Bonhoeffer not only the possibility of physical death, but also 
the death of personhood. Without a sense of one’s past, he feared that life would be lost in 
loneliness and non-being.50 In this liminal space, loneliness in fact “reveals personhood because 
loneliness is the confession of lost relationship; it is clutching to find your personhood […] the 
feeling of loneliness is the closest experience that we have to death. It is to be dead to all others; 
it is to be alone” (Root 2013:61). Though the threat of physical death was not yet glaringly 
evident, the theme of death becomes a prominent part of Bonhoeffer’s attempt to recover his past 
in his fictional writing during the interrogation period.  
                                                
48 In Ethics Bonhoeffer had come to acknowledge the ethical justification for the “freedom to sacrifice one’s life” 
through self-inflicted death, particularly in specific cases when a person was not acting “exclusively and consciously 
out of personal self-interest” (DBWE 6:200). Already in Ethics (probably contemplating his own arrest and potential 
interrogation), Bonhoeffer had argued that “If a prisoner takes his own life because he fears that under torture he 
would betray his people, his family, or his friends…” and if he could “spare them serious damage only by freely 
taking his own life, then self-inflicted death is so strongly subordinate to the motive of sacrifice that all 
condemnation of the deed becomes impossible” (DBWE 6:201). Bonhoeffer compared the conscious sacrifice of 
self through self-inflicted death, as in the case stated above, to be fundamentally indistinguishable “from the self-
evident Christian duty to leave the last place in the lifeboat of a sinking ship to another and to die with open eyes, or 
to use one’s own body to shield the body of a friend from a bullet. One’s own decision becomes here the cause of 
one’s own death, even though the distinction remains between direct self-inflicted death and risking one’s life while 
commending it to God.” (DBWE 6:201-202). See fn. 107, DBWE 6:201 for indications of possible sources from 
which Bonhoeffer draws the example of a full lifeboat.  
49 Emphasis is Bonhoeffer’s. 
50 The most unreserved expression of this experience is capture in Bonhoeffer’s poem ‘The Past’ (DBWE 8:418- 
421, 3/158). 
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Further exploring this connection, we note Renate’s (2000:197) observation that Bonhoeffer’s 
fictional “drama is fraught with a high degree of tension–understandably, given the stressful 
situation of the writer’s early weeks and months of imprisonment and hearings.” This tension 
revolves around the theme of death, which Renate (2000:198-199) claims is the primary theme 
of the drama, while also being present but in “a much more peripheral role” in the novel. Though 
it is most prominent in his fiction, the theme of death also surfaces throughout his letters in the 
constant reminder of the effects of war on people that are close to him and again and most 
graphically in the chained death-row prisoners who occupied the cells on either side of his own.  
However, the theme of death is starkly absent in the initial stage of Bonhoeffer’s official 
correspondence.51 Bonhoeffer explored the theme of death almost exclusively in his fictional 
musings and fragmentary notes, where it was safe to maintain a relative distance in anonymity. It 
appears he may have preferred to keep silent on this theme in his correspondence, as it was one 
of the things that effected him most deeply. Only once he is again in command of his situation 
does he open up to write on the theme of death. This time it is through the medium of poetry,52 
which openly “expresses his feelings about himself and the prospect of his own death” (Green 
2000:3). In his poetry, death is viewed with new eyes, having passed over the threshold of 
liminality and into a generous and incorporated experience of what it means to be a wholehearted 
and wholly present human being on the boundary of one’s own death.  
Bonhoeffer had previously contemplated this threshold on the boundary between temporality and 
death, in a sermon in Barcelona in 1928. There he had indicated that life does not go on forever, 
but like all great works of beauty must perish. Death as it reveals the impermanence of life calls 
us all to treat it “as the ultimate boundary with utmost seriousness” (Vosloo 2008:342). In the 
same sermon he called his audience in Barcelona “to open their eyes for the beginning of 
newness on this boundary” (Vosloo 2008:342).53 For Bonhoeffer the connection between time 
                                                
51 The exception is a brief reference to the death of Maria’s father and brother (DBWE 8:57, 1/2) and Bonhoeffer’s 
notes on separation and the emptiness of time (DBWE 8:72, 1/11).  
52 In particular Bonhoeffer’s poems “Stations on the Way to Freedom” (DBWE 8:512-514, 4/191), “The Death of 
Moses” (DBWE 8:531-541, 4/197), and “Jonah” (DBWE 8:547-550, 4/199) all express the salient recurring death 
motif. 
53 Bonhoeffer’s eyes would eventually be opened to the discovery of newness on the boundary of death, but not until 
he was on the cusp of it himself. The last stanza of his poem ‘Stations of the Way to Freedom,’ which has been 
devoted to the theme of ‘Death,’ carries this discovery of newness (DBWE 8:154, 4/191). 
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and death implies a distinctive liminal quality, opening up new possibilities on the boundary of 
life.  
I mention the themes of personhood and death in Bonhoeffer’s poetry here to show the liminal 
character of time. We can see that time for Bonhoeffer, is inalienably bonded to the themes of 
personhood, the past, and to death. His sense of losing the past and his fear of death are explicitly 
connected to the liminal experience of structural and social invisibility in isolation, in contrast to 
being connected to his loved ones. In the early stages of his imprisonment, Bonhoeffer’s very 
real and tangible sense of separation, brought about by liminality, begins to unravel his sense of 
self, calling into question his own personhood in relation to others. While this connection and its 
ultimate reframing are most pronounced in Bonhoeffer’s “Who Am I?” (DBWE 8: 459-460, 
3/173) poem, the root of this questioning of personhood is concealed in his exploration of time in 
the initial stage of his imprisonment. As imprisonment drastically changed Bonhoeffer’s social, 
relational, spatial and temporal status, his view of self ultimately began to change. Both 
imprisonment and interrogation had forced him into a position of submission that threatened to 
destroy both his community and his very being.  
Bonhoeffer’s response was to wrestle with these themes through writing, while also practicing 
gratitude for the gift of the other. Navigating liminality and anchoring his new spatial and 
temporal existence within God’s time and order, required an acknowledgement of the 
impartibility of time. Throughout his imprisonment, he continued practicing an active memory of 
his own history and past. Beaudoin (2002:349) suggests that this practice of active remembering 
is part of a “Christian technology of the self,” that played a prominent role in his daily routine 
and ordering of the carceral space. Bonhoeffer’s active dialogue with the past, occurred through 
writing letters, plays, fictional stories, and eventually poetry, “enabling him to regularly 
reintroduce himself to his own history” and to the symbols that had given his life and his 
relationship meaning (Beaudoin 2002:349). Actively remembering his past facilitated a renewed 
relationship with his own concrete history and community, allowing him to associate the 
meaning and purpose of his life in the present through a continuous connection to both self and 
others. This technique helped him to break free of imprisoning subjectivity. Let us now turn to 
explore Bonhoeffer’s early attempts to counter imprisoning subjectivity by reorder reality in the 
face of his interrogations.   
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Separation and Telling the Truth 
The second essay that Bonhoeffer wrote in prison was about “telling the truth” in specific cases 
of conflict.54 This essay, combined with his non-theological work on “the sense of time,” reveals 
both the inner challenge of liminality, as well as his capacity to navigate the space in-between 
familiar structures of social and political life. I offer a reading of this essay on truth against the 
backdrop of imprisonment and interrogation. Interrogation was, for Bonhoeffer, an invasion into 
his inner personal life and selfhood and as such, provoked a particular liminal crisis of meaning. 
A crisis that required a response if he was to ward off or resist possible alternatives, which he 
saw as idolatrous distortions of reality and truth. The leitmotifs of personhood, death, and 
sociality again play a prominent role in Bonhoeffer’s response to liminality. Here, however, 
rather than the explicit theme of death, life plays a prominent role, taking on responsibilities for 
others lives in the face of death. Against this backdrop I argue that the essay functions as a 
reorientation of the categories of above and below, grounding reality and truth in a concrete 
relational and living encounter with others, which forced Bonhoeffer to reorient his position 
amidst the liminal space below.  
Furthermore, it is my contention that the themes developed in this essay – life, reality, and a 
refutation of metaphysical idols or conceptions of God – form part of the foundational thinking 
of  “the theological turn,” which takes place in April 1944. This largely overlooked essay shares 
striking similarities to the development of what Wüstenberg (1998:112-136) observes in the 
Tegel theology, namely Bonhoeffer’s theology of life. My intention here is not to refute 
Wüstenberg’s claim that Bonhoeffer’s conception of “life” develops in particular ways in late 
                                                
54 Bonhoeffer first mentioned the essay titled ‘What Does It Mean to Tell the Truth?’ to Bethge on November 18, 
1943 (DBWE 8:182, 2/73), around the same time he was beginning to work on his ‘Prayers for Prisoners.’ However, 
he presumably began the essay at an earlier date “under the impact of the interrogations and the urgent 
accompanying constraint to conceal the truth” (DBWE 16:601, 2/19, fn 1). It is my contention that due to the 
sensitive nature of the essay’s subject matter, Bonhoeffer refrained from mentioning its existence until the first 
illegal correspondence with Bethge, although he had begun working on it much earlier. This argument is further 
substantiated by the fact that no mention of the essay is made outside of his illegal correspondence. Although the 
essay presumably only “reached the manuscript form in which it appears here [in DBWE 16] by the time of his final 
report about it” (DBWE 16:601, 2/19), on December 15, 1943 (DBWE 8:223, 2/86), its inception and its content are 
grounded early on in the interrogation period.  
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correspondence with Bethge and under the influence of his reading of Dilthey in prison.55 
However, I do contest his late starting point. Wüstenberg (1998:136-137) claims that 
Bonhoeffer’s earlier “statements on the theme of life can yet be understood from the perspective 
of the manuscripts to Bonhoeffer’s Ethics (in 1940-1943),” this is, he claims, “no longer the case 
with his understanding of an earthly, christological life, an understanding that is critical of 
religion (1994).” While Bonhoeffer’s essay on “telling the truth” does indeed share linguistic 
similarities with Ethics in relation to the theme of life, it also points towards the development of 
thought and emphasis that Wüstenberg insists is definitive of his later prison theology. It is not 
my primary aim to argue this point, but rather to substantiate my claim that the prison experience 
does in fact play a fundamental role in the development of Bonhoeffer’s late Tegel theology. 
Read against the backdrop of this claim, Bonhoeffer’s essay shows the latent substructure of his 
turn to reality, his theology of life and his critique of religion. Let me now turn to offer a reading 
of the essay.  
Facing interrogation, Bonhoeffer had little doubt that he would be forced to lie if he was to 
conceal the truth about the conspiracy and save himself and his fellow conspirators. A favourable 
outcome for the conspiracy itself depended upon Bonhoeffer’s ability to protect the truth. This 
deception, however, posed an ethical dilemma for Bonhoeffer and it was critical that he develop 
a strategy that would allow him to satisfactorily answer the questions of his interrogators, while 
revealing no more than necessary (Martin 2005:208). To orient himself within the liminal space 
of the prison cell Bonhoeffer needed a way of locating his ethical discourse within God’s 
ordering of the world, without the former structures of order and authority grounded in the 
above. This required a strategy and a language that would simultaneously reveal and conceal the 
truth.  
Reflecting deeply upon the context of speaking the truth, he faced questions of meaning: “What 
does ‘telling the truth’ mean?” and “who” requires of us that our words be true? (DBWE 16:601, 
2/19). Drawing upon the conceptual language of Ethics, he explores the meaning of “telling the 
truth” and the way in which “the truth” is ordered, legislated, and given authority within certain 
offices or mandates. From the perspective of juridical order (Ordnung), “telling the truth,” meant 
                                                
55 It is obviously important to note that Wüstenberg (1998:137) does indeed trace the influence of Dilthey in 
Bonhoeffer’s thought back as early as 1929. 
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relating the facts regarding his involvement with the Abwehr office, his UK classification 
(sparing him from military service), his international travel, and his involvement in Operation 7. 
In answering the above questions, however, Bonhoeffer sought to inscribe an alternative vision 
of reality,56 in which he pushed for the concept of ‘truth’ to be seen, not as an abstract ‘ought,’ 
some external metaphysical form, but a lived and concrete reality and relationship that can only 
be determined in context. In so doing, his essay mobilises a space of resistance, underwriting his 
development of a rhetorical strategy designed to misdirect the offensive attempts of his 
interrogators, and undermine their authority to demand of him the truth.57 In addition, it reveals 
another attempt at navigating liminal space. 
Bonhoeffer begins his argument with the question, “who” requires of us that our words be true? 
To whom one speaks the truth is of critical importance (DBWE 16:602, 2/19). In his analysis of 
one’s relation to truth, Bonhoeffer argues that truthful speech – as it is contained within language 
and governed by the dynamics of distinct relationships (i.e. parent/child, husband/wife, 
friend/friend, teacher/student, governing authority/subject, and enemy/enemy) – must inevitably 
vary in accordance with the “who” that demands the truth.58 Failure to properly perceive the 
“who” question, would ultimately lead to the destruction of the relational encounter through 
disregard for the “living truth between persons” (DBWE 16:604, 2/19).  
Bonhoeffer grounds the essence of truth within the sphere of relationality and life itself, as a 
means of protecting his small community of co-conspirators. Here we can see in a very real way, 
that for Bonhoeffer, truth must be relational and living. This reality is never far from view in his 
essay on the meaning of “telling the truth.” Bonhoeffer writes: 
Depending on the person to whom I am speaking, the person who is questioning me, or what I am 
discussing, my word, if it seeks to be truthful, must vary. A truthful word is not an entity constant 
in itself but is as lively as life itself. Where this word detaches itself from life and from the 
                                                
56 Larson (2010:146) indicates “the work of the prison writer is to inscribe an alternative map of her/his cultural, 
social, and moral location by writing alternative bonds of personal or historical association.” 
57 Martin (2005:206) offers a compelling analysis of Bonhoeffer’s “rhetoric of misdirection,” highlighting particular 
similarities between his interrogation strategy and the genre of “trickster narratives.”  
58 Bonhoeffer illustrates this point throughout the essay in and through the parent/child relationship. He writes: “The 
truthfulness of the child toward parents is by its very nature something different from that of parents toward their 
child. While the life of the small child lies open to the parents and the child’s word is to reveal all that is hidden and 
secret, the same cannot be true of the reverse relationship. In regard to truthfulness, therefore the parents’ claim on 
the child is something different from that of the child on the parents” (DBWE 16:602, 2/19).  
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relationship to the concrete other person, where “the truth is told” without regard for the person to 
whom it is said, there it has only the appearance of truth but not its essence (DBWE 16:604, 2/19).  
For Bonhoeffer, the truthful word can only maintain its essence if it remains attached to its 
source of life, abiding in relationship to the concrete other. Truth itself has no life apart from its 
relationship to the other or to its given context within the “real.” Bonhoeffer holds that this core 
premise is true, even if God is the one that demands the truth of us. To argue that truthful speech 
is owed “not to this or that person but to God alone…” is correct in so far as it does not “thereby 
disregard that even God is not a general principle but is the Living One who has placed me in a 
life that is fully alive and within this life demands my service” (DBWE 16:602, 2/19).59  
A Challenge to Above and Below Hierarchies  
Bonhoeffer’s discussion of truth here draws on the conceptual language of Ethics and is 
grounded in his “doctrine of mandates,” in which the “offices” (e.g. parent, husband, teacher, 
governing authority, pastor, magistrate) of society are authorised within four divine “mandates” 
of relation and authority (marriage and family, work, church and state) (Green 2005:17-18; 
DBWE 6:388-408). These “mandates” describe the divinely ordained patterns of authority and 
ethical responsibility in society.60 Although a detailed analysis of Bonhoeffer’s doctrine of 
mandates lies outside of the scope of the present project, 61 it is important to note the particular 
way in which his interrogation destabilised this former ordering and called for a reorientation of 
his own position within the structures of above and below. It is my contention that this 
                                                
59 Bonhoeffer’s essay on “telling the truth” further validates Wüstenberg’s (1998:xv) argument “for the centrality of 
‘life’ as a theological category in Bonhoeffer’s prison theology.”  
60 This notion (“doctrine of mandates”) is highly complex in Bonhoeffer’s thinking and offers revisions to several 
ideas in traditional Lutheran theology: “the doctrine of order of creation,” the “doctrine of the ‘three estates,’” and 
the “doctrine of the ‘two kingdoms’” (Green 2005:18), as well as possible revisions to Emil Brunner’s “orders of 
creation,” which Guth (2013:133) suggests were “all prone to Nazi corruption.”  
61 For Bonhoeffer’s primary discussion of the mandates, see his Ethics (DBWE 6); as well as his essay “A 
Theological Position Paper on State and Church” (DBWE 16:502-528, 2/10) and “A Study on ‘Personal’ and 
‘Objective’ Ethics” (DBWE 16:540-551, 2/13). For a Feminist revision of Bonhoeffer’s Mandates see Guth, K.V. 
2013. To See from Below: Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Mandates and Feminist Ethics. Journal of the Society of Christian 
Ethics, 33(2): 131-150. 
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destabilisation and reorientation played a formative role in Bonhoeffer’s experience of liminality, 
suspending him between two definite poles of ethical authority.  
In a section of Ethics titled “The ‘Ethical’ and the ‘Christian’ as a Topic,” Bonhoeffer had 
grounded the authorisation for ethical discourse within the objective position of those who hold 
offices of the “above”: 
[The] authorization for ethical discourse […] is granted to and bestowed on people, not primarily 
because of their subjective achievements and distinctions, but because of their objective position in 
the world. Thus it is the old person and not the young, the parent and not the child, the master and 
not the servant, the teacher and not the student, the judge and not the defendant, the governing 
authority and not the subject, the preacher and not the parishioner, to whom the authorization for 
ethical discourse is granted. This is an expression of the orientation from above and below, which 
is an intrinsic and essential quality of the ethical, even though it is so highly offensive to the 
modern mind. Without this objective order of above and below [Oben und Unten], and without the 
courage to be “above” – which modern people have so completely lost – ethical discourse 
degenerates into generalities and vacuous talk, and forfeits its character as ethical […] We cannot 
avoid the fact that the ethical demands a clear ordering of above and below (DBWE 6: 372-3, 375). 
It is this hierarchical structure, apparently endemic to Bonhoeffer’s doctrine of mandates that 
Barth was so highly critical of (Weissbach 1967:147). For it attaches more importance, 
Weissbach (1967:147) writes, to authority from “above” than to “freedom even of the person at 
the bottom.” Barth’s (as cited by Weissbach 1967:147) fundamental question regarding 
Bonhoeffer’s conservative view of governments and authority, was: “Is the notion of the 
authority of some over others really more characteristic of the ethical event than that of the 
freedom of even the very lowest before the highest?” Whether or not Bonhoeffer asked himself 
this question while writing his essay on truth we will never be known. Nevertheless, having lived 
and written almost exclusively from the privileged social position of the above, from the office 
of pastor and teacher, Bonhoeffer now found himself in the submissive position of the below, of 
servant, subject, and defendant. Although he was by no means the lowest in Tegel prison, 
Bonhoeffer was now discovering what it meant to be at the bottom and subject to governing 
authorities. 62  
                                                
62 The movement from oben to unten hand indeed begun early during Bonhoeffer’s involvement in the conspiracy, 
as he “renounced his position of secure dominance and moved for the first time in his life into a situation of genuine 
vulnerability” (Dahill 2009:87). However, it is clear that imprisonment intensified this experience and called for a 
certain reordering and discernment of reality and self. 
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This new position appears to have provoked a particular psycho-social crisis for Bonhoeffer, in 
which he felt the need to defend his authority, not only to engage in ethical discourse below but 
also to refuse the invasive demands of his interrogators to “reveal all that is hidden and secret” 
(DBWE 16:602, 2/19). In the position of the below, it is clear that Bonhoeffer experienced his 
interrogations as an alienating invasion by the above into his inner personal life and selfhood. 
What he would later refer to as an “illegitimate prying into the mystery of life” (DBWE 8:215, 
2/84).63 This invasion is personified through the actions of the teacher in Bonhoeffer’s essay. 
Disregarding the responsibility of his office, the teacher transgresses the boundaries of his office 
by demanding that the child reveal hidden secrets about his family (DBWE 16:605-606, 2/19). 
The teacher who was not justified in this intrusion is in actuality “guilty of the lie,” while the 
child’s lie, which sought to protect the order of the family “corresponds more closely to the 
truth” (DBWE 16:606, 2/19). 
Read autobiographically, this classroom scenario mirrors Bonhoeffer’s new social position. For 
the first time in his life he has been placed in the submissive position of the below; the child, the 
student, the subject, the defendant. Finding himself suspended within God’s clear and objective 
ordering of above and below he experiences a betwixt space. Here familiar points of orientation 
are detached from stable anchors in the above world of the Bildungsbürger. Unlike the child, 
however, Bonhoeffer does not lack “the experience, the discernment,” nor “the capacity for 
appropriate expression” (DBWE 16:606, 2/19). His essay can be understood as a formative 
response to his experience of liminality from below and a means of justifying his hidden 
rebellion against the divinely mandated authority of his interrogators. The experience of below 
forces Bonhoeffer to rethink his ethical categories, so that he can locate his own position within 
the orders of the cosmos and justify his ongoing conspiratorial activity as being grounded in 
Christ’s own vicarious representative action as a Stellvertreter.  
                                                
63 In this same letter to Bethge on December 5, 1943, Bonhoeffer indicates that “[t]ruthfulness” does not at all mean 
that whatever exists must be uncovered […] exposure is cynical; and even if cynics appear particularly honest in 
their own eyes or act like fanatics for the truth, they still miss the decisive truth, namely, that after the fall there is a 
need for covering [Verhülling] and secrecy [Geheimnis].” This was precisely what attracted Bonhoeffer to Stifter 
during his imprisonment: that “Stifter’s greatness lies in the fact that he refuses to pry into the inner realm of the 
person, that he respects the covering and regards the person only very discreetly from without as it were, but not 
from within” (DBWE 8:215, 2/84).   
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It would be overstating my case, however, to speak here of a fundamental shift in Bonhoeffer’s 
conception of above and below. While the concrete reality of interrogation offered him a new 
view of the world, there remain certain continuities in his experience and writing that ultimately 
undermine any fundamental shift in his thinking regarding the hierarchical structure of the 
mandates. Feminist scholarship continues to point out certain tendencies that persist in his prison 
writings – namely his continued insistence on the objective mandate of marriage, in comments 
about his future marriage to Maria and in his wedding sermon for Eberhard and Renate Bethge 
(DBWE 8:82-87, 1/18) – that ultimately undermine any notion of a change in his thinking or a 
shift in his understand of the classificatory categories of mandated authority and responsibility. 
These patriarchical tendencies, which reflect the cultural norms of his social location, reinforce 
“social roles and patterns of relationship conducive to inequality” (Guth 2013:134). Thereby 
undermining any concrete revision of his previous conception of the mandates that might give 
authority and responsibility to those who find themselves at the bottom. This critical point has 
contributed to the necessity for the kind of feminist correction and revision that Dahill (2013:53-
84)64 offers in relation to the categories of above and below or that Lovin (1984:143) and Guth 
(2013) offer in relation to the mandates more generally. So I am not arguing for a fundamental 
shift in Bonhoeffer’s thinking, but rather a nuanced perspective of the discontinuities in which 
the space of interrogation thrusts Bonhoeffer into the below. His essay seeks to protect the life of 
those who see the world from below, including his own, and in this way represents a formative 
experience of the below, even if he remained blinded to the ways that he continued to hold onto 
the position of above in terms of gender relations.  
Truth as a Question of Encounter 
It is my contention that Bonhoeffer’s essay on “telling the truth” represents a formational 
encounter with Jesus Christ that is made possible by the disorienting space of the below that 
throws the self and the ego off balance and opens up a place for embracing Christ and life itself 
                                                
64 Dahill (2013:57) suggests that a “critically hermeneutical view of gender corresponds much more fruitfully to the 
rest of Bonhoeffer’s thinking and witness than his own explicit gender views do, suggesting that, had he survived 
the war, he might well have found his own categories of “above” and “below” – and the inherited gender roles that 
went with those for him – called into question by the Gospel and his own best thought.” 
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in a new way. Throughout the essay, as he had done throughout his carrier, Bonhoeffer grounds 
the contextual reality of truth within his Christology. In his Christology lectures of 1933, in the 
later development of his prison Christology (with the question “who is Christ actually for us 
today?”) (DBWE 8:362, 3/137), as well as in his fragmentary “Outline for a Book” (DBWE 
8:499-504, 4/187), Bonhoeffer’s starting point is the question of “who.” This indispensable 
question is what Pangritz (1999:137) calls a “question of encounter.” Bonhoeffer argues that 
truth itself can only be discerned through particular contexts and encounters in the concrete place 
of lived life in the world. This is so, because truth is not an idea but a person; truth is Jesus 
Christ, and Jesus Christ is in the world. Truth cannot be detached from the “who” of 
relationality, escaping safely into the metaphysical realm of God, for in Jesus Christ “God’s truth 
became flesh in the world and is alive in the real” (DBWE 16:605, 2/19). Jesus Christ remains 
the “who” that mediates an encounter with the truth in the concrete place of lived life. Therefore, 
for Bonhoeffer, to speak truthfully, requires “a long, earnest, and continual effort that is based in 
experience and the perception of reality” (DBWE 16:603, 2/19).   
In the same way, Bonhoeffer’s mobilisation of resistance to political evil “is grounded not in 
theories of social ethics, but in Christology" not in Christological abstractions but in a living 
connection to Jesus Christ (Dahill 2003:1). Here Bonhoeffer begins to offer a Christological 
vision of truth, which counters the truth of perverted juridical order. In his essay on “telling the 
truth,” we can already see a pattern of thought beginning to emerge during the interrogation 
period, which represents the embryonic phase of his later prison Christology. Bonhoeffer 
develops a sequence of interconnecting propositions; the living truth is relational and cannot be 
detached from the lived world or from its relationship to the concrete other. To do so would be to 
disregard the living truth, which is alive in the real, through the person of Jesus Christ. Discovery 
of the ‘”right” and truthful word for any given circumstance – read answering the questions of 
his interrogators – is a matter of discerning the real, in which “one’s gaze and thought must be 
oriented toward how the real is in God, and through God, and toward God” (DBWE 16:603, 
2/19).  
Although not yet fully articulated, this encounter is an encounter with the One who “is there for 
others” (DBWE 8:501, 4/187). What Bonhoeffer later says about “faith,” could here be said 
about “truth;” “[f]aith [or speaking the truth] is participating in this being of Jesus;” his “being-
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for-others” (DBWE 8:501, 4/187). If this reading holds, then it is safe to say that Bonhoeffer’s 
later prison Christology owes at least a share of its genesis to Bonhoeffer’s early struggle to be 
there-for-others as he navigated the difficulty of speaking the truth during his interrogation. 
Through this context specific encounter with Jesus Christ, Bonhoeffer experiences a person-
forming participation in the being of Jesus, “[b]ecoming human [Menschwerdung], cross, 
resurrection” (DBWE 8:501, 4/187). Thus, Bonhoeffer’s essay on “telling the truth” and the 
world behind the text, form a unique part of his final “turning from the phraseological to the 
real.” Here the “who” question of his Christology lectures is taken up again, moving more and 
more from Christological abstraction, and absolute forms of the metaphysical, whether in terms 
of truth or God, toward a fully embodied and concrete encounter with Jesus Christ and outright 
participation in his being there-for-others (DBWE 8:501, 4/187).  
Truth and the Mystery of the Living One 
Furthermore, Bonhoeffer’s encounter with Jesus Christ from below calls into question the ethical 
authority of the above who denigrate life and its meaning. By rooting truth within the 
Christological character of reality, Bonhoeffer seeks to ward against idolatrous distortions of 
reality or truth that claim authority over life itself. He writes that “[t]hose who say ‘God’ are not 
allowed simply to cross out the given world in which I live; otherwise they would be speaking 
not of God who in Jesus Christ came into the world but rather of some sort of metaphysical idol” 
(DBWE 16:602, 2/19). Although Bonhoeffer clearly maintains the mandates of his Ethics – in 
which truthful speech is authorised within relations of the mandates, such as governing authority 
and subject – these mandates always involve a necessary responsibility regarding the 
“preservation of the world toward and for the sake of Christ” (Green 2005:20). Drawing on his 
language of the “orders of preservation” (DBWE 3:139-140), Bonhoeffer insists that such 
mandates of authority are responsible to the Living One who defines and governs the 
preservation of the real world.  
Bonhoeffer here makes use of two critical allusions to the National Socialist state, its complex 
truth games, and its claim to biopolitical sovereignty over life. Although these allusions are at 
times oblique “because of the danger of writing direct attacks on the regime,” they resound with 
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clarity given the acoustics of Bonhoeffer’s social location (Green 2005:24).65 I hope to show that 
these two critical allusions (the “metaphysical idol” and the “cynic”), share characteristic 
similarities with political/historical allusions in Ethics (Green 2005:24), and can be taken as clear 
challenges to National Socialist ideologies and laws that infringe upon the rights of humanity and 
personal life. Bonhoeffer argues for the justification of an ethical “borderline case” or boundary 
situation, declaring the necessity of responsible action in the face of authority that has inverted 
values such as truth for the purpose of personal gain and political power, ultimately wreaking 
havoc on humanity and destroying community and life itself.  
Let us examine each of these allusions in relation to Ethics before turning to the larger symbolic 
and historical landscape. First, the “metaphysical idol.” For Bonhoeffer, the concrete encounter 
with Jesus Christ thwarts distortions of the image of God and protects truth and the nature of life 
as gift in the lived world. In Ethics Bonhoeffer had highlighted the danger of a kind of “myopic 
pragmatism” that in responsibility to a cause, transgresses the limits and boundaries of 
responsibility through the idolization of certain values (such as truth), ultimately inverting “all of 
life through the dominance of things over people” (DBWE 6:260). This idolatrous inversion of 
truth “destroys human beings by sacrificing them to the idol” (DBWE 6:260). Following Karl 
Barth’s (as cited in DBWE 16:602, 2/19)  “polemical use of language,”66 as well as this section 
of Ethics, Bonhoeffer’s critique of the “metaphysical idol” refers not only to the distortion of the 
image of God, but to any “absolutised image of man… posited by human invention.” Any 
general abstract principle that inverts the value of the ethical (“the true, the good, the right, the 
beautiful”) in service of a cause (National Socialism) or an image of man (the Führer), thereby 
desecrates its value by seeking to replace the “mystery of the living and life-giving God” for “the 
mystery of an enthroned but lifeless idol” (DBWE 16:602, 2/19). 
                                                
65 Levi Strauss (1952:25) in his book Persecution and the Art of Writing, illustrates how the context of persecution, 
“gives rise to a peculiar technique of writing, and therewith to a peculiar type of literature, in which the truth about 
all crucial things is presented exclusively between the lines. That literature is addressed, not to all readers, but to 
trustworthy and intelligent readers only. It has all the advantages of private communication without having its 
greatest disadvantage-that it reaches only the writer's acquaintances. It has all the advantages of public 
communication without having its greatest disadvantage-capital punishment for the author. But how can a man [sic] 
perform the miracle of speaking in a publication to a minority, while being silent to the majority of his readers? The 
fact which makes this literature possible can be expressed in the axiom that thoughtless men are careless readers, 
and only thoughtful men [sic] are careful readers. Therefore an author who wishes to address only thoughtful men 
[sic] has but to write in such a way that only a very careful reader can detect the meaning of his book." 
66 The German editors of DBWE 16 indicate this discursive connection in footnote [4.] of the essay (DBWE 16:602, 
2/19).  
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Echoing Ethics, the allusion of the “metaphysical idol” deconstructs the deification of abstract 
truth, which in the service of the cause deems human beings as unworthy of life. It denounces the 
narrow horizons, self-centred interests (“myopic pragmatism”), and slogans of the National 
Socialist’s, which rang “Recht ist, was dem Volke nützt,” (“Justice is what is useful for the 
people”), as lifeless and detached from responsibility (DBWE 6:260, fn. 52). Countering the 
“metaphysical idol,” Bonhoeffer’s essay grounds truth in the person of Jesus Christ, the Human 
One, whose living truth is incarnated in the world, whose justice and truth are directed to the 
concrete neighbour within the reality of the lived world. Truth is grounded not in abstract legal 
facts but in selfless love for the real human being. Bonhoeffer’s formative experience of 
interrogation and his response, give rise here to language that is beginning to move toward the 
conceptual language of his “world interpretation” developed later in the prison experience. 
Bonhoeffer’s second allusion is the “cynic,” who “puts on display a dead idolatrous image of 
truth” and wreaks havoc on the human community by preying on human weakness (DBWE 
16,604, 2/19). This image shares a particular affinity with “the tyrannical despiser of humanity” 
in Ethics, which is of course representative of Hitler (DBWE 6:85-86; Green 2005:24). 
Bonhoeffer describes the cynic as one who claims to “tell the truth” in all circumstances: 
By putting a halo on his own head for being a zealot for the truth who can take no account of 
human weaknesses, he destroys the living truth between persons. He violates shame, desecrates the 
mystery, breaks trust, betrays the community in which he lives, and smiles arrogantly over the 
havoc he has wrought and over the human weakness that “can’t bear the truth.” He says that the 
truth is destructive and demands its victims, and he feels like a god over the feeble creatures and 
does not realize that he is serving Satan” (DBWE 16:604, 2/19). 
Again through the inversion of truth, both the “cynic” and “the tyrannical despiser of humanity” 
(both of which I believe to be allusions to Hitler) hide their secret and profound distrust for 
human weakness behind “the stolen words of true community” (DBWE 6:86). They praise 
themselves with “repulsive vanity” becoming zealots of truth and goodness, yet they despise “the 
rights of every individual” and trample the weak (DBWE 6:86; DBWE 16:604, 2/19). One 
passage of Ethics draws an even closer connection between the two allusions. Here Bonhoeffer 
highlights the power of “the tyrannical despiser of humanity” to deem others unworthy: “he 
considers the people stupid, and they become stupid; he considers them weak, and they become 
weak; he considers them criminal, and they become criminal […] his conventional protestations 
of solicitude for people are bare-faced cynicism” (DBWE 6:86). Indeed the cynic alludes to 
 53 
Hitler, the despiser of humanity, who “despises what God has loved, despises the very form of 
God become human” (DBWE 6:87).  
These two allusions reverberate within a political and symbolic landscape, in which the National 
Socialist state had absolutised the image of the Führer, making a claim over truth and life in 
service of the biopolitical structure of the state. In Agamben’s (1998:83) illuminating analysis of 
the National Socialist state, “[t]he Führer represents precisely life itself insofar as it is he who 
decides on life’s very biopolitical consistency.” Within this juridical-political context, the Führer 
and the state after him, hold the sovereign power to decide “the point at which life ceases to be 
politically relevant;” to deem “life unworthy of being lived” (Agamben 1998:83). The Führer’s 
words that the ”new State knows no other task than the fulfilment of the conditions necessary for 
the preservation of the people,” found what may be the most “rigorous biopolitical formulations” 
of the National Socialist state. In the words of Verschuer (as cited in Agamben 1998:83), they 
“mean that every political act of the National Socialist state serves the life of the people. . . .” 
Thus, the concentration camp, and at another level military interrogation prisons like Tegel, were 
consequential acts in service of the “life” of the Volk. 
Within this symbolic and political landscape, Bonhoeffer writes as one of the potentially 
disposable bodies of the state. His life was both included in the juridical order [Ordnung] and yet 
remains there on the verge of exclusion, in the realm of biopolitical liminality. For Bonhoeffer, 
this is a completely new experience of the “view from below.” During his involvement in the 
conspiracy, Bonhoeffer had become familiar with the destructive mechanisms and systems of 
‘thingification,’ whereby human beings desecrate “the true, the good, the right, and the 
beautiful,” by defining their usefulness in the service of state ideologies (DBWE 6:260). Now he 
had become the “thing” itself. From this new position Bonhoeffer draws upon his earlier Ethics, 
seeking to inscribe an alternative map of life by locating it within the reality of the Living One 
and thereby naming the destructive forces of the National Socialist state and the Führer as an 
abstraction, a “metaphysical idol” or even an “enthroned but lifeless idol.” In the interrogation 
rooms of the Reich War Court, the contestation over truth was the liminal boundary between life 
and death for Bonhoeffer.  
Bonhoeffer’s essay on “telling the truth,” written from the desk in his prison cell, ultimately 
counters this destructive force by insisting upon the fundamental preservation of life amidst 
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lifeless biopolitical forces of power. This notion of life, present throughout Bonhoeffer’s essay, 
thus represents an early fragment in the development of what Wüstenberg (1998:136) refers to as 
Bonhoeffer’s theology of life, in which the “concept of life becomes the central connecting 
concept between the human existence of Jesus and meaningful Christian human existence, 
exhibiting thus ‘life-christological’ content.” This largely overlooked piece in the development 
of Bonhoeffer’s theology of life, which acts as a bridge between his Ethics and his “philosophy 
of life,” also plays a fundamental role in his response to the disorientation of liminality. In and 
through the creation of this essay we can see Bonhoeffer’s own embodied and concrete 
participation in the “life” of Jesus Christ, who is grounded not in metaphysical abstraction, but in 
the concrete reality of this world. Responding to the invasion of his interrogators, Bonhoeffer 
experiences what would later become the world orienting stability he was longing for in the 
liminal space of his prison cell.  
Ethical Liminality in Borderline Cases 
In light of the above, another section of Ethics becomes important for understanding what 
Bonhoeffer is doing in his essay on “telling the truth.” In a section titled ‘History and Good,’ 
written in the beginning of 1942, Bonhoeffer argued that there are specific occasions within 
historical life, when the “strict observance of the explicit law of a state, a corporation, a family 
[…] entails a clash with the basic necessities of human life [Lebensnotwendigkeiten]” (DBWE 
6:272-273). Within such occasions, which he terms “borderline cases,” extraordinary situations 
call for “appropriate responsible action” that may depart from the “domain governed by laws and 
principles, from the normal and regular” state of legal affairs (DBWE 6:273). Such occasions 
might be termed political or biopolitical liminality. Within such cases, “deception”67 may be the 
only appropriate responsible action “for the sake of one’s life necessities” (DBWE 6:273). Those 
acting in free responsibility must be willing “to become guilty [Bereitschaft zur 
Schuldübernahme]” (DBWE 6:275). Here again Bonhoeffer’s argument is grounded in his 
Christology. Responsible action finds its origin in Jesus Christ’s “vicarious representative 
                                                
67 Bonhoeffer replaced “lie” with “deception” in the original. 
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responsible action [stellvertretend verantwortliches Handeln],” which was not concerned with 
new ethical ideals or goodness (Matt. 19:17), but solely with a “love for real human beings” 
(DBWE 6:275). Responsible action cannot withdraw from the community of human guilt, 
precisely because it is responsible, exclusively concerned about other human beings, and 
originates in selfless love for the real human being (DBWE 6:275). 
Bonhoeffer’s essay on “telling the truth” is the embodiment of responsible action within such a 
borderline case. In lying to his interrogators, Bonhoeffer knew that he was taking on guilt, not in 
relation to juridical order and the governing authority, although that may also be true, but in 
relation to God’s judgment. He was willing and able to do so precisely because the living truth 
has its origin, its essence, and its goal in the mystery of the Living One. He understood this 
responsible act of deception to be grounded solely in Christ the Living One who took on guilt in 
love for real human beings. Not in self-interested protection of his fellow conspirators, friends, 
and family, but in selfless love of the human community.  
As a result, Bonhoeffer developed an ethically and theologically rigorous framework for 
speaking the truth within a space of biopolitical liminality. When the orders (Ordnung) of 
authority transgress the boundaries and limits of responsibility; when ethical concepts are 
inverted and evil is disguised as good, and right, and true, then it is the task of the responsible 
ones to act and to resist.68 Amidst the fixed discursive practices of the state, designed to control 
and fix truth and life itself, Bonhoeffer embodies his Ethics of responsible action.  
While Bonhoeffer lamented having never finished his Ethics (DBWE 8:181, 2/73), this thesis 
suggests that he did indeed complete the final chapters of his Ethics, not as a published work, but 
in and through his life, lived in responsibility to the mystery of the living and the life-giving 
God, and in conformation with Jesus Christ (Incarnated, Crucified, Resurrected). This is the 
formfulness of liminality, which opens up the space for a transformative encounter with Jesus 
Christ. 
                                                
68 This essay function as a postlude to his section ‘Who Stands Firm?’ in “After Ten Years.” Who stands firm in the 
groundlessness and liminality of below; who stands firm in the face of interrogation and imprisonment? “Only the 
one whose ultimate standard is not his reason, his principles, conscience, freedom, or virtue; only the one who is 
prepared to sacrifice all of these when, in faith and in relationship to God alone, he is called to obedient and 
responsible action” (DBWE 8:40, prologue). 
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Separation and the Transformation of Space 
I have argued thus far, that for Bonhoeffer, the prison cell symbolised a break or disjunction 
from his former life and a growing sense of separation from his past and his future. Most 
importantly, however, he felt cut off from the relationships that gave meaning to and formed his 
own person. Detached from former socio-cultural meaning structures, he was thrust into the 
disorienting space of the profane. This experience of separation threatened to become a 
permanent state of between-ness without a fixed point or centre to gain orientation. Life in his 
cell was suspended between the void and any possible future, between death (non-being) and life 
itself. I have also argued above that enforced submission and rigorous interrogation challenged 
social and ethical hierarchies, inverting the good and the true, and ultimately relocating him from 
the world of the above to the world of the below. From this new position, Bonhoeffer developed 
an ethical and theological justification for a borderline case or boundary situation, grounding his 
ongoing conspiratorial activities within the “life-christological” preservation of life grounded in 
concrete reality, thereby freeing him to act responsibly in genuine love for real human beings.  
The focus of my analysis thus far has rested primarily on texts outside of Bonhoeffer’s official 
correspondence during the interrogation period. These texts have offered critical insight into his 
early spatial, temporal, as well as ethical experience of imprisonment. In this final section, I will 
turn to examine Bonhoeffer’s official correspondence. This material shows that he turned toward 
the disorientation and discomfort of liminality from very early on, attempting at times to contain 
and reframe and at other times to let go. While the structures of the prison cell required 
submission, Bonhoeffer countered by instilling a strict inner and outer discipline, deepening the 
carceral design through the cultivation of a monastic order. Transforming the space of his cell 
into a monastic enclosure, Bonhoeffer was able to adapt to his situation and construct a place of 
resistance to the depersonalising forces of incarceration. This process of liminal transformation is 
slow in becoming and only beings to take shape in the second and third period of his 
imprisonment, however, the embryonic stages of this transformation are present right from the 
start; in form, if not in content. Through ritual performance, Bonhoeffer sought to transform the 
profane space of his cell into a sacred space of liminal displacement. In what follows, I will 
further seek to illustrate how the prison space becomes a formative place, in which Bonhoeffer is 
freed to encounter God in new ways. 
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Reading Bonhoeffer’s Official Letters 
I will first make a few important observations regarding interpretation of Bonhoeffer’s official 
letters. In contrast to his early notes on a “sense of time” and his essay on “telling the truth,” 
Bonhoeffer’s official letters offer a decidedly different picture of life in Tegel. They reflect a 
composure and reserve that mask any real sense of a crisis of meaning. The themes of 
personhood, death, the past, and even life, are starkly absent. Here the theme of discipline takes 
prominence, as well as the performance of spiritual practices and the attempt to make sense of 
the meaning and fruitfulness of liminality. Nevertheless, the production achieved in and through 
his response to separation and telling the truth (ethical separation) stands concealed within the 
experience of liminality expressed in his official correspondence. In contrast to the argument as 
it has preceded thus far, Bonhoeffer official correspondence suggests that he in fact valued his 
experience, for the way that it deepened his spiritual life and his understanding of being human. 
Looking toward his official correspondence then, three observations become important for 
understanding and interpreting his letters.  
The first observation is biographical. Bonhoeffer was known for being particularly proud of his 
bourgeois cultural inheritance, which had taught him the practice of discipline, reserve, and 
keeping silent about things that impacted one most deeply (Bethge, R 2000:202). He avoided 
self-promotion, valued privacy and discretion, and only rarely spoke of his deepest emotions, 
longings, and fears.69 In addition, it was not at all part of “his family’s tradition to speak openly 
and easily of intimate matters” (Beaudoin 2002:347). In this characteristic style, Bonhoeffer used 
his letters to reassure his parents that he was indeed doing well and that they had no need to be 
anxious or worried about his imprisonment (DBWE 8:56, 1/2).70  
                                                
69 In prison, as well as in other places, Bonhoeffer believed that confession was the only authentic place for sharing 
one’s innermost feelings and emotions. Dahill (2009:8) notes that Bonhoeffer “considered those who freely poured 
out their hearts to observers to be shamefully immodest.” See chapter 3 for discussion on this point in relation to 
Bonhoeffer’s fellow prisoner and walking partner. See also DBWE 8:200-201, 2/79; 286, 2/108. 
70 Bonhoeffer’s efforts to comfort his parents seems to have had an effect, as indicated in an unpublished letter from 
Paula Bonhoeffer on April 22, 1943 (NL, A 76,6): “Your letter has been a great relief to us. While we did not expect 
anything other than that you would calmly accept the external deprivations you are experiencing, it does give us 
great relief to read in your letter that you are really not doing badly and that we should really believe it.” 
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The second observation is socio-political. Bonhoeffer used his official correspondence71 to mask 
certain realities of his experience, not only from his parents, but also from the Reich Military 
officials who censored his letters. In Tegel, the institutional structures of surveillance functioned 
to conceal and limit the boundaries and trajectories of potential discourse. What and to whom he 
writes was confined by the power and limits of surveillance.72 In this context, Bonhoeffer was 
forced to present a performative image of himself, as a strong and capable pastor. Who being 
ignorant of legal matters – was perplexed by his sudden imprisonment, but willing to do his civil 
duty, enduring his time in Tegel in submission and obedience. Although this creates an 
interpretive environment of suspicion, it also focuses our attention on what he does in fact say 
and to whom. It invites us to think along with Bonhoeffer in understanding what he intends his 
readers to “know and indeed believe” (DBWE 8:56, 1/2).  
This leads to a third observation regarding his official letters. As a skilful writer, Bonhoeffer uses 
his official letters to contain and reframe his own experience. Writing is essentially an extension 
of his being. It is part of his way of relating both to himself and to others. It follows that 
Bonhoeffer uses his letters to observe, understand, interpret, and reflect upon his own experience 
of being a prisoner. In addition, his letters function as a quintessential part of his meaning 
making process. They act as a container helping him to draw very clear boundaries around his 
experience, holding back raw emotions and despair, while at the same time participating in the 
ongoing formation of self and community. In this way, they function as a reframing device, 
offering a medium for alternative appraisals and discernment of reality. While the boundaries of 
his life are severely curtailed and governed by surveillance and censorship, they are also self-
imposed to some degree by internal censors and restrictions.  
                                                
71 The archive of letters written by Bonhoeffer during the interrogation period were addressed exclusively to his 
aging parents, Karl and Paula Bonhoeffer, with the exception of one letter written to his bother-in-law and fellow 
conspirator Hans von Dohnanyi (DBWE 8:69, 1/10). DBWE 8 also contains a number of letters written to 
Bonhoeffer, including many letters from Karl and Paula Bonhoeffer, five letters from his brother Karl-Friedrich 
(DBWE 8:58, 1/4; 77-78, 1/15; 93-94, 1/23; 103-104,1/28; 116-117, 1/35), one letter from his sister Susanne Dreβ 
(DBWE 8:88, 1/19), one letter from his brother-in-law and fellow conspirator Hans von Dohnanyi (DBWE 8:59-61, 
1/5), one letter from his bother-in-law Rudiger Schleicher (DBWE 8:65, 1/8), two letters from the Senior Reich 
Military Court Prosecutor Dr. Manfred Roeder to Karl Bonhoeffer (DBWE 8:58, 1/3; 77, 1/15), one letter from Karl 
Bonhoeffer to the Senior Reich Military Court Prosecutor (DBWE 8:75, 1/13), as well as two of Bonhoeffer’s 
personal notes (DBWE 8:70-73, 1/11; 73-74, 1/12), and one “Wedding Sermon from the Prison Cell” (DBWE 8:82-
87, 1/18). 
72 “Until the end of July 1943, the censor only permitted Bonhoeffer to write letters to his parents every ten days” 
(DBWE 8:56 f.3). 
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Due to the complexity of his situation, Bonhoeffer’s official letters contain varying degrees of 
self-revelation. Untangling the lines of these threads in understanding the formative nature of this 
prison experience is not an easy task. His letters – regulated by internal and external censors – 
include moments of self-disclosure and self-containment, revelation and deception.73 Likewise, 
the theme of internal and external, disclosure and containment arise, I argue, not only as a facet 
of misdirection, but also as a result of the transitional phenomena of liminality. Nevertheless, 
these letters, as Beaudoin (2002:348) suggests, “always threaten to trick the reader, disavowing 
their originary referent in a lonely solitary prison cell.” Or as in the words of Ricoeur (as cited by 
Vosloo 2012:54) they are “like flashes of light in the dark.” Yet, these flashes of light continue to 
illuminate a life longing to discover wholeness amidst fragmentation. To discover the formative 
nature of his prison experience, we must read these letters like the censors, with critical and 
scrutinising eyes, stitching together the important threads that emerge from his often fragmentary 
and at times incomplete letters (Beaudoin 2002:348). All the while searching for the 
subterraneous continuities of his experience, his sense of self, and his continuing longing for 
connection to others on the “outside” world. 
Liminality between Inside and Outside 
Bonhoeffer’s life in a cell, as has been argued above, was initially tormenting, particularly as 
enforced solitude74 resulted in a dramatic loss of autonomy. “The door slammed shut and 
locked” (DBWE 8:418,3/158), severing the connection between the autonomous world “out 
there” (his former life) and the restrained world “in here” (the prison cell).75 This troubling sense 
of being “locked in” produced an external (agency impinging on him) and internal (frustration of 
                                                
73 Bonhoeffer considered this to be part of humanity’s awareness of shame: “Shame contains an acknowledgement 
of and protest against disunion, which is why human beings live between concealment and dislocation, between 
hiding and revealing themselves, between solitude and community. […] The most profound and most personal joys 
and pains must also be kept from being revealed in words” (DBWE 6:305). 
74 Hauerwas (2009:113) indicates that there is an important distinction in Bonhoeffer’s thinking between solitude 
and loneliness: “In Sanctorum Communio, he distinguished solitude from loneliness, associating the former with 
‘divine wrath’. Accordingly, he observed that ‘Solitude is an ethical category, and being under God’s wrath is worse 
than the misery of loneliness’ (DBWE 1, p. 285)”. However, in prison Bonhoeffer arrives at a new understanding of 
solitude. He writes, “Despite all the deprivations, I have also come to cherish the solitude” (DBWE 8:240, 2/89).  
75 See DBWE 8:61, 53, 80, 381, for specific uses of  “in here.” Variations of the metaphor, including (but not limited 
to) “inside/outside” and “internal/external,” are present throughout DBWE 8 and will be noted as they occur. 
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agency: not being able to get out or act) disjunction during the interrogation period.76 Within his 
cell the outside world along with the external circumstances of imprisonment (legal and carceral) 
were outside of his control. For him, the external deprivations, though significant, were more 
easily overcome than the “considerable internal adjustment” demanded by the solitude of his cell 
(DBWE 8:56, 1/2). As a result, the internal world was perceived as the solitary arena of agency. 
Yet, thereto he felt “restrained” and “confined” by an inner restlessness and lack of autonomy. 
Taking up this point Marsh (1994:138) argues that the “prison” - a metaphor Bonhoeffer had 
used in Act and Being to signify “intolerable self enclosure” – had “now become [concretely] 
real, ironically vicious and mocking.”77 What had been a “lonely self-imprisonment” in his 
younger years (Dahill 2009:30) was now dominated, not by the “masterful ego” (Dahill 
2009:60), but by the material enclosure and subjectification of his cell. Thus relegating all 
individual action and/or agency to the “realm of the invisible” (DBWE 8:155, 2/57). The 
contours of this self-enclosure are configured in Bonhoeffer’s early correspondence through 
outside/inside metaphors, underlining his spatial experience of the prison cell and its unbearable 
imprisoning solitude. Responding to this situation he attempted to focus on “what one still has 
and what can be done […] and on restraining within oneself the rising thoughts about what one 
cannot do and the inner restlessness and resentment about the entire situation” (DBWE 8:79, 
1/17).78 This theme is again notably present in a letter to Dohananyi on May 5, 1943: “We must 
simply let go of what we cannot accomplish and confine ourselves to what we can and should 
do” (DBWE 8:70, 1/10).79 In both texts, the external carceral sphere of restraint and confinement 
accent a sense of interior enclosure, in which Bonhoeffer was forced to turn inward to find an 
inner order and resolve for enduring his present situation. Although many interpreters of 
Bonhoeffer are highly suspicious of interiority and inwardness,80 as was Bonhoeffer to an 
                                                
76 See DBWE 8:56, 66, 68, 79, 84, 88, 91, 98, for references to internal or external relations. 
77 Quoting Bonhoeffer, Marsh (1994:138) goes on to say: “In Act and Being, written a decade and a half earlier in 
1929, Bonhoeffer described the world-constitutive claims of autonomous reason as a cry that only “dissembles the 
mute loneliness of isolation,” sounding “without echo into the world governed and construed by the self,” keeping 
the self a “prison to itself.” 
78 Emphasis is mine. 
79 Emphasis is mine. 
80 See Williams (1988:36-53) for a evaluation of what he sees as a critique of modern accounts of interiority and of 
the therapeutic self. 
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extent,81 it is clear that the carceral space initially intensified an experience of inwardness and 
self-enclosure. Longing to escape the circularities of solitude and the insidious monotony of his 
cell, Bonhoeffer’s chief task was to achieve an integrity of self in the face of assaults that came 
both from within and outside the self. 
The experience of self-enclosure and containment reveals an important feature of Bonhoeffer’s 
experience of liminality. Drawing on metaphor theory, Fludernik (1999:47) “treats the metaphor 
of containment [represented through outside/inside metaphors] as a prototypical scenario in 
which the subject or object resides within a container.”82 Typical of prison literature, “the 
container metaphor functionalizes the enclosing circumference of the container” and figures the 
“coordinates of carceral topography” (walls, doors, windows) through egress (exit) and ingress 
(entry) movements (Fludernik 1999:47). The container represents a limitational boundary (either 
prison walls or the body’s skin) – between the outside and the inside, the internal and the 
external – the circumference of which operates as a boundary, enclosing the subject within a 
liminal sphere. Operating as a threshold, the boundary of the container can be transgressed either 
positively or negatively in either direction – egress or ingress (Fludernik 1999:47).  Examination 
of the container metaphor, calls attention to important features of Bonhoeffer’s experience of 
carceral liminality, in which the structure of the carceral space is figured symbolically in his self-
identity, taking on internal and external relations within solitary confinement. Here we can 
observe the formative nature of the prison space acting negatively upon the prisoner and 
enclosing the self in isolation. 
A critical text that further illustrates the containment metaphor and its correlated movements of 
egress and ingress is found in Bonhoeffer’s letter to Bethge on May 30, 1944. Although this 
letter is from a much later period, it represents the climax of an outside/inside disjunction that 
began during the interrogation period and remained throughout the course of his imprisonment. 
                                                
81 See Northcott (2009:11-29) for a nuanced exploration of Bonhoeffer’s understanding of human identity, 
interiority, and inwardness. See also Marsh, C. 1992a. ‘In Defence of a Self: the Theological Search for a Post-
Modern Identity’, In SJT 55, 427-448; Marsh, C. 1992b. The Overabundant Self and the Transcendental Tradition: 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer on the Reflective Self. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 60(4):659-672.; and 
Marsh, C. 1994. Reclaiming Dietrich Bonhoeffer: The Promise of his Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
for a description of Bonhoeffer’s notion of the “Overabundant Self” and the “Reflective Self.” 
82 The following section draws from the carceral topography of Fludernik’s (1999) essay Carceral Topography: 
spatiality, liminality, and corporality in the literary prison.  
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I’m sitting up here in my cell, the house is quiet, a few birds are still singing outside, and there’s 
even a cuckoo calling in the distance. These long, warm evenings, which I’m now experiencing 
here for the second time, exhaust me somehow. They make one long to be outdoors, and one could 
do crazy things if one weren’t so ‘sensible.’ Could one perhaps have become too sensible already? 
After such a long time of deliberately beating back every desire one has, two serious consequences 
might follow: either one is burned out inside, or things all build up until one day there’s a terrible 
explosion (DBWE 8:407, 3/152).83 
Here the container metaphor and the relation between outside and inside, constitutes more than a 
spatial or territorial dividing line (like crossing the boundary between two nation states or 
walking through the outer gates of the prison). The boundary here constitutes a true threshold 
whose crossing marks a potential temporal and spatial transgression or transformation (Fludernik 
1999:46-47). In this text, the physical separation of outside/inside is figured symbolically as a 
bodily experience of containment. Desires held within the body through sensibility, may lead 
either to destruction from within, or transgression of one’s skin in an explosion. Furthermore, the 
deprivation of freedom and the danger of interiority in containment are intensified by the 
presence of bird’s singing in the distance outside. The bird’s ability to fly away, escaping 
imprisoning subjectivity, symbolically represents Bonhoeffer’s most fervid and pressing desires. 
Highlighting the symbolic nature of birds in prison literature, Fludernik (1995:55) suggests that 
the bird’s escape, retroactively “enhances the prisoner’s sense of solitude and hopelessness […] 
exacerbating the prisoners despondency.”84  
Alternatively, Bonhoeffer recognises that containment holds the potential for becoming “truly 
selfless” by crossing the boundary of self-enclosure and transcending the confines of imprisoning 
selfhood (DBWE 8:407, 3/152). Having experienced this interiority as “self-torture,” he chose 
instead to “escape into thinking, writing letters,” and for his own protection, forbid himself from 
desires that might contribute to his own sense of solitude and hopelesness (DBWE 8:407, 3/152). 
Here he realises that the threshold can be transgressed (negatively) or transcended (positively) 
from either side. Though he is unable to cross the threshold of the container, he finds a way to 
escape potential transgressions of the self. Bonhoeffer’s letter to his parents on May 15, 1943 
(mentioned earlier), illustrates a similar example of the egress/ingress boundary. Here physical 
                                                
83 Emphasis mine, except for Bonhoeffer’s own italics “Could one perhaps have become too sensible already?” 
84 In Bonhoeffer’s poem, ‘Who Am I?,’ enforced confinement is employed in the scenario of being caged like a bird: 
“Restless, yearning, sick, like a caged bird, / struggling for life breath, as if I were being strangled, / starving for 
colors, for flowers, for birdsong” (DBWE 8:459, 3/173). Here the prototypical imaging of being caged is employed 
to metaphorically image the imprisoning subjectivity of enforced confinement (Fludernik 1995:56). 
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containment had forced upon him an experience of “temptation” that came both from an “inner 
restlessness and resentment” and as an “attack from the outside” (DBWE 8:79, 1/17).85  
Positively figured, the boundary of the carceral topography (the walls and door of the cell), 
which were built to confine, also hold the threshold for a transcendent liberation, as in 
Bonhoeffer’s letter to Bethge on November 20, 1943. Here the prison cell becomes an analogy 
for transcendence: “a prison cell like this is a good analogy for Advent; one waits, hopes, does 
this or that – ultimately negligible things – the door is locked and can only be opened from the 
outside” (DBWE 8:188, 2/73).86 Ingress that had formally represented an attack from the outside 
is now transformed into a possible egress or escape. Waiting, which had intensified the loss of 
autonomy and agency now becomes a threshold of spiritual significance. In this way, the very 
same door that represented the limit of his existence, “opens him further to One who alone can 
open our prison doors” (Dahill 2006:12). In the space of the cell, transcendent freedom comes 
from outside the container of the cell and the self, through a positive connotation associated with 
the door of his cell.87 Here we can begin to see the formative nature of the prison space as it 
create a place for symbolic an opening up of the intolerable self-enclosure.  
In addition to the role of Christian holidays such as Advent,88 Bonhoeffer experienced a similar 
egress through the reception of letters that penetrate the prison boundary. Receiving a letter from 
his parents, he writes: “It is as if the door of the prison cell opened for a moment, and I 
experienced with you a slice of life on the outside. The longing for joy in this sombre building is 
great. […] One therefore makes the fullest use of all internal or external sources of joy” (DBWE 
8:98, 1/25).89 Again, the container is opened from the outside and life is experienced in genuine 
alterity. We can see here that Bonhoeffer is making every effort to achieve integrity of the self, 
in the face of an internal and external absence of joy.  
                                                
85 Here Bonhoeffer’s comments are followed by a reference to his essay on the “sense of time,” and therefore can be 
related to a temporal experience of liminality. 
86 Emphasis is Bonhoeffer’s. 
87 Fludernik (1999:49) comments on the liminality of the prison door, writing that “[t]he most important opening of 
the prison walls, the door, constitutes a point of egress but also of ingress […] therefore ambivalent in its positive 
and negative connotations.” 
88 This theme will be explored further in Chapter 3 of this study. 
89 Emphasis is mine. 
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It follows, as Moran (2013:339) rightfully indicates, that though the carceral space “seems to be 
sharply demarcated from the outside world, the prison wall is in fact more porous than might be 
assumed.” As a result, the carceral topography of containment becomes a powerful metaphor for 
the structural “openness of personal being” (SC 73; Dahill 2009:43). In liminality, the container 
marks off the boundary of both the body and the prison cell, acting “as a space of betweenness 
[sic] where a metaphorical threshold-crossing takes place between outside and inside,” and 
between Self and Other (Moran 2013:339). Thus experiences of freedom, of transcendence, of 
communion, and of home, are not inherently inhibited (though they seem to be) by the confines 
of the prison walls or by self-imprisonment. The boundary between the inside and outside, the 
past and the future, empty time and healing time, the enclosed self and the abundant self, 
individuality and community – the disjunction of which Bonhoeffer initially experiences as a 
profane space (formless and void) – overtime, become the very threshold whose crossing signals 
a freedom and a transformation of selfhood; a liberation from self-enclosure. Thus, in the 
confines of liminal space Bonhoeffer experiences the “openness of personal being” in a fresh and 
profound way:  
It is remarkable how in such night hours one’s thoughts revolve quite exclusively around those 
people without whom one wouldn’t want to live, and thinking of oneself recedes entirely or as 
good as disappears. Only then does one sense how interwoven one’s own life is with the life of 
other people, indeed, how the centre of one’s own life lies outside oneself and how little one is an 
isolated individual. The line ‘as if it were a part of myself’ is quite true, […]; human life extends 
far beyond one’s own bodily existence (DBWE 8:149-150, 2/54).90 
Experiencing the threshold of self-liberating communion with others, Bonhoeffer concludes that 
he no longer feels like an isolated individual, trapped in self-enclosure. This spiritual depth 
comes from God who has led him into liminality, who is guiding him through the void, and who 
will give him back his personhood. The two biblical passages that sum up this experience of 
liminality for Bonhoeffer, are Jer. 45:4-5 and Ps. 60:2. Both passages speak of a liminal 
existence, in which a former stability is destroyed so that a new life can grow in the cracks: “O 
God…. You have caused the land to quake; you have torn it open; repair the cracks in it, for it is 
tottering” (Ps.60:2) (DBWE 8:150, 2/54). It is likely that Bonhoeffer gravitated towards these 
biblical passages in his reading of scripture, because they correspond with the theme of his own 
experience; former structures breaking down, being plucked up and the earth being torn open. 
                                                
90 Emphasis is mine.  
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Here the enforced solitude of below has broken down former social structures of selfhood, 
tearing open a holy space of displacement in which sacred liminality can do its work. 
Liminality and the Divine Ordering of Reality  
As argued above, the isolating enclosure of his prison cell was eased through symbolically 
configured metaphors for the transcendence of self-enclosure. This transformation came not as 
the result of the “masterful ego” or a concerted act of resistance, but rather, through the 
development of a quasi-monastic order. The disorientation of liminality opens up a formative 
space for incorporation of others as the centre one’s own life.  Building upon the section above, I 
will show how Bonhoeffer’s cell was transformed from a penal enclosure into a monastic 
enclosure, through the performance of spiritual practices he learned at Finkenwalde and 
elsewhere. These spiritual disciplines receive a new depth and reality as a result of the enforced 
solitude of below. Bonhoeffer sought to bring order to his experience of enforced solitude, 
reframing it as a liminal and sacred displacement. This reframing represents both a fundamental 
response to, as well as the generative fruit of the liminal reality described in the previous two 
section. Reframing liminality as a sacred displacement, Bonhoeffer sought bring the “microcosm 
that is the self – body and soul… into peaceable harmony with the macrocosm of cosmos and 
Church that are the theatres of the glory of God” (Northcott 2009:24). 
This transformation began in the daily struggle to order his new spatial and temporary 
experience. Seeking to hedge in the emptiness of time, contain his desires, and regain a sense of 
agency and order, Bonhoeffer found an “antidote” in the establishment of a “strict order” 
(DBWE 8:74, 1/12) and a daily routine (DBWE 8:63, 1/6; 66, 1/9; 79, 1/17) from which he did 
not depart. Bethge (2000:831) indicates that this order consisted of “physical exercise, his long-
accustomed meditation, and, after his Bible was returned to him on the third day, memorizing 
and reading the Scriptures.” These practices of discipline represented the one remaining place of 
control and a primary means of overcoming self-enclosure in the confines of solitude. 
Bonhoeffer feared that the transgression of this order, “would have been the beginning of 
capitulation, from which presumably worse things would have followed” (DBWE 8:227, 2/88) – 
including a loss of orientation and subjective identity. Contesting with capitulation, Bonhoeffer 
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endeavoured to reorient the disordered self within the formational practices of the Christian 
tradition (Northcott 2009:23). Patterning his day on a cycled rhythm of reading, meditation, 
prayer, and academic work initially helped in easing the horrifying passing of time and gave him 
“some strength for inner order” (DBWE 8:227, 2/88).  
To some extent, however, Bonhoeffer’s official letters reveal a disciplined and conscious 
suppression of self-disclosure and the reality of his carceral suffering. Attempting to fight back 
disorder and inner temptation he appears weary of admitting, even to himself, just how 
oppressive life in prison was. He sought instead to reframe his experience as a “good steam bath 
for the soul” (DBWE 8:56, 1/2). This reframing, though part of his effort to reassure his parents, 
also points towards the implications of a life lived in the cost of discipleship and the self-denial 
and taking up of one’s cross that he saw as an integral part of following Jesus Christ (Willmer 
1999:175).  
In addition, Bonhoeffer’s letters reveal a particular self-mortification and detachment of the self 
and its desires. At some level, it appears that he feared that the body, confined within the 
architecture of solitude, would be prone to sentimentality, becoming the irrational and unruly site 
of emotion and desire that threatened to lead the mind, soul, and spirit astray.91 In this 
environment, the body was to be trained through discipline in order to quiet its loud coercive 
demands. For example, when reflecting on his growing sentimental relationship with animals, he 
wrote: “Prisoners are probably inclined in general to react to the lack of warmth and comfort 
they experience in their environment with an excessive heightening of their emotional side and 
may easily overreact in all personal and emotional matters” (DBWE 8:110-111, 1/31). 
Bonhoeffer feared this would lead to a “so-called prison psychosis,” and in such cases, he 
believed that the Christian faith was effective in restoring order to one’s life and in rendering 
levelheadedness (DBWE 8:111, 1/31).  
On a hypercritical level, Bonhoeffer’s assessment of the prisoner’s experience of material 
incarceration highlights the kind of “examination” and “normalization” techniques analysed by 
                                                
91 This view of the body and its emotional irrationality can also be read into the first stanza (Discipline) of 
Bonhoeffer’s poem ‘Stations on the Way to Freedom” (DBWE 8:512, 4/191). 
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Foucault (Gordon 1999:399).92 By categorising the excessive heightening of emotional reactions 
as abnormal behaviour leading to prison psychosis, Bonhoeffer essentially normalises the body’s 
behaviour by demarcating the boundaries or limits of what is respectable or sensible (Gordon 
1999:399; DBWE 8:407, 3/152). To restore order to the body Bonhoeffer turned to the Christian 
tradition. Read here through a critical Foucauldian lens, Bonhoeffer’s self-mortification and self-
suppression of emotion and desire (DBWE 8:407, 3/152) implies an internalisation of the 
disciplinary requirements of the monastic and carceral structures that confine and restrain the 
soul within normalised categories of bodily behaviour. Reframing the prison cell as a monastic 
enclosure of interior solitude and a “good steam bath for the soul,” Bonhoeffer’s language 
evokes notions of the discursive practices of the “technologies of the self,” through which “the 
micro-powers and technologies of control” (Lacombe 1996:332), at work inside and outside the 
carceral enclosure, achieve the subjugation of bodies, “ensuring that the ‘soul’ conforms to the 
existing rules, codes, and mores” (Gordon 1999:399).93  
Bonhoeffer’s critical surveillance of self and other prisoners may have at times fallen prey to the 
“examination” and “normalisation” techniques of the panoptic “gaze.” This was likely true 
throughout his life, especially due to his own social privilege and cultural heritage. On another 
level, however, these moments of observation were also part of a growing self-awareness.94 
                                                
92 Gordon (1999:399) indicates that the power of normalisation “determines the ‘acceptable’ limits of behavior [sic] 
by demarcating the normal and ‘respectable’” (Gordon 1999:399).   
93 Ulrich (2009:156) maintains that there is “no hint” of the “disciplining techniques analysed by Foucault and 
others” in Bonhoeffer’s practice of discipline. It is my belief, however, that he too quickly discards Foucault’s 
analysis in an attempt to safeguard the practice of Christian spiritual disciplines against Foucault’s notion of 
technologies of control. Moreover, it is naïve and theologically irresponsible to disregard the correlating 
technologies of subjectification of body and soul that Foucault highlights in both the carceral and monastic contexts. 
To speak about discipline in the prison context with out mention of Foucault, would be to speak of Bonhoeffer’s 
theology without acknowledging his Christological focus; the two have become synonymous. Northcott’s (2009:24) 
evaluation on this point is more nuanced than Ulrich’s and becomes instructive for understanding Bonhoeffer’s 
experience of enforced solitude. Northcott (2009:24) insists: “we cannot understanding Bonhoeffer’s theological 
account of human identity […] without seeing it in the context of his recovery of what Foucault, I think rather 
misleadingly, calls the ‘technologies of the self.’” Beaudoin’s (2002:348, emphasis is his) thesis takes us further, 
arguing: “Bonhoeffer’s letters reveal fragments for a Christian technology of the self founding an apophatic relation 
to the self.” See Beaudoin, T. 2002. I Was Imprisoned by Subjectivity and you Visited Me: Bonhoeffer and Foucault 
on the Way to a Postmodern Christian Self. Currents in Theology and Mission,29(5):341-361.  
94 Although Bonhoeffer later speaks of an aversion to such self-reflection/self-awareness (DBWE 8:221, 2/86) and 
“condemns those in the fields of pastoral or psychological counselling who advocate such self-knowledge,” his 
letters reveal a sustained attentiveness to the movements of the Spirit and attention to the self (Dahill 2009:58). 
Bonhoeffer’s “reluctance to open himself to self-disclosure” is in part, a manifestation of the fact that he had 
“extremely strong personal boundaries and was careful and intentional about what he revealed and to whom” (Dahill 
2009:207). His earlier theological reflections overwhelmingly associated the self with sin and self-disclosure with a 
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Bonhoeffer’s withdrawal from emotional sensitivity was ultimately provoked by a heightened 
connection with the order of creation and an embrace of earthly life. During his daily walks, he 
had developed a deep connection with the tits (chickadee’s) that nested in the courtyard. When a 
“heartless fellow destroyed everything” by knocking the nest to the ground (killing them in the 
process), Bonhoeffer sensed a vulnerability and a self-disclosure that frightened him (DBWE 
8:110, 1/31). This insensitivity threatened not only to destroy his hope, but his vulnerable 
humanity. Withdrawing from this abuse into the self, Bonhoeffer observed his own heightened 
connection with creation and the danger of disclosing the connections between the self and life 
outside the self in such a space of vulnerability. His normalisation of emotion arguably functions 
as self-defence rather than self-enclosure. This self-awareness eventually comes full circle in a 
deeper awareness of the Christian faith, “properly understood” (DBWE 8:110, 1/31).  
The pattern of connection-withdrawal-deeper-connection highlights an important aspect of 
Bonhoeffer’s ordered life. In his cell, where the chaos of empty time threatened to undo the 
primal structures of reality itself, Bonhoeffer longed for an ordered life, as a way of participating 
in a divine order. Amidst the void, Dahill (2006:5) writes that “a fundamental gift of God is 
simply that of the most basic ongoing ordering of things: space to breathe, a structure of prayer 
and communal life that points to the reality of God ordering and ruling all things still.” Through 
spiritual practices and a quasi-monastic order, Bonhoeffer sought to open a space within the self, 
for the experience of a different reality. One not governed by the dominant carceral discourse 
and order of that surrounded him ideologically and materially. For Bonhoeffer, this cosmic order 
counters (rather than unconsciously internalises)95 the external discipline of the structural 
carceral requirements. In this way he participates in the formation of the self in Christ and in the 
order of the Christian community. Participation in this divine ordering of reality ultimately 
strengthened his resolve against the disciplinary order of his cell.  
                                                
shameful exposure of self. Throughout his imprisonment, there is a sense that he is struggling to reconcile an 
authentic self-awareness with his deeper fears of self-disclosure as shameful. Bonhoeffer’s poetry represents an 
openness to self-disclosure and a new sense of self that is on the verge of making itself visible. The beginnings of 
this transformation can be detected in his early self-defence and his need to draw clear boundaries around his 
experience. 
95 Bonhoeffer saw such an unconscious internalisation as a problem: “Now after four weeks of imprisonment, the 
quick, conscious, internal reconciliation with my fate is being gradually complemented by a certain unconscious, 
natural acclimation to the situation. This is a relief, but it also has its problems, for one should rather not want or 
ought to get used to this situation; you will feel the same way” (DBWE 8:66, 1/9). 
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Resisting a naïve analysis of this transformation (from carceral enclosure to monastic enclosure); 
it is important to illustrate two ways in which Bonhoeffer’s view of Christian discipline counters 
the carceral disciplinary forces analysed by Foucault. Firstly, Bonhoeffer’s understanding of a 
counter order, glimpsed in his teaching from a weekend Confessing Church retreat in 1940,96 
illustrates how the order of the Christian community stands in opposition to a state order of 
useful or passive subjectification. Bonhoeffer conceived of two opposing “orders” facing each 
other: 
On the one side, the state’s demand toward exerting all energies to secure life for the people, and, 
on the other side, the ordering of the Christian community to submit to the command of Christ 
alone. If the state continues to force each individual to work on its own behalf, it thereby prevents 
the individual person who believes in God from achieving the highest insight on the Christian path. 
Currently work is a necessity. This means that the state has made a necessity into a virtue by setting 
up work as the most important consideration at present. For this reason, the Confessing Church 
must fight to ensure that the state allows the individual sufficient free time to live out the Christian 
faith (DBWE 16:66, 1/15). 
Here the order of the Christian community, in submission to Christ alone liberates the individual 
from the coercive disciplinary techniques of National Socialism. In contrast to the practiced 
production of “passive subjectivity” through structural technologies, towards the end of 
producing useful individuals and working bodies, Bonhoeffer saw in the ordering of the 
Christian community, a way of setting the body free in God’s good world, by setting limits to 
“governmental power over the body” (DBWE 6:213). In Ethics, Bonhoeffer’s notion of 
protecting bodily life, insists that “[t]he human body never becomes simply a thing that might 
fall under the unbounded power of the other person, to be used only as a means to that person’s 
ends. The living human body is always the human person himself or herself” (DBWE 6:214). 
Within this discussion, he regarded the exploitation (Ausbeutung) of the human body by other 
persons or institutions, including arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, to be a “violation of the 
freedom that is granted to the human body” (DBWE 6:217). In submission to the reality of Christ 
in his cell, Bonhoeffer was discovering anew how God’s cosmic order ultimately shelters “the 
mystery of human bodiliness” (DBWE 6:214) and creates a space for an embrace of bodily life 
that resists the coercive forces of the state apparatus. This insight may form part of Bonhoeffer’s 
later aversion to the blackmail of religion that uses power over to coerce the weak into religion. 
                                                
96 These notes, which record Bonhoeffer’s teaching at the retreat, are part of a Gestapo surveillance report written by 
a participant of the retreat, Heinz Bracks, who was operating as a Nazi spy (DBWE 16:68, 1/15). 
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Secondly, the transformation of his cell into a monastic enclosure, counters naïve appraisals of 
self-mortification and interiority. On this point, Northcott (2009:24) insists that Foucault’s 
“technologies of the self” is misleadingly in that it locates the invention of Christian spiritual 
practices in medieval monastic Catholicism, and in the panoptic “gaze” of God, that penetrates 
the subject. Countering this appraisal, Northcott (2009:24) argues that these practices of spiritual 
discipline gain their sustaining force, not in medieval monasticism and the panoptic “gaze,” but 
in the “Jewish disciplines of the soul” (practices of contemplation, confession, meditation on the 
Word and singing of Psalms); in the practices of the early desert fathers (solitary life and 
substantial human interiority); and within the larger “divine plan of salvation of the world.” 
Bonhoeffer’s practice of prayer and meditation on the Word and Psalms was not a passive 
subjectification produced by power,97 but an agency forming conformation of the self (body and 
soul) to the cosmic purposes of God revealed in Jesus Christ and the way of the cross. The desert 
fathers, the monastics, and Bonhoeffer in his prison cell after them, all engaged in the spiritual 
struggle of liminality. Displaced from their former lives, they sought to “purify their desires and 
recover the true self, restored by the Spirit, through askesis, prayer, and solitude” (Northcott 
2009:25). Therefore, as Northcott (2009:24) maintains, it is inaccurate to speak of the practices 
of the monastic enclosure as “technologies of the self,” as they are primarily: 
…practices by which Christians for two thousand years have trained themselves together and in 
solitude for the holy life, so that the microcosm that is the self – body and soul – is brought into 
peaceable harmony with the macrocosm of cosmos and Church that are the theatres of the glory of 
God, even as each individual self bears the divine image (Northcott 2009:24). 
Liminality and the Enforced Solitude of Below 
Bonhoeffer’s transformation of the carceral space of the prison cell into a monastic enclosure, 
helped him to navigate the disorientation of liminality by reframing it within a long line of 
Christina tradition grounded in practices of the Israelites, the desert fathers and monastics.98 For 
                                                
97  See Gordon (1999:395-414) for an ontological reading of “Foucault’s Subject.” Here Gordon (1999:396) argues: 
“in his later work Foucault strove to resituate the subject, seeking balance between agency and structure, activity and 
passivity.   
98 Rather than producing a docile body, these practices of spiritual discipline cultivated agency and formed the self 
in harmony with the cosmos. 
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Bonhoeffer, this monastic discipline did not originate in his prison cell, although it certainly took 
new shape there. Already with the Seminarians at Finkenwalde, Bonhoeffer had built solitude 
into the patterned rhythm of life, with both times together as well as the “need for prayerful time 
alone” (Kelly & Nelson 2003:154). At Finkenwalde and in the years of his active involvement in 
the conspiracy, Bonhoeffer sensed that daily meditation and prayer were the key to following 
Christ in social, political, and spiritual liminality, without which each day would be “without 
meaning and substance” (DBWE 16:139, 1/71). Throughout the war, Bonhoeffer continued to 
remind the ordinands in his circular letters, of the importance of these practices. In one such 
letter, Bonhoeffer urged his former students not to abandon the vital practice of daily meditation, 
for it was, “particularly important for us today” (DBWE 16:244, 1/44). Bonhoeffer’s further 
elaboration of the point is instructive for understanding the significance of his life in prison. He 
goes on to say: 
Daily silent reflection on the word of God as it applies to me […] tends to become the 
crystallization of all that brings inner and outer order to my life. With the interruption and 
dissolution of our previously ordered life that the present age has brought about – with the danger 
of losing our inner order through the profusion of events, through the all-consuming claims of work 
and service, through doubts and moral conflicts [Anfechtung], battle and unrest of all kinds – 
meditation gives our life something like constancy. It preserves the connection with our former life, 
[…] it sustains us in the healing community of the congregation, […] it is a fountain of peace, of 
patience, and of joy; it is like a magnet directing all the available powers for ordering our life 
toward its pole; it is like pure deep water in which the heavens with their clouds and sun are 
radiantly mirrored. But it also serves the Most High, in that it opens for God a space of discipline 
and quiet, of healing order and contentment (DBWE 16:254, 1/144).   
In prison Bonhoeffer needed this healing order more than ever, this magnetic pole of orientation, 
this constancy of life that brings together the fragmentary elements of ones past and of ones 
disoriented self. In the enclosure of his cell, as the world outside continued to race by, he was 
learning afresh the absolute necessity of spiritual order, discipline, and prayer in a chaotic world. 
This was not a blind submission to an abstract fate or to the apparently inevitable will of God, 
but a participation in a divine order, a means of discovering the constancy and integrity of ones 
life, hidden in the liminal space that daily silent reflection creates for God. Finding this 
significance afresh in the practice of daily meditation on God’s Word helped Bonhoeffer to 
endure the constant waiting with patience and gratitude.  
Building on the practices of Finkenwalde, Bonhoeffer reframes the liminality of his cell within 
this wider tradition, thereby deepening his carceral solitude through the self-disciplining (body 
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and soul) practices of the monastic enclosure.99 This disciplinary order is grounded in the human 
capacity to open a space of discipline and quiet for the continual conformation of the self to 
Christ. Countering the external discipline of the prison regulations with a self-imposed inner 
discipline (Gremmels 2010:568), Bonhoeffer’s cell becomes a site of autonomy and agency and 
his body the liminal site for both submission to God and resistance to any encroachment on the 
freedom of bodily life.  
These practices reflect both Bonhoeffer’s sympathies for the vita contemplativa,100 as well as the 
pathos of his spiritual life. Yet, his overall sympathies for solitude and silence derive from an 
earlier biographical feature. Dahill (2001:190) claims that “[f]or Bonhoeffer, the only way out of 
the sterile and lonely wasteland his ‘imprisoning ego’ had created was to experience himself as 
‘totally claimless’ in the face of the ‘absolute demand’ of the other.”101 Beginning in the early 
1930’s, Bonhoeffer framed his conversion to Jesus Christ in prayer and Scripture, as a movement 
into submission, “of surrendering at last to reality in the form of the concrete divine or human 
other” (Dahill 2001:191). Whereas, the silence and solitude of Finkenwalde had been part-and 
parcel of this process of spiritual growth, prison now represented the “absolute demand” and 
“total claim” of the other. It is my contention that in the liminal space of enforced solitude, the 
                                                
99 Fitzpatrick (2003:99-100) refers to three levels of “enclosure” within monastic orders. Each of these levels 
corresponds with Bonhoeffer’s experience and deepens our understanding of his life in a prison cell. The first level 
is material, signifying a particular space within physical boundaries, in which only those who belong go and from 
which they leave only for specific purposes. The second level is juridic, indicating a particular order, rule, or law 
that governs the life of this material space and those who live in it. The third and final level refers to the monastic 
value – solitude. Solitude is both a material and an interior space that indicates the “practice or discipline of 
enclosure as a way of guarding one’s heart” (Fitzpatrick 2003:100). Or in the words of Olivera (as cited by 
Fitzpatrick 2003:100): “Solitude of the heart and the concentration of all one’s strength in the search for God require 
an interior solitude fortified and manifest by exterior solitude.” 
100 Bonhoeffer had patterned the life of Finkenwalde on communities he had visited in England, including Anglican 
monasteries, as well as the “seminars of Presbyterians and Congregationalists, plus the Methodist College of 
Richmond” (Kelly 1996:13). 
101 Bonhoeffer was born into a culture and family that prized intellectual achievement and fostered critical thinking 
and ego strength. Ultimately this upbringing spurred him on toward the driving intellectual ambition that 
characterized his early years of study. While Bonhoeffer was an amazingly gifted and brilliant young thinker who 
earned a great deal of praise and attention for his success as a theological thinker, this ultimately came at a cost for 
him personally. Drawing on Green’s (1972) seminal work on human sociality, Dahill (2001:189) observes that 
Bonhoeffer’s “experience of this drive of ambition and ego was an extremely alienating one” that often left him 
feeling “cut off from God and others in their genuine alterity.” Even as a boy, Bethge (2000:39) recounts, that 
“despite his reputation for sociability and even-temperedness,” Bonhoeffer was known for suddenly withdrawing 
“from a lively conversation into solitude” (Bethge 2000:39). Therefore, not in spite of, but as a result of his 
“dominating ego”, Bonhoeffer often experienced what he describes as a “self-confinement and isolation of the very 
loneliest solitude with its tormenting desolation and sterility” (DBWE 2:42). 
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boundaries of Bonhoeffer’s prison cell became a threshold for self-enclosure, whose crossing 
signalled a new transformation of self. The prison cell, figured symbolically, becomes the 
threshold for a final liberating jailbreak from the “imprisoning ego.”   
This movement is fundamentally intensified by the enforced solitude of prison. At Finkenwalde, 
silence and solitude were chosen in freedom, at least for Bonhoeffer. In his cell at Tegel, solitude 
was not a freedom but the only option. On May 15, 1943, just over a month into his 
imprisonment, he wrote to his parents, “Despite all my sympathies for the vita contemplativa, I 
am nevertheless not a born Trappist monk. Anyhow, a time of enforced silence may be a good 
thing” (DBWE 8:81, 1/17). Although he longed for silence and solitude, Bonhoeffer sensed that 
enforced silence presented a completely new challenge.102 This challenge is seen in the clear 
contrast between the practices of Finkenwalde and those of Tegel. At Finkenwalde Bonhoeffer 
had been in control.103 He had continued to stress the practice of contemplative meditation, 
solitude, and prayer even in the face of much resistance from the ordinands and other church 
authorities. While he engaged in these practices along with the ordinands, he was not in anyway 
a postulate himself. He remained in control of these practices, in the position of the above, while 
the ordinands held the submissive position of below. As a result, the completely new situation 
brought on by imprisonment demanded a considerable internal adjustment for Bonhoeffer. He 
now practised enforced silence in the cell of the below.  
There is little doubt that this gave him a new perspective on the practices of Finkenwalde. But 
more than that, it forced him into a liminal position of submission, opening a space for the self’s 
confirmation with Christ through the ritual practices of meditation and of reading and 
memorising the scriptures. Bonhoeffer was now participating in the contemplative life, detached 
from the centre and displaced from the controlling position of above. Like the practices of the 
desert fathers and the monastics after them, solitude was intended to be a chosen liminal 
displacement, leaving the ego off balance in a shapeless world where new questions and answers 
could to arise. Being forced into this liminal space was uncomfortable, yet Bonhoeffer was 
                                                
102 Karl Bonhoeffer also expressed his concern for Dietrich, regarding prolonged isolation: “It is unhealthy to be 
dependent solely on meditation, even for someone who enjoys being alone, for it is contrary to our nature as human 
beings, who, after all, have been given language as a means of communication” (DBWE 8:76, 1/14). 
103 Reflecting on morning and evening devotion in a letter to Bethge on February 4, 1941, Bonhoeffer longs for 
memories of Finkenwalde: “I miss Finkenwalde, Schlönwitz, Sigurdshof more and more. Life Together was in many 
was a swan song’ (DBWE 16:139, 1/71). 
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discovering that it held the potential for developing new eyes – the “view from below.” In the 
context of emptiness instead of fullness, of defacing anonymity instead of persona, of poverty 
instead of plenty, and of below instead of above – Bonhoeffer was now learning to understand, 
more than ever before, what it meant to be human before God. No longer in control of these 
practices, but in submission to them, something genuinely new could happen. In the context of 
disorientation and enforced solitude, Bonhoeffer experiences a transformation of the formless 
space of the profane, into a sacred space where God could do something new. 
Conclusion: Navigating Separation 
Throughout this chapter my aim has been to delineate the contours of Bonhoeffer’s reflective 
engagement with imprisonment, as derived from his experience and as articulated in his writings 
on a “sense of time,” “telling the truth,” as well as fragments from his official letters. I have 
characterised this engagement as an experience of liminal space, in which he longed for a place 
to stand in a groundless world and for order amidst the formless chaos of empty time. Initially he 
grounded himself through the practice of active remembering, through the “life-christological” 
practice of maintaining relation to the living truth in boundary situations, and through the cosmic 
ordering of reality and self experienced through the spiritual disciplines of the Christian tradition. 
The formative and transformative space Bonhoeffer experienced during this period can be seen 
in the way that each unique response to liminality reframes the below of imprisonment as a 
liminal displacement, transforming the spatial and temporal spheres of his prison cell into a 
fruitful monastic enclosure.  
Returning in conclusion to question the formative nature of his prison experience, we can see 
that while Bonhoeffer endured the defacement of self-identity brought on by prison admission, 
initiation, and interrogation, he also consciously resisted taking on an institutional identity. He 
allowed himself to let go of certain lost privileges, while at the same time privately and 
publically resisting the behaviour of prison formation that he saw displayed in the guards and 
prisoners of Tegel. The liminal space created by his dramatic transition into the prison space 
provoked three movements that can be seen as spiritually and theologically formative for 
Bonhoeffer. Each of Bonhoefer’s responses to the disorientation of liminality, as interpreted 
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above, function simultaneously as a resistance to the isolating separation of imprisonment and a 
submission to the generatively formative encounter with the self, with others, with Jesus Christ, 
and with God. In the form of his notes on time Bonhoeffer consciously resists the emptiness of 
time experienced in a prison cell through active remembering and recovery of the past. Here the 
leitmotif of death plays a prominent role, exposing the vulnerability of personhood, the fragility 
of memory and the past, and the profound absence of the others intensified by separation. In the 
form of his essay on “telling the truth” he offers an alternative vision of reality, locating truth in 
life itself through “life-christological” content and thereby denouncing the lifeless and 
destructive forces of the biopolitical power of National Socialist ideologies. In this movement we 
see an early development of his later theology of life, grounding his own life in the concrete 
reality of this world by participating in the life of Jesus Christ and becoming-for-the-other. And 
finally in the deepening of the carceral space of enforced solitude we see the practices of the 
Christian spiritual tradition transform the materiality of his cell into the liminal space of the 
monastic enclosure. No longer in control of these practices Bonhoeffer is free to encounter the 
God of displacement in a new way.  
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Chapter 3: Liminality as Transition 
Action 
Not always doing and daring what's random, but seeking the right thing, 
Hover not over the possible, but boldly reach for the real. 
Not in escaping to thought, in action alone is found freedom. 
Dare to quit anxious faltering and enter the storm of events, 
carried alone by your faith and by God's good commandments, 
then true freedom will come and embrace your spirit, rejoicing.104 
 
But isn't it an essential part of human maturity, as opposed to immaturity, that your center of 
gravity is always wherever you happen to be at the moment, and that even longing for the 
fulfillment of your wishes can't pull you off balance, away from being your complete self, 
wherever you are?105 
Introduction 
This chapter offers a close reading of the awaiting trial period (August 1943 to April 1944).106 
Bonhoeffer’s letters from this period indicate a struggle to find his centre of gravity in the 
present moment (in prison) and remain his complete self amidst the discontinuity and 
fragmentation of liminal space (DBWE 8:324, 2/122). This struggle to find a balance as one’s 
complete self can be characterised as the second phase of liminality – transition – in which the 
liminar “must move from the liminal condition… by breaking through critical inflection points 
or turning points at the heart of the betwixt condition” before entering or becoming “incorporated 
into another social status” (Palmer, Kane, and Owens 2009:41). Two fundamental aspects of this 
transition are the search for a new “self-concept” (Noble & Walker 1997:32) and the capacity to 
construct an integrated and meaningful view of life out of the fragments of liminal disorientation. 
In contrast to the traditional theoretical framework of liminality, which purports a distinctively 
linear progression from the transition phase, toward – in this context – a relatively stable and 
new socially embodied incorporation into prison life, I will highlight the curiously “static and 
                                                
104 Second Stanza of Bonhoeffer’s poem ‘Station on the Way to Freedom’ (DBWE 8:513, 4/191).  
105 Letter to Eberhard Bethge, March 19, 1944 (DBWE 8:324, 2/122). 
106 de Gruchy (2010:13) notes that on July 30, 1943, “Bonhoeffer was informed that the preliminary investigation 
into his case had been concluded.” This marked the end of the interrogation period and the beginning of a 
transitional period characterised by waiting – Awaiting the Trial. 
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frustratingly repetitive” nature of Bonhoeffer’s experience of liminality in the prison space 
(Moran 2011:340).  
Drawing on Moran’s (2001:340) observations of the “static and repetitive” quality of liminality 
in the prison space, I am not implying non-movement in Bonhoeffer’s spiritual journey. Moving 
in and out of repetitive liminal moments, Bonhoeffer does not remain the same, since every 
repetitive act occurs within a context that has been effected by the further movement of time, 
history, and memory (and previous liminal performances), so that repetition always implies 
“difference” and “movement” because it occurs in a different context of meaning. Countering the 
traditional understanding of liminality as a linear transition “between two distinct forms of 
being” (Moran 2011:340), I will show the cumulative transformative effect of both resisting and 
submitting to the ongoing nature of liminality, simultaneously prolonging a state of between-ness 
and opening up the tensions within liminality towards a cumulatively formative and 
transformative state of being.  
Although Bonhoeffer observes in himself a “gradual process of habituation and adaptation” 
(DBWE 8:145, 2/50), it is clear that he resists the carceral structures designed to guide the 
prisoner’s transition into carceral identity and prison life. As he observed himself becoming 
comfortable with the conditions of imprisonment he made a conscious effort to reorient himself 
(DBWE 8:145, 2/50). I believe that this process of conscious reorientation can be understood 
within the framework of “turning points” at the heart of Bonhoeffer’s experience of betwixt 
space. These turning points interrupt regular patterns of behaviour and thought associated with 
his betwixt transitioning and ultimately shape, alter, or indeed accentuate the ways in which he 
makes meaningful connections with others and discovers spiritual and theological meaning and 
significance in the events of prison life. For the purposes of this study, a turning point is defined 
as an event or an experience, which triggers and results in the prisoner’s discovery of meaning 
within the prison experience; meaning that ultimately goes beyond separation and suffering, 
inviting possibilities for spiritually and theologically formative growth.   
The argument as it proceeds will examine two fundamental areas of experience that function as 
turning points, in which liminality becomes potentially formative and transformative. The first 
section examines what Bonhoeffer describes as a “state of being led.” Here I focus on 
Bonhoeffer’s concrete spirituality and the ways in which the tensions experienced in the prison 
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space call for a renegotiation of self, relationality, and the spiritual significance of life with God. 
The second section focuses on multiple role transitions expressed in his letters, giving shape to 
his emerging pastoral role within the prison space and his developing humanistic insights 
concerning the preservation of life. I examine how specific transitions between multiple roles 
and social locations of responsibility through the practice of spiritual care for others, 
simultaneously calls into question his self-concept, while also offering a stable pole of 
orientation for others. It is concluded that by resisting incorporation into prison life, Bonhoeffer 
not only prolongs the disorientation of liminality, but ultimately learns to live as a whole human 
being in the midst of liminality, holding together the fragmentary pieces of his life so that 
through participation in the life of Jesus Christ they might become part of some larger whole. 
Transition and Bonhoeffer’s Concrete Spirituality 
In light of the broader purpose of this chapter, I intend here to trace a set of transitional 
experiences or turning points within liminality that highlight Bonhoeffer’s developing spiritual 
life within the prison space. To substantiate this argument I will examine a set of contrasting 
experiences, which give voice to the formative nature of betwixt space. The discontinuities and 
continuities of this space are shaped and accentuated by these opposite poles of experience: 
home and prison, absence and communion, and dislocation and located-ness. It is clear that 
Bonhoeffer experiences the space between these themes as simultaneously liberating and 
constraining in relation to the development of a concrete spirituality.107 Rather than collapsing 
the tension between these internal and external conflicts of opposites – that appear irresolvable in 
their original form – Bonhoeffer discovers a space in which the opposites can be brought 
together, fundamentally bridging the inner and outer experience. In this “between” or transitional 
arena, an experience of freedom is found. By tolerating the tension of opposites without settling 
on one pole of the spectrum, Bonhoeffer learns to navigate liminality and over-time a new state 
of being is realised, despite his continued experience of liminality.  
                                                
107 Dahill (2009:86) indicates, “an authentically Christian spirituality, for Bonhoeffer, is necessarily highly concrete. 
The interconnections between God and the world that for him define ‘concreteness’ are manifested always and only 
in the particular.” 
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Bonhoeffer conceptualises this process as a space in which “God meets us not only as Thou but 
also in the ‘disguise’ of an ‘It’” (DBWE 8:304, 2/115). Giving rise to the question:  “how to find 
the ‘Thou’ in this ‘It’ (i.e., ‘fate’), or in other words… how ‘fate’ really becomes ‘the state of 
being led’” (DBWE 8:304, 2/115). This notion emerges within liminality as the trajectories of 
“resistance” and “submission” present Bonhoeffer with a contrast of opposites (DBWE 8:303, 
2/115). Navigating the boundary line between these two forces he determines that there can be 
no principle distinction – when to “stand up to ‘fate’” and when to “submit to it” –but rather, 
“both must be there and both must be seized resolutely” (DBWE 8:304, 2/115). In this way one 
learns to endure the present situation and “make the most of it,” and “[o]nly on the other side of 
this twofold process” can one “speak of ‘being led’” (DBWE 8:304, 2/115).108 In light of 
Bonhoeffer’s own conceptualisation of navigating the betwixt space between resistance and 
submission, I will attempt to trace Bonhoeffer’s process of “being led” through liminality, 
toward full participation in the life of Jesus Christ. This process is an essential part of discerning 
the will of God, which he believed, always “lies very deeply hidden among many competing 
possibilities” (DBWE 6:321). What follows should give shape to a number of possibilities 
Bonhoeffer perceived in betwixt space.  
The argument as follows, will proceed by examining four categories of contrasting themes: home 
and prison, absence and communion, and dislocation and located-ness. In each section I aim to 
show how within the tensions of liminality, Bonhoeffer encounters turning points as he navigates 
the concrete space between resistance and submission. Moving him from a constant state of 
betwixt space toward a “state of being led” (DBWE 8:304, 2/115) through liminality, ultimately 
arriving at a willingness to “receive with open and outstretched hands what God gives” (DBWE 
8:342, 2/130). 
Home and Prison 
Bonhoeffer’s notion of "what we become only through other people” marks a particular turning 
point within liminality, as it accentuates the ways in which the prison space not only deepens his 
                                                
108 Emphasis is Bonhoeffer’s. 
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understanding of sociality, but more importantly, for the way it enlivens his desire to experience 
the presence of God in the concrete materiality of his prison cell (DBWE 8:154, 2/57). The 
emergence of this notion of becoming, I argue, is very closely tied to the repetitive nature of 
liminality, in which the prisoner is suspended between home and prison; when receiving visitors, 
letters, and packages within the prison space. Drawing on Moran’s (2013:339) deployment of a 
“geographical engagement with liminality,” I will show how the visiting room, and in turn, the 
reception of packages and letters – those spaces in which Bonhoeffer encountered significant 
others from his life – act as betwixt space, suspending him between momentary “performances 
of home” and the isolation of his prison cell. In the midst of this space we can observe a transient 
threshold-crossing between the “outside” and “inside” of the prison boundary (Moran 2013:347). 
I argue here that this experience of liminality ultimately blurs the boundary between the self and 
the other and calls for a (re)negotiation of his self-concept and his relationships with others. 
While constituting a frustratingly repetitive state of liminality, this space also holds a cumulative 
transformation for Bonhoeffer, drawing him into a place of authentic communion and an ever-
increasing relationality with others, even in the midst of continued isolation and separation. 
Turning to the text of Bonhoeffer’s letters let me sketch what I believe to be a few key 
moments in this turning point at the heart of liminality. On October 13, 1943, while 
contemplating a stanza from Storm’s “Oktoberlied,” Bonhoeffer reflected on the significance 
of the “outside” world having gone mad and yet remaining “gorgeous” and “entirely 
resilient” (DBWE 8:166-167; 2/65). The contrast in Storm’s stanza between madness and 
resilience seems to have echoed in his consciousness, opening up his own frustrated sense of 
separation from the outside world. In this same letter he reflected upon moments that 
strengthened his own resilience and put him in touch with a bit of home. He writes: 
Yet in the end the ‘world’ is summed up, at least for me, in a few people one wants to see and with 
whom one wishes to be together. These occasional appearances by you and Maria for a short hour, 
as if from far away, are actually that from which and for which I primarily live. This is being in 
touch with the world where I belong (DBWE 8:167; 2/65). 
The occasional appearance of loved ones, although failing to replace his desire to be free, 
appears to mediate some level of contact with the outside world and in particular the world 
where he belongs. Bonhoeffer’s description of Maria and his parents’ visit demonstrates the 
liminal nature of the visiting room; it’s as if, at least for that hour, he is transported “far away,” 
 81 
experiencing in the process a sense of having a taste of home and of life on the outside. This 
description highlights what Moran (2013:347) terms a “performance of home,” in which the 
prisoner is enabled to participate in domestic activities, such as discussing family issues, 
exchanging goods and clothing, and just being together, all of which re-engages the prisoner 
“with their family members in a space within the prison” (Moran 2013:347). Although still under 
the watchful eye of the institution and its staff, the visit represents participation in a kind of 
“normal” life, here performed metaphorically between the “outside” and “inside” of the prison 
boundary. 
This state of indistinction or between-ness is not uncommon in the experience of incarcerated 
prisoners. For instance, in Moran’s (2013:339) study of carceral visiting spaces, he argues that 
visiting rooms act as in-between spaces in which prisoners come “face-to-face with persons and 
objects that come from and represent their lives on the ‘outside.’” Moran’s (2013:339) study 
shows how prison-visiting rooms act as liminal space or spaces “of betweenness where a 
metaphorical threshold crossing takes place between outside and inside.” Within the space of 
visiting rooms, prisoners encounter the “living embodiment of their previous life outside the 
prison – people from the outside – and can, for the duration of the visit, suspend the immediate 
reality of incarceration and discuss the affairs of their family, friends, and hometown” (Moran 
2013:346). In contrast to Goffman’s interpretation of the prison as a “total institution,” Moran 
(2013:339) instructively insists that the interpenetration of objects, goods, visitors, and even 
ideas – as in the case of Karl, Paula and Maria’s visit – reveals the “blurred nature of the prison 
boundary” (between outside and inside) and the permeability of the prison walls that are 
perceived as impenetrable. This permeability ultimately intensifies the prisoner’s transient state 
of liminality, again breaking down the distinctions between “inside” and “outside.” Here persons 
and objects from the “outside” are present within the walls of the prison and the prisoner on the 
“inside” experiences the feeling of having been transported home, if only temporarily, “outside” 
the prison walls.109 
                                                
109 The opposite of which can also be experienced by visitors, who temporarily become part of life on the inside 
and momentary prisoners of the same walls. A clear example of this arose after Holzandorf’s highly illegal and 
secret visit, organised for Bonhoeffer and Susanne, which left Susanne contemplating the meaning of 
Bonhoeffer’s comment: “how terribly nice of Holzandorf.” Susanne later wrote “[a]nd with that adjective so 
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We can see expressions of betwixt space elsewhere in Bonhoeffer’s letters; in other 
reflections upon visits from family and friends, and similarly in his reflections on the 
reception of packages or letters. Although Moran’s focus remains on visiting rooms as 
geographical liminal spaces, I contend that the reception of packages and letters also function 
as catalyst for liminality and a metaphorical threshold crossing. For example, Bonhoeffer 
regarded packages as a mediation of an “indirect connection” (DBWE 8:80, 1/17) with his 
family and friends. Making use of the contents of one such package, he gave them thanks 
writing, “[I] feel surrounded by all of you during breakfast, which is all the better since I find 
especially the morning the most difficult part of the day to cope with inwardly” (DBWE 
8:119, 1/37). Here the gift of a package mediates not only the love and concern of his family, 
but the presence and personhood of its senders. Bonhoeffer’s description of opening the 
package denotes a metaphorical threshold-crossing of the prison boundary, suspending him 
in the space between absence and presence. The package itself initiates a temporary 
performance of home, in which he experiences the presence of his family at breakfast time, 
even as he eats alone in his cell. The materiality of the package shifts Bonhoeffer’s focus 
from the carceral to the domestic environment. Crossing this threshold Bonhoeffer senses the 
development of an inward resilience in the face of imprisonment. 
In addition, visits with Maria, although rare, were also liminal moments of connection with 
reality. Together they could discuss books they had read, matters pertaining to both their 
respective families, and their future home together and how it might be arranged. Maria took 
great care to bring Bonhoeffer what he needed or to deliver goods sent by his parents. These 
ordinary conversations and material goods enabled Bonhoeffer to re-engage with his fiancé 
in a space within the prison. Although he feared that Maria would not be able to weather this 
storm alongside him, he refused to over spiritualise his present situation or divert their 
conversations from reality. When Maria’s mother and grandmother made the suggestion that 
they make use of their visiting time for the discussion of profound “religious problems” or 
questions, or even as a “little prayer service” together, Bonhoeffer refused, insisting that this 
                                                
often used by him in past times, our childhood and youth is back with us and the horror of those closed walls 
has gone.” (Dress 1964:216). 
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would have been an abstraction from the ordinary life he longed to return to (DBWE 8: 338; 
2/128). He was pleased that Maria was “of the same mind” in being “radically opposed” to 
such a “planned procedure” (DBWE 8:338-339; 2/128). Each moment with Maria was a 
space apart in which he could get “in touch with a bit of real life” (DBWE 8: 338; 2/128), 
something incarceration was sorely lacking. In the solitude of his cell he was forced to live 
primarily in his head, reading and reflecting upon his experiences. In contrast, his visits with 
Maria offered a brief reprieve from his enclosure, opening him up to ordinary domestic 
conversations and grounding him once again in reality. The engagement of domestic 
activities during visits, sharing family news, delivering food or books, discussing their future 
home together, once again demonstrates the essence of the visiting space as one in which 
home is performed. These performances of the materialities of home, broke open the prison 
walls and temporarily transported Bonhoeffer into the possibilities of their future life 
together.  
Above all, the most tangible sign of connection was mediated through letters, “which the 
prisoner used to assure himself of the nearness of those from whom he was separated” (Bethge 
2000:838). Although he longed to be dealing with “real people” rather than “thoughts of 
imagined figures” (DBWE 8:170, 2/67), these letters, as Bethge (2000:838) writes, “became 
Bonhoeffer’s elixir of life in Tegel. He lived for them and through them.” When letters arrived in 
Bonhoeffer’s cell, he felt “as if the door of the prison cell opened for a moment,” and he could 
experience “a slice of life on the outside” (DBWE 8:97, 1/25). These descriptions among 
numerous others, demonstrate the capacity of a letter to breakdown the “outside-inside” 
distinction. Although he remained under the watchful eye of the institution and its censors, there 
is a kind of “normal” life that is performed in and through his correspondence. The simple act of 
reading or writing letters, which contained familiar domestic topics, located him in a betwixt 
space, in-between the “inside” and “outside” boundary of the prison walls. Within this place of 
liminality, he could participate in the life of his family and friends and they in turn could 
participate in his. 
Having surveyed a few key texts highlighting the permeability of the prison walls and the liminal 
space created by the performance of home within the prison context, I now turn to a discussion 
of the potentially formative and transformative effect of these metaphorical threshold crossings. 
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Moran (2013:347) notes that the carceral visiting space “can be understood relatively 
unproblematically as a liminal space in the sense of betweenness and indistinction.” In contrast, 
however, the transformative role of this space remains relatively unclear to scholars who study 
liminality within the prison space. For Bonhoeffer, these spaces appear, at least from the above 
descriptions, to pose a significant challenge, forcing him to hold the tension between the 
closeness and intimacy experienced when crossing the threshold and the post-liminal reality of 
returning to the loneliness of prison life. From the privileged perspective of the reader, however, 
we can see that Bonhoeffer is not unchanged by the event. At points Bonhoeffer indicates a 
perceived sense of resilience, newly able to cope with the most difficult parts of the day. 
Although this doesn’t necessarily represent an immediate progression from liminal space to 
another status entirely, there is a sense, in which Bonhoeffer also hints at a cumulative effect,  
connecting him to his life on the outside and the people whom he wished to see and be together 
with. These moments helped Bonhoeffer to reframe his fragmentary experience of life in prison 
and contribute to a sense of hope amidst his present reality. While remaining in solitude, he finds 
himself living from and for these moments of connection.  
Recurrent exposure to this ordeal, however, becomes a transformative course in and of itself for 
Bonhoeffer, especially when each occurrence is followed by an immersion back into the 
distinctively coercive and depersonalising environment of Tegel. Returning physically or merely 
cognitively to his cell, he is reminded of the deprivation of prison life and his growing 
dependence on the help of others. Acknowledging an “indebtedness to others” (Beaudoin 
2002:348), Bonhoeffer is grasped by a sense that he is becoming something more as a result of 
being completely dependent upon the generosity of others. On September 13, 1943, after 
receiving a whole stack of letters and a visit from his parents, he writes, “a day with mail rises 
noticeably out of the monotony of all the others” (DBWE 8:154, 2/57). He goes on to say: 
It is a strange feeling to be utterly dependent for everything on the help of others. But in any case, 
one learns in such times to be grateful and hopefully not forget it later. In normal life one is often 
not at all aware that we always receive infinitely more than we give, and that gratitude is what 
enriches life. One easily overestimates the importance of one's own acts and deeds, compared with 
what we become only through other people (DBWE 8:154, 2/57). 
Here the cumulatively transformative effect of liminality lies not only in reframing prison life, 
but also a reframing of “normal life.” The indistinction of liminal space has made him keenly 
aware of what in “normal life” is often overestimated, undervalued, or overlooked. Bonhoeffer, 
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who is known for his call to responsible action and deeds for the other, is forced to (re)negotiate 
his relationship to others. The text above indicates a constraining and yet liberating sense of 
gratitude for what he is becoming through others. Crossing this threshold he discovers that the 
walls of the self, like the walls of the prison, are more permeable than previously thought and we 
receive infinitely more than we give or do for others. Or as Butler observes, “[p]recarity exposes 
our sociality, the fragile and necessary dimensions of our interdependency” (Butler 2009:x).  
Turning toward the formative context of solitude, we can see that the materiality of visits, 
packages, or letters, became for Bonhoeffer not only a lasting experience of connection, but 
bearers of a deeper spirituality reality. While reflecting on the reception of a Pentecost package 
from his parents, Bonhoeffer writes: “[d]espite the deep certainty about our connection in spirit, 
the spirit [Geist] nevertheless always seems to have an unquenchable desire to make visible this 
connection of love and thinking about one another, and then the most material things become 
bearers of spiritual realities” (DBWE 8:107, 1/29). He goes on to say: “I believe this is analogous 
to the desire in all religions to have the spirit become visible in the sacraments” (DBWE 8:107, 
1/29). Here Bonhoeffer picks up on the betwixt space of the sacraments, in which material things 
communicate a union of spirit and body. While Bonhoeffer remains an awaiting trial prisoner 
and there is no immediate post-liminal transition that might change his status, he is, through 
repeated occurrences of this event, drawn into a place of authentic communion and an ever 
increasing relationality with others and God. In the midst of continued isolation and separation, 
Bonhoeffer discovers his own process of conformation to the Incarnate One, the one who makes 
the spirit of God present and visible in the material reality of his own life.  
Absence and Communion 
Another turning point in Bonhoeffer’s spiritual life, which is immediately apparent from his 
illegal correspondence with Bethge, is the absence and then mediated presence of what had been 
a “singular friendship” (de Gruchy 2005:59).110 Having been “so utterly accustomed to sharing 
                                                
110 Their prolonged separation, which was brought on by Bonhoeffer’s imprisonment, was broken on November 26, 
1943, when Bethge first visited him in Tegel prison; followed by a series of letters over the course of the next few 
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everything” with Bethge in the years preceding his imprisonment, the sudden and long 
interruption of their friendship (brought on by imprisonment), represented what Bonhoeffer 
referred to as a “profound readjustment and a great deprivation” (DBWE 8:221, 2/86). 
Reconnecting with Bethge was for him a “necessitas,” filling a “spiritual hunger” that had 
become more “tormenting than physical hunger” (DBWE 8:240, 2/89). In the renewal of this 
connection Bonhoeffer finds himself living in an empty space, suspended between absence and 
communion. He concludes that the only way to maintain authentic communion with Bethge and 
with others is to allow the emptiness of this betwixt space to remain unfilled through the practice 
of radical openness.  
I do not intend here to offer an interpretation of the meaning and significance of their friendship 
as it developed either before or during imprisonment; that path has been traversed by many, 
including Bethge (1995:80-104), de Gruchy (2005:59-86), and in a lesser way by Hauerwas 
(2009:91-113) and Dahill (2009:105-106), among others.111 My focus is on the formative 
renewal of their friendship as it triggers certain lasting impressions that give meaning to 
Bonhoeffer’s self-conception and spiritual life at the heart of liminality. This section is not 
intended to be comprehensive, but rather to point out two interlocking ways that I see the 
renewal of their friendship functioning as part of a cumulative turning point in Bonhoeffer’s 
transitioning liminality. These two events relate to the practice of mutual confession, and the 
development of a sense of communitas or shared spiritual and psychological support within 
liminality. Cumulatively, these two events are fundamental in Bonhoeffer navigation of 
prolonged liminality and help him to avoid an endless state of limbo that might disrupt 
fundamental aspects of his psyche (McCraken 1987). 
In the first place, the renewal of their friendship made possible the continuation of a radical 
openness experienced in the practice of mutual confession and functioned as a space for self-
                                                
weeks and months, ending with Bonhoeffer’s last correspondence – ‘Outline for a Book’ - and Bethge’s last letter to 
Bonhoeffer on September 30, 1944 (de Gruchy 2005:86). This illegal correspondence was established “through the 
good services of one of Bonhoeffer’s guards, Corporal Knobloch” who smuggled the letters out of the prison and 
mailed them from his home (de Gruchy 2005:69). 
111 On the theme of friendship in the correspondence between Bonhoeffer and Bethge, see Letters and Papers from 
Prison (DWBE 8), 248, 268, 284, 523-524, 526-530 and Conspiracy and Imprisonment (DWBE 16), 134-36, 138-
42. Dahill (2009:105) writes that the four letters contained in DBWE 16, which were “written between Dietrich and 
Eberhard for Dietrich’s birthday, February 4, 1941, provide moving reflections from each of them on their abiding 
pleasure in this friendship.” 
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disclosure and the deepening of Bonhoeffer’s spiritual life. Having been refused access to a 
pastor,112 those in charge of the prison had cut him off from pastoral care. Although this 
ultimately prolonged his sense of liminality, he regarded it as beneficial, as he depended all the 
more intimately on the Bible and would not have been able to speak to a Chaplain in the same 
way that he could speak only to Bethge (DBWE 8:178-179, 2/73). With the opportunity of the 
uncensored illegal communication, he was again able to request what he needed most, his pastor, 
with whom it was possible to practice radical truth-telling and authenticity. In his first letter to 
Bethge he requested: 
And now today, be for me—after so many long months without worship, confession, and the Lord's 
Supper and without consolation fratrum—my pastor once more, as you have so often been in the 
past, and listen to me.… In the first twelve days here, during which I was kept isolated and treated 
as a dangerous criminal—to this day the cells on either side of mine are occupied almost 
exclusively by death-row prisoners in chains—Paul Gerhardt proved of value in unimagined ways, 
as well as the Psalms and Revelation. I was preserved in those days from all severe temptations 
[Anfechtungen]. You are the only person who knows that "acedia"-"tristitia" with its ominous 
consequences has often haunted me, and you perhaps worried about me in this respect— so I feared 
at the time. But I have told myself from the beginning that I will do neither human beings nor the 
devil this favor; they are to see to this business themselves if they wish; and I hope I can stick to it 
(DBWE 8;179-180, 2/73) 
Here for the first time Bonhoeffer is able to share the depths of his experience, giving further 
shape to the struggles he had only briefly alluded to in letters to his parents or contemplated 
himself in short and fragmentary notes. This first letter to Bethge acts as a summary of his 
prison experience thus far, detailing a sense of the continuities and discontinuities of 
liminality and the resilience and spiritual resources he accessed in response to disorientation. 
Bonhoeffer devoted his energies throughout the course of the next five days (from the 19th to 
the 22nd of November), to pouring himself out in the text of his letters to Bethge; recounting 
experiences of prison, confessing regrets, asking for forgiveness, admitting his weaknesses 
and struggles, and pondering whether their mutual experiences will have changed them or 
whether they will remain entirely their “old selves” (DBWE 8:184, 2/73).  
                                                
112 Here I am trying to work with Bonhoeffer’s own expression, “You know that those in charge here have even 
refused me access to a pastor” (DBWE 8:178-179, 2/73). However, Bethge indicates, “after the situation eased 
following the hearings he received frequent visits from two pastors of the Berlin church”: Pastor Hans Dannenbaum 
and Pastor Dr. Harald Poelchau (Bethge 2000:852). Contact with these Pastors was illegal and had to remain 
concealed to protect the Pastors from disciplinary measures. Nevertheless, it remains true that Bonhoeffer could 
share with Bethge in a way that he could with no one else. See Poelchau’s (1964: 222-225) description of visiting 
Bonhoeffer in prison.  
 88 
Saturated in a world of surveillance, Bonhoeffer had learned the art of misdirection, yet he 
longed for a place of radical openness and authentic transparency. The growing fear that he 
had stated in his New Years essay of 1942 was becoming ever more real; that in learning the 
“arts of obfuscation and equivocal speech” he might “become suspicious of human beings” 
and fail to speak to others “a true and open word” (DBWE 8:52, Prologue). In his 
correspondence with Bethge, he sought now for an “inner strength to resist” what had been 
forced upon him in this event, struggling with all his being to find his way “back to 
simplicity and honesty” (DBWE 8:52, Prologue). In this way, his correspondence with 
Bethge would become the one true place where he could “speak and hear the complete truth” 
(DBWE 8:235, 2/88). He soon requested of Bethge: “With you I will put on no pretence, nor 
you with me. We never did so earlier and don’t ever wish to” (DBWE 8:235, 2/88).  
Dahill (2009:105) notes that in the establishment of the practice of radical openness through 
confession (which had started at Finkenwalde), Bonhoeffer had “for the first time 
experienced the liberation of honest and mutual self-disclosure and the awesomeness of the 
trust and freedom this brings.” Renewing this practice through correspondence, Bonhoeffer 
once again began to experience the liberating capacity of mutual self-disclosure, helping him 
to navigate his transition into and through liminality.  
From this point forward, their friendship, correspondence, and mutual confession, functioned 
as a key component of Bonhoeffer’s transition into the heart of betwixt space. It also played 
a part in the renewal his spiritual life, allowing him to explore and reflect upon his prison 
experience and the inner and outer discrepancies in his notion of the self; “I often wonder 
who I really am: the one always cringing in disgust, going to pieces at these hideous 
experiences here, or the one who whips himself into shape, who on the outside (and even to 
himself) appears calm, cheerful, serene, superior…” (DBWE 8:221, 2/86). Noble and Walker 
(1997:33) claim that this gap between one’s “ideal self” and one’s “current perceptions of 
who we are” – what they term “self-concept discrepancy” – is often intensified during 
periods of liminality, as a result of ambiguity surrounding one’s transitioning sociocultural 
role. Although Bonhoeffer partially rejected the self-conflicting experiences of prison – 
considering that there were “[m]ore important matters… at stake than self-knowledge” 
(DBWE 8:221, 2/86) – it is clear from his correspondence with Bethge, that through a 
posture of radical openness, he was able to successfully navigate the psychological and 
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emotional consequences of the gap between his inner and outer experience of the self. While 
Bonhoeffer abandoned this line of thought before finding a resolution, it is clear that 
Bethge’s friendship and the practice of radical openness through confession, became an 
integral component of Bonhoeffer’s sense of self and served multiple roles during his liminal 
transitioning.  
In the above text, as in many other places of their correspondence, we see a pattern of shared 
practices and symbols of past relationship, which play an important part in Bonhoeffer’s identity 
and spiritual life; worship, confession, the Lord’s Supper, the hymns of Paul Gerhardt, the texts 
of the Psalms and Revelation, as well as past knowledge of self-disclosure shared between 
friends in confession. Although he was denied access to some of these practices, their continued 
symbolic significance – now fully represented in his friendship with Bethge – allowed for part of 
his former identity to be transported into the space of the prison, taking shape in new forms. 
Transitioning into the prison space necessitated some leaving behind of the connections of 
personal relationship, however, Bonhoeffer relied all the more intimately on the symbols of this 
relationship to ease the transition into the new space of the prison. The symbolic nature of their 
correspondence and mutual confession was like the “the first drops of water in a long time from 
a spring,” in the absence of which Bonhoeffer “spiritual life had begun to wither (DBWE 218, 
2/86). 
The second feature of this turning point is the renewal of sense of authentic communion 
communicated through shared spiritual and psychological support, mediated through their letters. 
Here Bonhoeffer was able not only to share his own struggles, but also to listen and hear 
Bethge’s struggles as he transitioned into a military role at the “military training camp in Lissa” 
and then onto the Italian front (de Gruchy 2005:70). Through the discussion of shared 
disorienting experiences the two developed a feeling of what Turner (1969:250) termed 
“communitas,” in which liminal entities experience “unmediated communication, even 
communion, between definite and determinate identities.” This bond and mutual support 
continued to develop throughout Bonhoeffer’s imprisonment and functioned as a key turning 
point in his navigation of liminality. It did not fill the emptiness of time or cure the pain of 
absence, but rather kept it open to new possibilities. This is clearly illustrated in a letter to 
Eberhard and Renate on Christmas Eve 1943. Seeking to guide them as they faced a period of 
separation (during Eberhard’s military training), Bonhoeffer reflected on the difficulty of 
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remaining connected to the people who you are attached to and have shared all important 
experiences with, even in the midst of separation. 
There is nothing that can replace the absence of someone dear to us, and one should not even 
attempt to do so; one must simply preserve and endure it. At first that sounds very hard, but at the 
same time it is a great comfort, for one remains connected to the other person through the 
emptiness to the extent it truly remains unfilled. It is wrong to say that God fills the emptiness; God 
in no way fills it but rather keeps it empty and thus helps us preserve – even if in pain – our 
authentic communion. Further, the more beautiful and full the memories, the more difficult the 
separation. But gratitude transforms the torment of memory into peaceful joy (DBWE 8:238, 2/89). 
Here the emptiness experienced in transitional spaces of painful separation is transformed 
through gratitude and a posture of openness to the other. Maintaining this tension, rather than 
collapsing it, Bonhoeffer discovered a means of preserving the precious gift of authentic 
communion with others. In this way, “times of separation are not lost and fruitless for common 
life, or at least not necessarily, but rather in them a quite remarkably strong communion – despite 
all problems – can develop” (DBWE 8:238, 2/89). Through this posture of openness one learns 
not to anxiously worry, but rather “entrust the other person to God wholly and without reserve, 
and let our worries become prayer for the other person” (DBWE 8:238, 2/89). Holding the empty 
space created by absence entails a certain level of vulnerability to pain, to hurt, and to wounding. 
And yet, as Bonhoeffer discovers, it is the very place in which the solitary life produces 
transformational fruitfulness, binding us not only to the other, but also to God who is present 
amidst the emptiness of liminality. 
In conclusion Bonhoeffer’s correspondence with Bethge clearly facilitated a place in which he 
could not only give expression to the struggles of his prison experience, but also reframe and 
give meaning to his experience of liminality, through the practice of a radical openness in mutual 
confession and the maintenance of authentic communion (preserved in times of separation), 
These expressions further structure his experience as being fruitful for understanding their 
common life together and the strength of communion that is fortified by times of liminal 
separation. In this way, the renewal of their connection through letters, functions as a turning 
point at the heart of Bonhoeffer prison experience, opening him up to the meaning of liminal 
displacement as a form of authentic communion with others and with God.  
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Dislocation and Located-ness 
The final transitional experience I will consider in this section is Bonhoeffer’s experience of 
celebrating the Christian holidays in a prison cell. Although his letters surrounding the holidays 
are filled with hope, they also indicate a heightened sense of dislocation from his family and 
friends. Having significant symbolic meaning, these days continued to evoke past memories of 
his family gathered together or of the various places in which he had celebrated together with 
Bethge. The contrast between memories of past celebrations and the context of his present reality 
clearly intensified his sense of betwixt space and suspended his transition into prison life. It is 
my contention, however, that this dislocation also served the purpose of focusing his attention on 
a fresh encounter with the days of the Christian year, discovering within his prison cell a new 
located-ness in a truth and reality not governed by carceral regulations or previously experienced 
in festivals celebrated at home. In this way the Christian holidays are an integral component for 
understanding Bonhoeffer’s prison experience, as they serve multiple roles during his liminal 
transition. These include his anticipation of spending the holidays once again with his loved 
ones, which became both a point of orientation and a point of dislocation. But more than that, 
these times of the year served the purpose of locating his prison experience within the concrete 
reality of Christ.  
Here again, Bonhoeffer’s spirituality, as has been argued throughout this study, is deeply 
christocentric, continually appealing to the person of Jesus Christ for the revelation of reality and 
the ongoing conformation of one’s own life and action. This christocentrism, as Dahill 
(2009:179) suggests, is obviously quite broad for Bonhoeffer, “intended not to imprison ultimate 
truth within the Christian sphere but to open Christians to truth and reality wherever they 
encounter it.” Building upon this insight, I will show, how turning to the rhythm of the Christian 
calendar, Bonhoeffer not only draws strength from past memories of holidays spent together with 
family and friends, but more importantly, discovers a located-ness in the unexpected and 
unplanned ways in which the life of Jesus Christ interrupts the isolation of imprisonment and 
breaks open a surprisingly liberating encounter with reality.  
Let me first offer a general sketch of the ways I see the Christian calendar functioning as a 
transitional experience in Bonhoeffer’s developing spiritual life. In the times surrounding 
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important holidays, his letters are filled with a profound sense of hope. This hope, in part, rests in 
anticipation that he will once again spend, Easter, Pentecost, Advent, or Christmas together with 
his family and friends. Continuing a long used practice, Bonhoeffer marks his letters to indicate 
important days of the year.113 In addition to communicating important dates of origin for his 
readers,114 these signifiers helped Bonhoeffer to measure the passage of time in solitude. One 
gets a sense from reading these holiday letters that they play an important function as temporal 
markers or points of orientation, breaking up the endless time of prison life and anchoring him in 
a deep and resilient sense of hope in the future: “I am very confident that we will celebrate Easter 
together again in freedom” (DBWE 8:241, 2/89). As each holiday nears, his letters reflect on past 
memories and an anticipated desire for connection with loved ones. Anything from familiar 
songs to vivid imagery triggers powerful memories of family festivals or important holidays 
spent with Bethge at Finkenwalde, Schlönwitz, and Sigurdshof (DBWE 8:201, 2/79).  
As each holiday came and passed Bonhoeffer refused to be discouraged about remaining in a 
prison cell. At times he was content to have experienced a sense of peace and gratitude for past 
memories: “Christmas is over. It brought me a couple of quiet, peaceful hours, and a great deal 
from the past was quite present” (DBWE 8;245, 2/92). And at other times he simply 
reconfigured the next holiday as a point of orientation: “So Easter too will come and go without 
our being home and seeing each other. But I’m not putting off hopes any further than Pentecost” 
(DBWE 8:337, 2/128). This endless cycle of disappointment followed by repositioned hope 
illustrates a sense of dislocation from his home and the world in which he belongs. Although he 
refuses to let it discourage him, the symbolic meaning of the holidays remains located in a space 
of indistinction, both inside and outside of prison boundary; either with memories of home 
present with him in his cell or in his cell but longing to be at home. The reoccurring rhythm of 
the holidays continued to prolong Bonhoeffer’s betwixt transitioning, keeping him suspended 
between these two space; home and the prison cell.  
There is also a sense in which these days belong to him and his loved ones. This is most fully 
articulated in his final reference to the Christian calendar: “We had put off seeing each other 
again from Christmas to Easter to Pentecost, and one holiday after another passed by. But the 
                                                
113 Such as, Wednesday after Easter, Second Sunday in Advent, Christmas Eve or Christmas Day. 
114 As his letters would often arrive many days if not weeks after they had been sent. 
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next holiday will certainly belong to us; I no longer have any doubts about that” (DBWE 8:424, 
3/160). Here we can see that the rhythm of the Christian calendar, although provoking a 
profound sense of dislocation, also gave Bonhoeffer a way of measuring time and maintaining a 
very real, if not distant, connection and special bond with his family and friends. These moments 
in time foster a sense of resilience amidst dislocation, breaking up the monotony of prison life 
and ensuring that he would never lose hope in the freedom to once again celebrate these 
traditions of life and meaning together with his family and friends. 
In contrast to their role as moments of dislocation, the days of the Christian calendar, overtime, 
also fostered a sense of located-ness. Though they provoked a particular sense of liminality, 
existing simultaneously inside and outside the carceral space, they also became a concrete space 
of resistance to the dislocation of imprisonment. That is to say, that under the guise of familiar 
religious pageantry, the practices and rituals of the Christian year became a fertile place for 
resistance to germinate, all the while shielded from the direct surveillance of the prison guards. 
During Advent, for example, Bonhoeffer describes humming the tunes of Advent songs, holding 
his own “Sunday devotions,” hanging “the Advent wreath on a nail [in his cell],” and attaching 
“the Lippi nativity scene inside it” (DBWE 8:201, 2/79).  And then at Christmas he lit Maria’s 
candles and read the Christmas story to himself (DBWE 8:245, 2/92). Seen from a critical 
perspective, these unassuming spiritual practices represent the careful reconfiguration of the 
prison space and its symbolic meaning. As we know from Foucault’s (1979) analysis of space, 
and the carceral space in particular, the mechanisms of power operative within the carceral 
system depend upon the particular arrangement of space. The Panopticon, after all, works 
because of the way it arranges space in a particular way. Bonhoeffer’s reconfiguration or 
arrangement of space within his cell, therefore acts as a resistance to the mechanism of power 
that denied him access to sacred music and spaces such as the prison chapel. Within 
Bonhoeffer’s spiritual practices during Advent and Christmas, something of a counter-site is 
constructed. His arrangement of space and sound within his cell located him in the life and 
reality of Christ, thereby inverting the mechanisms of power that depend upon the particular 
arrangement of space in the prison. 
As a site of resistance we can begin to see how the prison cell itself becomes a new location for 
uncovering the contradictions, tension, and immanent possibilities of the Christian holidays. Of 
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all the holiday references in Bonhoeffer’s prison letters, Christmas appears to function most 
prominently in this way, continuing to hold a special place in his consciousness. The located-
ness of Christmas in his cell slowly emerges as he nears his first Christmas in prison. Writing to 
Bethge on 20 November 1943, he comments: “In case I am still sitting here in this hole at 
Christmas, don’t let that bother you… As a Christian, one can celebrate Christmas even in prison 
– at any rate, more easily than at family festivals” (DBWE 8:186. 2/73). While this first 
reference reveals a level of ambiguity in relation to the prison space itself, there is a sense in 
which the prison cell becomes an authentic place to encounter the incarnate Christ. The 
development of this notion of the located-ness of Christmas begins to develop as Christmas 
nears. In a letter to his parents on the first Sunday in Advent, 28 November 1943, Bonhoeffer 
reflects on the nativity scene by Altdorfer, “in which one sees the holy family with the manger 
amid the rubble of a collapsed house” (DBWE 8:206, 2/81). Noting the particular located-ness of 
the holy family, Bonhoeffer enquires after Altdorfer’s intent; maybe “here,” in midst of bombing 
raids, of war and loss of life, in the midst of imprisonment, “even here one can and ought to 
celebrate Christmas” (DBWE 8:206, 2/81).  
This reflection on the Altdorfer’s nativity scene must have evoked memories for Bonhoeffer’s of 
first encounter with the painting in Munich in 1940, when he bought one hundred postcards of 
the painting and mailed them out with a circular Christmas letter to the Finkenwalde brothers. A 
few sections of that letter further indicate the meaning of this image and its particular located-
ness for Bonhoeffer. In his letter he considered the possibility of an authentic Christmas 
celebration amidst the rubble of war. That when we are confronted with the significance of 
Christmas and the birth of Christ, we far too often “want to stick our heads into the sand” and 
“escape to some isle of the blessed. […] how often we Germans have made of Christmas just 
such an island onto which one can escape from the actual reality of life for a few days or a least a 
few hours” (DBWE 16:106, 1/47). But Bonhoeffer insisted that amidst the horrors of war, reality 
comes crashing back, shattering the unreality of the Christmas celebration we’ve constructed. 
Yet, Bonhoeffer goes on to write, “for this reason we now also hear the ancient tidings with new 
meaning and new longing. […] (s)o too our Christmas celebration does not lead us out of the 
needs and burdens of our life in the world, does not lead us straight to paradise” (DBWE 16:107-
108, 1/47).  
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It is clear, that building on this previous interpretation of Christmas, Bonhoeffer begins to 
discover his own located-ness within the liminality of his prison cell. This located-ness did not 
stop him from hoping to spend Christmas once again with his family and friends. No, he 
continued to look forward to a time when he would celebrate Christmas in freedom. And yet, 
turning to his cell as the concrete place in which Christ is born, he discovers his own located-
ness within the life of Christ. This point is illustrated as he returns to contemplate the 
significance of Christmas in a letter to his parents on 17 December 1943: 
Viewed from a Christian perspective, Christmas in a prison cell can, of course, hardly be 
considered particularly problematic. Most likely many of those here in this building will celebrate a 
more meaningful and authentic Christmas than in places where it is celebrated in name only. That 
misery, sorrow, poverty, loneliness, helplessness, and guilt mean something quite different in the 
eyes of God than according to human judgment; that God turns toward the very places from which 
humans turn away; that Christ was born in a stable because there was no room for him in the inn—
a prisoner grasps this better than others, and for him this is truly good news. And to the extent he 
believes it, he knows that he has been placed within the Christian community that goes beyond the 
scope of all spatial and temporal limits, and the prison walls lose their significance (DBWE 8:225-
226, 2/87).  
Here the beauty of this particular Christmas is not that he is celebrating it in a prison cell, but 
rather that being located in a prison cell means that he can’t turn away from the beauty of 
Christmas. His located-ness in the prison space becomes spiritually and theologically formative 
as it opens up an encounter with “the authentically transcendent God who comes not in the forms 
we expect or imagine…, but in surprising and liberating reality” (Dahill 2009:182). This 
liberating reality, is formative precisely amidst the constraints of a dislocating experience of 
liminality. Separated from family and friends, dislocation strips away the sentimentality of 
Christmas, leaving the radical poverty and liberating reality of the Incarnation bare: God for us, 
God with us (Dahill 2007:13). Here God is seen as turning toward the very place where society 
has turned away, completely turning social categories of exclusion upside down. 
Thus it can be concluded that by holding the tension between dislocation and located-ness, 
Bonhoeffer refuses both incorporation into a socially embodied prison status or a fundamental 
turn away for the concrete reality of his prison experience. Rather, turning toward the 
concreteness and particularity of his cell he discerns the “Thou” in the disguise of an “It.” This 
ever-deeper immersion into the reality of his own life, the centre and meaning of which, like all 
of reality, is Jesus Christ (Dahill 2009:93), uncovers “the poverty of the manger and the 
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depths…, darkness and pain of the world into which Jesus is born” (Dahill 2007:13). In this 
location Bonhoeffer is left standing by the manger with Christ,115 cherishing “the richness and 
goodness of the world in all its complexity and miraculous beauty within which God has become 
incarnate” (Dahill 2007:13). 
As a place of resistance this spiritually and theologically formative insight transcends the prison 
walls by dissolving their meaning and significance as forces of punishment and incorporating 
their spatial and temporal limits within the healing and restorative bounds of the Christian 
community. Experiencing Christmas on this liminal borderline, Bonhoeffer concludes in a letter 
to his parents, that it will “take its distinctive place forever in the series of diverse Christmases” 
that he had “celebrated in Spain, in America, [and] in England” (DBWE 8:225, 2/87). For 
Bonhoeffer, this participation in Christ’s story gives his experience a meaning and significance 
that transcends the waiting, longing, loneliness and isolation of his imprisonment. Though they 
can take others things from him, they cannot take this meaning making process. Regardless of 
the outcome, whether it will shame him or exonerate him, his experience has become part of a 
meaningful narrative that has purpose and significance beyond the annoyance of the present 
circumstances. 
Drawing this section to a close, we can now conclude that liminality opens a space in which 
Bonhoeffer is drawn, through turning points at the heart of liminality, into a place of authentic 
communion and an ever increasing relationality with others and God. By navigating the 
boundary line between home and prison, absence and communion, dislocation and located-ness, 
Bonhoeffer experiences a state of being led through liminality and the contrasting tensions of 
resisting or submitting to fate. In this context, as I have attempted to show, the materiality of the 
prison space suspends the symbolic nature of separation, facilitating a space of formative growth, 
in which Bonhoeffer discovers that we become only through other people and that even in 
                                                
115 This is in reference to Bonhoeffer’s reflections on the Paul Gerhardt hymn, Ich steh an Deiner Krippe hier (“I 
stand beside your manger here”). Bonhoeffer writes to Bethge: “Perhaps this line can also be of some help to you in 
the coming weeks. Also, in these past few days I have discovered for myself the hymn "I stand here at your manger . 
. ." Up till now I had never really made much of it. Probably one has to be alone a long time and read it meditatively 
in order to be able to take it in. Every word is extraordinarily replete and radiant. It's just a little monastic-mystical, 
yet only as much as is warranted, for alongside the "we" there is indeed also an "I and Christ," and what that means 
can scarcely be said better than in this hymn” (DBWE 8 230, 2/89). 
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separation, God helps to preserve this formative connection, binding us to each other and to 
God’s self. In the liminal space created by visits, letters, packages, renewal of friendship, and 
isolated celebrations of the Christian holidays, Bonhoeffer discovered a located-ness in the 
unexpected and unplanned ways in which the life of Jesus Christ interrupts the isolation of 
imprisonment and breaks open surprisingly liberating encounters with reality. These encounters 
with liminality helped Bonhoeffer to navigate the boundaries between a necessary resistance to 
fate and an equally necessary submission to the “Thou” in the disguise of an “It.” Liminality 
experienced in the confines of a prison cell thereby became a new location for uncovering the 
contradictions, tensions, and immanent possibilities of the Christian life.  
We can now see how these turning points functioned as sites of conformation, leading 
Bonhoeffer further into the burdens of life in the world (rather than beyond), as the very place 
where God is present and where transcendence is experienced in the earthly life of Christ. 
Liminality sharpens this sense of located-ness and brings into focus the often neglected, 
overlooked, or invisible qualities of life and its beauty. In this way liminality inverts reality, 
locating the margins of society, where sorrow, poverty, and loneliness abound, as the very place 
of Christ’s Incarnate presence.  
Transitions and Bonhoeffer’s Liminal Roles 
Having examined the texts above relating to Bonhoeffer’s concrete spirituality and its 
development within liminality, let me now turn to examine three distinctive role transitions that 
he experiences and enacts in the prison as his mobility and freedom to practice pastoral care 
opens up during the awaiting trial period. As highly skilled social actor, Bonhoeffer negotiates 
liminality by making three fundamental transitions between social roles and categories in Tegel 
Prison; from observed-prisoner to participant-observer, from imprisoned-pastor to pastor-to-
prisoners, and from object of carceral regulations to subject of boundary creation, protector of 
human boundaries, and preserver of life. Here Bonhoeffer’s observations of fellow prisoners and 
the prison system, his pastoral ministry to fellow prisoners and wardens, his prayers written for 
prisoners, and his carefully prepared prison reports, offer us a window into his continued life of 
ministry within the liminal space of imprisonment. This material narrates his pastoral concerns, 
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his anthropological and religious observations of fellow prisoners, and his longing for a stable 
ground within betwixt space. Written from the confines of his prison cell these particular 
fragments highlight Bonhoeffer’s continuing conformation to Christ and his continued journey 
toward authentic human maturity and wholeness. Transitioning between multiple roles and social 
locations of responsibility through the practice of spiritual care for others, Bonhoeffer discovers 
a stable grounding for the self and for others through performative pastoral acts.  
From Observed-Prisoner to Participant-Observer  
During the awaiting trial period, Bonhoeffer began to take an active role in negotiating the space 
in-between observed-prisoner and participant-observer. As a prisoner, he was an object of 
constant surveillance. Yet he navigated this experience through his letters and his action, by 
redirecting surveillance back onto the material world of the prison system. Examining the 
structural impact of incarceration on prisoners, Bonhoeffer observed certain social and cultural 
phenomena that arise from experiencing long periods of isolation and deprivation of freedom. 
His reflections demonstrate a desire to understand particular responses to existential suffering, as 
well as the processes by which isolation and suffering are understood and managed through 
various meaning making or coping strategies discernable in the behaviour and interpretations of 
fellow prisoners. These observations oscillate between structural, interpersonal, and self-
reflection, offering further insight into the experience of life as a prisoner and opening up new 
ways of living within the liminal space of imprisonment.  
Bonhoeffer’s observations of the prison environment and his fellow prisoners indicate that 
extended isolation and deprivation of freedom have “a demoralizing effect in every respect on 
most people” (DBWE 8:187, 2/73).116 Particularly in the case of young prisoners, who “suffer to 
such a degree under the extended isolation and the long, dark evening hours that they break 
down completely under it” (DBWE 8:223, 2/86). He concludes that “[i]t is in fact insane” to 
confine prisoners to their cells without any meaningful work (DBWE 8:223, 2/86). This insanity 
is furthered for Bonhoeffer in the imbalance between “minor stupidities” and “major 
                                                
116 Emphasis is Bonhoeffer’s. 
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consequences” enacted through carceral punishment (DBWE 8:187, 2/73). Impacted greatly by 
those prisoners who are condemned to death, Bonhoeffer conceptualises a “different penal 
system” based on a “principle” of proportionate punishment, which maintains an analogical 
correlation between offence and consequence. This system would penalise “‘absence without 
leave’ by cancelling all leave; ‘unwarranted wearing of medals for bravery’ by deploying the 
person to dangerous frontline service; ‘thievery of comrades’ by temporarily marking the thief; 
‘illicit trading of food’ by reducing the person’s rations, and so forth” (DBWE 8:187, 2/73). His 
thinking in this regard grew out of an engagement with “O.T. law,”117 in which he found no 
system for deprivations of freedom (DBWE 8:187, 2/73). Although he never fully develops this 
alternative system, he later indicates that “a fundamental reform of criminal justice” continued to 
occupy his thought and he hoped this experience would “bear fruit someday” (DBWE 8:232, 
2/88). 
The above fragments indicate two initial movements in Bonhoeffer’s thought. The first is an 
assessment of the present system, its structures, and its impact on the well-being of prisoners. 
The second is a remapping of criminal justice in light of the lived experience of prisoners. Let 
me unfold both of these movements in turn, before moving on to particular responses to the 
experience of imprisonment.  
Firstly, Bonhoeffer observes a demoralising futility experienced by fellow prisoners, resulting 
from the material isolation of incarceration. Confined to their cells, isolation deprives prisoners 
of their liberty and restricts their movement; it suspends familiar meaning structures, severing 
connections with family, social roles and responsibilities, flattening any possible future, 
workable resolution, or knowable outcome to the present situation. Indiscriminate punishment 
ultimately intensifies this flux of instability and uncertainty. Without familiar points of 
orientation, “[n]othing holds fast; nothing stays in place. Everything is short term and short 
winded” (DBWE 8:284, 2/108). This spatial and temporal language identifies and articulates a 
sense of liminality observed in other prisoners in the isolation of their cells. Amidst liminal 
disorientation, Bonhoeffer observes in his fellow prisoners, an inability to control or interpret 
their situation, to change the parameters of their condition through participation, or even to 
                                                
117 Emphasis is Bonhoeffer’s. 
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understand the logic or correlation of their punishment in relation to their offence. Amidst this 
betwixt space, prisoners, especially the younger ones, completely break down in darkness and 
dissolution.  
Observing this wide spread phenomena in other prisoners he interprets the carceral space as a 
catalyst for instability and despair. Here he initially identifies the spatial configuration of the 
prison and its isolating enclosure, as an insane ordering of punishment leading to demoralising 
deprivation of life and essential freedoms. From his privileged position as participant-observer, 
his observations demonstrate an implicit judgement of the carceral structure, indicating that its 
systems of justice no longer take responsibility for what Foucault (1979:9) phrased, the “violence 
that is bound up with its practice.” While exposing the failure of this system, Bonhoeffer refuses 
to stop short at assessment. 
In a second movement, he pushes forward toward a remapping of the common structures, 
conditions, and established orders of the penal system. Bonhoeffer’s alternative visioning of 
proportionate punishment remains both underdeveloped and carries with it certain hidden power 
structures,.118 Nonetheless his attentiveness to reality and his persistent determination to work 
from and yet move beyond his experience of prison, his observations of fellow prisoners, and his 
reading of Scripture, lay the ground work for future possibilities for the criminal justice system 
and its preservation of human freedom. For Bonhoeffer, punishment is a necessary boundary for 
the preservation of life, rather than a platform for the indiscriminate use of power and the 
deprivation of human freedoms.  
In this regard, Bonhoeffer’s observations of the prison environment indicate that recurring 
boundary violations are the modus operandi of the prisoner’s existence; violations perpetuated 
both by petty tormentors and well-intended caretakers. He writes to Bethge on November 22, 
1943, declaring that he becomes “quite ferocious” whenever he sees “entirely defenceless [sic] 
people being unjustly roared at and abused” (DBWE 8:190, 2/73). He continues: “These petty 
tormentors of others, who vent their cruelty in this way and of course are found everywhere, can 
upset me for hours” (DBWE 8:190, 2/73). As Bonhoeffer’s observations progress there is a 
                                                
118 In Foucault’s (1979:105-106) terminology, this system of proportionate punishment is called “analogical 
punishment.” Although “analogical punishment” purports visible and just power relations, Foucault (1979:105-106) 
indicates that the “power that punishes” in this system, simply remains “hidden.”  
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tension in his thinking. On the one hand, he observes the vulnerability of defenceless prisoners 
exposed to the cruel reality of institutional imprisonment and senses a growing concern for those 
who experience the world from below.119 On the other hand, he maintains a position of 
superiority over other prisoners who are not able to navigate liminality with the cultural reserve 
and personal composure that he assumes is prudent.  
This latter judgement gives rise to observations of prisoners who retreat inwardly from the 
inevitability of their situation, taking refuge, however temporary, in what they know of 
themselves and in habitual patterns or illusory ways of controlling reality and collapsing the 
tension of liminality towards self-interests and personal desires. Here he observes in his fellow 
prisoners the need to talk, indiscriminately chattering about personal affairs without regard for 
the truth or for honest confession (DBWE 8:295-296, 2/112). Exposed to constant boundary 
violations, prisoners turn toward their own experience, talking “ceaselessly about their affairs to 
others” even when others are no longer listening (DBWE 8:295, 2/112). They “just want to talk 
about themselves” and can no longer “carry on a conversation about anything beyond personal 
affairs” (DBWE 8:296, 2/112). He concludes that he is “surrounded almost entirely by people 
clinging to their desires, so that they’re not there for anyone else; they don't listen anymore and 
aren't able to love their neighbor [sic]” (DBWE 8:325, 2/122).  
Although Bonhoeffer’s observations lean toward the panoptic gaze, essentially normalise the 
body’s behaviour by demarcating the boundaries and limits of what is respectable or sensible 
(Gordon 1999:399), it is clear that he is trying to make sense of his own experience and response 
to liminality. Turning to view responses to liminality, he searches for theological resources that 
Christianity might offer within this context. 
                                                
119 Even the well-intended visitors leave the prisoner in his prison cell helplessly exposed to secondary 
victimisation. Discerning this situation, Bonhoeffer observes that even the “sweet old man” who came to the prison 
on his own initiative to play Christmas carols on his trumpet, exposes prisoners unknowingly to further misery and 
difficulty. The prisoner has no way of protecting himself from torment or exterior stimuli. Listening to the drifting 
sounds of Christmas carols, prisoners are forced to block out misery by whistling and making lots of noise, “simply 
in order not to weaken” (DBWE 8:232, 2/88). Bonhoeffer concludes: “in the face of this misery that reigns in this 
building, a remembrance of Christmas that is merely more or less only playfully sentimental is inappropriate” and 
“can in fact become dangerous” (DBWE 8:232, 2/88). What is truly needed is a good personal word or sermon to 
help strengthen prisoners in their misery. Unable to offer this word or sermon, Bonhoeffer is left felling “sorry for 
the many helpless young soldiers in their cells” (DBWE 8:232, 2/88). 
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Responding to what he observes in others, Bonhoeffer decides that a Christian must truly “live as 
if there were no wishes and no future,” letting go of control or possible outcomes and instead 
turning toward ones discomfort by engaging the experience of liminality. In this way, one learns 
to become one’s true self (DBWE 8:325, 2/122). As Bonhoeffer engages his own sense of 
liminality in this way, he is surprised to see how others begin to orient themselves toward his 
person, relying upon him, seeking advice from him and looking to him for stability. Engaging his 
own experience of liminality, Bonhoeffer is able to be there for others, to listen to them, and to 
love his fellow prisoners by offering them his one remaining possession, his true self. 
This contemplative detachment from wishes and anticipation of the future (a characteristic 
Bonhoeffer would transcend in the third period of his imprisonment) helped Bonhoeffer to stay 
grounded within the prison space without seeking external sources of power as he observed in 
his fellow prisoners, who had begun “to read fortune cards to predict whether an alarm will come 
that night!” (DBWE 8:207, 2/81). Observing other prisoners response to liminality, Bonhoeffer 
notes that during “tumultuous times superstition blossoms” and “people are quite prepared to pay 
attention to it, even if only with half an ear” (DBWE 8:207, 2/81).120 Although Bonhoeffer 
rejected such superstition attempts to explain reality or predict the future, he does indicate that 
they “are reminders of intercession and church community, of God’s wrath and mercy, and of 
divine guidance” (DBWE 8:322, 2/121). Given theological significance, these responses clearly 
form part of Bonhoeffer’s own negotiation of liminality. Without an eschatological telos, 
however, these superstitious customs reflect habitual patterns of cognitive dissonance, seeking 
refuge from suffering and discomfort by to clinging to the familiar, although cheap, external 
explanation that might lighten the misery of imprisonment. While these habitual cognitive 
patterns are a way of understanding one’s suffering, Bonhoeffer concludes that they ultimately 
offer an illusory consolation, rather than any real hope in a possible future or outcome (DBWE 
                                                
120 The three superstitious customs that Bonhoeffer lists are: (1) “[k]eep your fingers crossed for me,” (2) “[t]ouch 
wood,” and (3) “[n]o one can avoid his fate.” To these he adds a fourth, “[w]hat’s the use of that?!” (DBWE 8:322, 
2/121). Searching for a deeper significance for these superstitious explanations, Bonhoeffer tries to “observe to what 
extent people still believe in anything ‘supernatural’” (DBWE 8:322, 2/121). Correlating superstitious customs with 
some kind of supernatural belief, he extrapolates three ideas that appear to be widespread amidst the liminality of 
imprisonment: 1) superstitious customs are connected to a fundamental longing to know that others “are watching 
over you;” 2) that there is some metaphysical explanation for one’s suffering (“God’s wrath at human hubris”) or; 3) 
that one’s suffering is part of some larger plan or fate and cannot be avoided (DBWE 8:322, 2/121). 
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8:322, 2/121). They reflect a submission to an abstract fate rather than a submission to reality or 
God.  
The above observations lead Bonhoeffer to consider his own experience of suffering. Writing in 
the same letter to Bethge (March 9, 1944), he remarks that too much is unnecessarily made of the 
question of suffering. Articulating here the embryonic stages of his later theological thinking 
concerning suffering, Bonhoeffer implies that one’s own suffering isn’t what really matters, but 
rather the suffering of the church, and therefore God, amidst the sufferings of the world. Drawing 
upon the example of the Catholics, he conveys the impression that knowing what “suffering and 
martyrdom really are” in terms of historical memory allows one to “remain silent about minor 
harassments and hindrances” (DBWE 8:323, 2/121). Although Bonhoeffer longed to offer 
comfort to others who suffered in Tegel and beyond, his comments here reflect a willingness to 
engage his own experience of imprisonment, as a means of participating, not in some abstract 
fate, but in a larger eschatological plan; in the sufferings of God in the world.  
In conclusion, Bonhoeffer’s role as participant-observer of imprisonment, calls attention to his 
willingness to engage liminality in search for a stable and enduring ground. His critical analysis 
of the prison system cast judgement on the dehumanising structures of institutional incarceration, 
while also seeking to point the way forward toward a more just and human system. Towards this 
end, he believed that the foundations of Christianity provided the necessary resources for the 
navigation of liminality and the reconstruction of justice. In a letter to Bethge on November 27, 
1943, he summarises this engagement by indicating that the intense experiences of war and 
imprisonment, if survived, would “presumably provide the necessary experience for a rebuilding 
of the life of the peoples, internally and externally, that is only possible on the foundation of 
Christianity” (DBWE 8:201, 2/79). He therefore instructs Bethge: “we must really preserve our 
experience, come to terms with it, let it become fruitful, and not push it away” (DBWE 8:201, 
2/79). He believed that exposure to liminality during war and imprisonment, over time, would 
offer necessary insight into the experience of being human and the resources within Christianity 
for living in a groundless world. By letting go of what cannot be changed and searching for a 
firm grounding in God’s own suffering in and through the church, Bonhoeffer engages liminality 
as a participant-observer and lays the foundation for his pastoral ministry to other prisoners.  
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From Imprisoned-Pastor to Pastor-to-Prisoners 
Observing the demoralising effects of extended isolation and deprivation of freedom, as 
indicated in the analysis above, Bonhoeffer longed to comfort his fellow prisoners in their 
suffering. In a letter to his parents at Pentecost he wrote: “Were I the prison chaplain, I would on 
such days go from cell to cell from early in the morning until late in the evening; then much 
would happen” (DBWE 8:105, 1/29). The boundaries of the prison cell, however, presented a 
serious limitation to such a desire. As the awaiting trial period brought new freedoms and 
mobility, the pastoral inclinations of the inmate from cell 92 found a performative space and 
audience within the Tegel community, as he began to offer spiritual care to others through 
conversation, by creating a safe space for others, and through his “Prayers for Prisoners” (DBWE 
8:194-198, 2/75-2/77). During this period we can observe a transition in Bonhoeffer’s role from 
imprisoned-pastor to prisoner-pastor. Although this transitioning role gave him a new sense of 
agency, it also clearly provoked a certain self-concept discrepancy. 
During air raids, during times of exercise in the prison yard, and in the infirmary – where he 
himself had occasionally been treated for illness – Bonhoeffer became, as Poelchau121 
(1964:222) recounts, “the pastor of his fellow prisoners, and even, increasingly, of his wardens.” 
Rapidly earning an unofficial membership on the infirmary staff,122 he helped the sick, made 
quick decisions during air raids, and spread calm to those around him (Schlingensiepen 
2010:342). Poelchau (1964:223), the chaplain who made illegal pastoral visits to Bonhoeffer’s 
cell, later admitted that while they discussed many things in their times together, pastoral and 
otherwise, Bonhoeffer was often “the pastor and I the prisoner.”  
                                                
121 Dr. Harald Poelchau was the chaplain in charge of the civil part of Tegel prison.  He “was not actually supposed 
to visit the military wing of the prison, but was so well regarded in Tegel that he had no trouble gaining access to 
Bonhoeffer in his cell” (Schlingensiepen 2010:344). Poelchau and Hans Dannenbaum (another prison chaplain at 
Tegel) realised at once what “an ‘assistant chaplain’ they unexpectedly had in prison” and quickly put Bonhoeffer’s 
gifts to use amongst the other prisoners (Bethge 2000:852). Not only was he more than adequately qualified for such 
an unofficial chaplaincy position, but he knew the existential struggles of the prisoners, having grappled himself 
with the physical and spiritual deprivations of imprisonment. 
122 Poelchau (1964:222) recounts that “[t]he medical orderlies especially became attached to him, and often sat up 
late talking with him in the sick quarters.”  
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The above description highlights Bonhoeffer’s liminal transitioning in Tegel and opens up a key 
interpretive lens for understanding the interrelation between his ministry to fellow prisoners and 
his own formation in prison. Bonhoeffer’s transition from pastor to imprisoned-pastor and then 
again from prisoner to pastor-to-prisoners, accents the inherent tension and fluidity of his liminal 
existence. Living “midway between two identifiable states,” he belonged to neither world while 
embedded firmly within both (Cody & Lawlor 2011:209). In this betwixt space Bonhoeffer again 
experiences “a moment in and out of time,” eluding or slipping “through the network of 
classifications that normally locate states and positions” in the carceral space (Turner 1967:95-
96). In this betwixt space Bonhoeffer clearly experiences a suspension of identity, no longer 
attached to fixed and/or definable social categories (Cody & Lawlor 2011:209); neither his 
former status and vocation, nor his new social location and label as a “convicted criminal” 
(DBWE 8:344, 2/131). Becoming a pastor to prisoners, wardens, and even the prison chaplain, 
he occupied a privileged position of liminality, in-between social categories.  
Amidst this ambiguity, Bonhoeffer is forced to negotiate the complexity of his liminal self and 
the symbolic and spiritual resources available between two distinct socio-cultural identities 
(Cody & Lawlor 2011:207). Various fragments from his letters, call attention to the growing 
relational ambiguity of his liminal role as pastor-prisoner and prisoner-pastor. For instance, after 
interactions with fellow prisoners and guards, he is amazed by the way that people “marvel” at 
his “peace and cheerfulness [Heiterkeit]” (DBWE 8:188, 2/73). Even the wardens that locked 
him in his cell would request prayer and comfort in times of need, asking him, “Pastor, please 
pray that we have no alarm tonight!” (DBWE 8:214, 2/84). Because of his personal calm and 
personality, military prisoners and wardens of Tegel quickly became captivated by his presence 
and capacity for thoughtful discussion and good advice, and began to covet his company. He 
wrote to Bethge, recounting the strange goings on of a political prisoner/pastor: “prisoners who 
work in the kitchen or outdoors tip one another off in the afternoon as to when I am going to be 
in the infirmary and then come up with some reason or another because they think it nice to 
converse with me” (DBWE 8:223, 2/88). Bethge (2000:848) further indicates that even the 
guards “tried to rotate their duties so that they were assigned to the section of the corridor where 
Bonhoeffer’s cell was. He was so good to have a conversation with, and one always got some 
sound advice in dealing with one’s own little troubles.”  
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This fluid inversion of regularized social roles, which is particularly stressed in Poelchau’s 
comment above, left Bonhoeffer questioning: 
[W]ho I really am: the one always cringing in disgust, going to pieces at these hideous experiences 
here, or the one who whips himself into shape, who on the outside (and even to himself) appears 
calm, cheerful, serene, superior, and lets himself be applauded for this charade—or is it real? What 
does "poise" [Haltung] mean, actually? (DBWE 8:221, 2/86). 
Although this text clearly anticipates Bonhoeffer’s later poem “Who Am I?,”123 and is widely 
discussed in that context, it takes on a different layer of meaning when set within the context of 
his liminal pastoral ministry from which it arises. Here it illustrates the liminality of his self-
concept as provoked or called into question by the complex negotiation of various and 
performative identities in the service of spiritual care to others. In the midst of a threshold 
existence, midway between convicted criminal and prison chaplain, Bonhoeffer’s sense of self 
emerges as a dialectic of light and darkness, strength and weakness, serenity and disgust, 
resistance and submission. Rather than attempting to whip “himself into shape” he is content to 
live firmly within this liminal identity, thus allowing the threshold self to be formed in the in-
between space of liminality. In this context, what is more important than “self-knowledge” is the 
acknowledgement of a widespread experience of groundlessness that exists beyond the confines 
of the self. This is intensified by Bonhoeffer’s sense of the ambiguity of the fate of the German 
nation, its church, and its people. In this context, he tried to keep bigger issues in mind.124 His 
primary task was learning to live as a whole person amidst the constantly shifting ground of 
liminality, while simultaneously learning to let go of what cannot be accomplished and striving 
                                                
123 I will not deal specifically with the many interpretive voices that have grappled with the meaning of this well-
known text (in connection with other similar fragments on the self as well as Bonhoeffer’s poem ‘Who Am I?’), 
however, I would like to note my awareness of a variety of interpretive stances within Bonhoeffer scholarship. 
Although interpreters agree that Bonhoeffer clearly opposed an inner/outer distinction on both theological and 
psychological grounds, interpretations of this opposition range in perspective: Williams (1988:36-53) enlists 
Bonhoeffer in a critique of the modern quest for the authentic self through interiority and inwardness; 
Wannenwetsch (2004:290-291) enlists Bonhoeffer’s suspicion of interiority in a recovery of the moral self through 
public worship and liturgy; Marsh (1992a:427-488; 1992b:659-672; 1994), in dialogue with modern German 
philosophical thinkers, argues for a dialogical self-becoming through the Christological relation between self and 
other; Northcott (2009:24-26) and Beaudoin (2002:348-361), in different ways, propose the formation of human 
identity through the practice of Christian technologies of the self – ‘arcane discipline;’ and finally, Dahill’s 
(2009:202) interpretation remains the only one I am aware of, that in light of historic Christian spirituality, laments 
Bonhoeffer’s universally negative mistrust of “the process of growth in introspection and self awareness.” 
124 “If one only keeps the bigger issues in mind while experiencing these small, recurring disappointments, then one 
soon perceives how trivial are one's own deprivations” (DBWE 8:135, 2/44). 
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to reframe reality in terms of responsibility and authenticity – “who I really am.”125 In this space, 
Bonhoeffer experiences what Marsh (1992b:670) terms the “dialogical self-becoming of the 
individual,” in which one discovers through Christological relation to reality, “how the center of 
one's own life lies outside oneself and how little one is an isolated individual” (DBWE 8:149, 
2/54).  
Although this threshold existence is presented in fragments throughout his letters, this thesis 
proposes an intensification of liminality brought on by Bonhoeffer’s performance of pastoral 
care to fellow prisoners. The threshold self stands before an applauding “audience,” striving to 
mediate the indeterminacy of the current blurred socio-cultural positioning. The theoretical 
framework of liminality, serves to underline the performative mediation and interrelation 
between Bonhoeffer’s own questioning of authentic human identity and self and his practice of 
spiritual care in Tegel. That is to say, that his particular approach to spiritual care is more than 
dispositional, it is also structural, emerging from the spontaneity of his experience of the 
threshold self and the formational reshaping of the self in liminality.  
Taking this point further, the above text, along with its use of the word Theaterleistung 
(“charade,” literally, “theatrical heroics”), highlights the performative nature of Bonhoeffer’s 
mediation of the liminal self within the carceral space  (DBWE 8:221, 2/86, fn 17). He 
acknowledges the space between his outer, active, and performative self, and his inner and 
passive-lived experience of liminality. As a “skilful and culturally astute social actor” (Bar-Lev 
& Vitner 2011:669), Bonhoeffer turns toward the carceral space as a threshold, becoming 
through this turn, a “stable pole” from which others find a fixed point of orientation (DBWE 
8:213, 2/84). Although the “authority” of this role is performative, “it is not just put on for a 
show but is authentic and unselfconscious” (DBWE 8:213, 2/84). This authentic performative 
self is an active and conscious self, aware of ambiguity within the self and yet determined to live 
in the flux of in-between space, keeping ones “centre of gravity” wherever one happens to be 
(DBWE 8:324, 2/121). Being his complete self, through pastoral care enlivened by his own 
                                                
125 In contrast to Wannenwetsch, Williams, and Hauerwas, who focus on Bonhoeffer’s suspicion of interiority and 
inwardness, Northcott (2009:17) insists that this text (along with the ‘Who Am I?’ poem) is part of a search for a 
“true individualism, as opposed to the fictional selves fostered by the will to power” and the technologies of control 
and subjectification. 
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prison experience, he helped to create a balance, both for himself and for others (his audience) 
amidst the instability of imprisonment and the constant air raids of war.    
Furthermore, we can see that the materiality of the prison environment both constrains and 
enables Bonhoeffer’s performance of the self. In constraint, it produces separation, confinement, 
and the disoriented self. Yet this space simultaneously enables the performative space for a 
mediation of the threshold self through care for others. Through a series of performative acts, 
tangible spaces of liminal freedom are produced, which tacitly create a transformative climate, 
not only resisting existing norms of carceral control, but enabling the conditions for a sense of 
autonomy and degrees of freedom to be experienced by both Bonhoeffer and the prisoners for 
whom he cares. Bar-Lev & Vitner’s (2011:667)126 study of spatial configuration as the 
materialisation of power relations highlights precisely this point; how particular spaces 
simultaneously “enable and constrain certain performances” (Bar-Lev & Vitner 2011:667). 
Though the prison space remained fairly stable in its “powerful invocation of ‘regularized and 
constrained repetition of norms’” (Butler 1993:95, as cited by Bar-Lev & Vitner 2011:668), the 
widespread experience of liminality enables Bonhoeffer’s performance of pastoral care in Tegel, 
temporarily re-scripting the carceral space, resulting in a suspension of normal social categories 
and the destabilisation of “dominant forms of social reproduction” within the prison (Bar-Lev & 
Vitner 2011:668). This social destabilisation is furthered by the crisis of air raids, during which 
the existing order is temporarily suspended and Bonhoeffer’s performative “poise” becomes a 
communicative means of negotiating the ambiguity of liminality. Thus, Bonhoeffer experienced 
imprisonment as both containment and as threshold; as prisoner and as pastor. 
One letter in particular, written to Bethge on February 1 and 2, 1944, recounts much of 
Bonhoeffer’s thought concerning pastoral care to fellow prisoners, giving further substance to 
the portrait of Bonhoeffer as prisoner-pastor. Reflecting on the air raids of January 30, he tells 
Bethge of the prisoners who came to him the next morning seeking “a bit of comfort” (DBWE 
8:284, 2/108). Acting as a guide for navigating betwixt space, Bonhoeffer attempts to guide his 
fellow prisoners in learning to live authentically in the world as they search for stability within 
the flux of distress, anxiety, sorrow and instability. Fragments of this letter indicate that his 
                                                
126 Bar-Lev & Vitner (2011) draw their theoretical framework for spatial configuration primarily from Foucault, 
Butler, and Goffman. 
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primarily pastoral concern was creating a silent holding space or “safe zone” (Dahill 2009:228), 
in which he could “really share someone’s particular distress and not try to wipe it away or touch 
it up” (DBWE 8:284, 2/108). Outside of a gentle questioning that subtly suggested what really 
matters, he believed it was responsible to maintain silence, leaving space for distress to be 
expressed “without interpretation” (DBWE 8:284, 2/108).127 Yet, he had no sympathy for “false 
interpretations” of distress that sought to take refuge from discomfort in exchange for a false 
grounding and comfort. He concluded: “I think that true consolation must come upon one 
unexpectedly, the same as the distressful situation did” (DBWE 8:284, 2/108). This was clearly 
true in Bonhoeffer’s experience and he sought offer it to his fellow prisoners.  
Regarding “love for another” as consisting “first of all in listening,” Bonhoeffer gave fellow 
prisoners a safe space defined by clear boundaries, in which prisoners could co-exist without fear 
of abuse or domination (Bonhoeffer 1985:36). With Bonhoeffer, fellow prisoners had fewer 
barriers of privilege to cross to receive spiritual care. Here was a pastor who new the view from 
below, who truly new their struggles, and who experienced the same sense of liminality. Who at 
the end of the day heard the same steal door slam shut, who experienced the same lonely nights 
of solitude in a cold and grey prison cell, and who shared the same haunting anxiety about the 
impending future. The life of spiritual discipline that Bonhoeffer had cultivated during the 
interrogation period had prepared him for this task. He now offered himself to other prisoners as 
a performative way of resisting the frightening depersonalisation of Tegel. While at the same 
time submitting to the God who could be found in the suffering of a prison cell. As a result, the 
performative self offered a stable gravitational pole of orientation for other prisoners and prison 
staff. 
Turning form the above analysis of Bonhoeffer’s transitioning pastoral role in the prison space, 
let us now turn to examine how the fruitfulness of this experience has given birth to the powerful 
spirituality contained in his prayers. It is with this same passion and certainty, as illustrated in his 
pastoral ministry, that Bonhoeffer had written “Prayers for Prisoners” (DBWE 8:194-198, 2/76-
                                                
127 Emphasis is Bonhoeffer’s. Regarding silence in spiritual care, Bonhoeffer had written: “The pastor’s duty in this 
form of spiritual care may be to be silent for a long time in order to become free of all ‘priestly’ behavior and 
conceited clericalism. That silence, which is the unconditional prerequisite for spiritual care, aids our preaching, for 
only after a long period of listening is one able to preach appropriately” (Bonhoeffer 1985:31).  
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2/78),128 at the request of Poelchau. These prayers were to be distributed amongst his fellow 
prisoners cells at Christmas 1943 (DBWE 8:182, 2/73; Bethge 2000:850, 852).129 Bethge 
(1990:77, as cited by DBWE 8:194, 2/75, fn. 1) insists that these prayers belong “to the most 
profound expression of Bonhoeffer’s spirituality.”130 He insists that “[t]hey were not jotted down 
spontaneously but were composed after extended meditation and experienced discipline” (Bethge 
1990:77, as cited by DBWE 8:194, 2/75, fn. 1). As such, they represent the fruitfulness of his 
own spiritual journey amidst liminality, carrying the spirit of the Psalms and the spiritual essence 
of Gerhardt’s hymns, and arising as they do, from daily prayer, meditation on the Psalter, and 
memorisation of Gerhardt’s hymns (Bethge 2000:850; Smith 2006:198). They reflect the stamina 
and vitality of Bonhoeffer’s spirituality, as well as his sensitivity toward the suffering of others 
and his ability to pray with and for them, as Christ prayed with and for him through the Psalms. 
They also reveal Bonhoeffer’s “misgivings” about praying for oneself in times of need; a matter 
that he wished to revisit in discussion with Bethge (DBWE 8:276, 2/106). While he considered it 
shameful that it “takes a crisis to shake us up and drive us into prayer” (DBWE 8:276, 2/106), he 
had also come – through reflection on the Psalms and his reading of the Old Testament in his cell 
– to realise that “[t]he entire history of the children of Israel consists of such cries for help” 
(DBWE 8:276, 2/106). It follows that Bonhoeffer was slowly coming to view the cry for help in 
prayer not as an individual or pietistic cry, but as the cry of the beloved community, in solidarity 
with the sufferings of loved ones, with fellow prisoners, and with all who carried out their 
difficult duty in Tegel and beyond (DBWE 8:196, 2/76). These prayers then represent the cry of 
                                                
128 These prayers are written for three specific occasions, morning and evening prayer, as well as a ‘Prayer in 
Particular Need’ (DBWE 8:198, 2/78). The first two prayers echo the pattern of prayer that Bonhoeffer advocated in 
the life together of Finkenwalde, which revolved around opening and ending the day in prayer (Kelly 1999:254). 
129 Once completed, the prison chaplains “obtained illegal access to Bonhoeffer’s cell and distributed the prayers 
among the cells” (Bethge 2000:850).  
130 Kelly and Nelson (2003:227) indicate that while Bonhoeffer is often “more noted as a man of action,” his 
writings also reveal “a man of deep, personal prayer.” From Finkenwalde to Flossenbürg Bonhoeffer had practiced 
daily prayer and devotion. The depth of his prayer life and the life orienting meaning and substance he received 
from it can be seen throughout his involvement in the conspiracy (in circular letters to the Finkenwalde seminarians 
and in letters to Bethge). This intimacy in prayer grows in maturity during his imprisonment as he came to learn the 
prayer of those below. Even at the end, Fischer-Hüllstrung (1964:232) recounts seeing Bonhoeffer through a half 
open door at Flossenbürg, “kneeling on the floor praying fervently to his God.” Seeing this Fischer-Hüllstrung was 
“deeply moved by the way this lovable man prayed, so devout and so certain that God heard his prayer.” 
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a community in the liminal displacement of exile,131 calling out for the world ordering hand of 
the Creator, Saviour, Judge, and Redeemer God to act. On behalf of those who suffer together 
with Christ in darkness, loneliness, restlessness, bitterness, poverty, and misery, and with those 
who are imprisoned and abandoned. The communal nature of these prayers is further reflected in 
the Trinitarian audience, in the omission of individualistic penitent language, and in the plea for 
strength in giving an account before God and others (DBWE 8:196, 2/76). Believing that prayer 
was a critical aspect of community, Bonhoeffer sought to draw everyone in the sprawling prison 
of Tegel, for whom liminality and existential suffering were the modus operandi, into the depths 
of prayer where he himself had found a firm ground within liminality and from which he drew 
his own strength. 
Although Trinitarian in their structure the heart of Bonhoeffer’s “Prayers for Prisoners” is again 
Christological. Their words carry a particular weightiness, much like the kind he described in a 
letter to Ruth Roberta Steahlberg (March 23, 1940) as words that “come not from some semantic 
reflection or observation but quite simply from daily personal intimacy with the crucified Jesus 
Christ” (DBWE 16:41, 1/3). In them, he shares a pattern of daily prayer, through which we 
“orient ourselves to the image of the crucified Christ and allow ourselves to be called to 
conversion” (DBWE 16:41, 1/3). Bonhoeffer refused to use these prayers as an opportunity to 
impose an esoteric religious life upon his fellow prisoners, nor to lead them to belief in God as 
an answer to their hardship, their weakness, or their inherent sinfulness. He considered any such 
attempt to be part of a “religious blackmail” he refused to participate in (DBWE 8:276, 2/106).  
Resisting such “empty spiritual verbosity,” Bonhoeffer wrote prayers with weight, prayers that 
“come directly, as it were, from the cross of Jesus Christ himself,” where “Christ is so present to 
us that it is he who is speaking our words” (DBWE 16:41, 1/3). Through prayer, the Incarnation 
thrusts us into the place where God has chosen to be found:  
Lord Jesus Christ, 
You were poor and miserable, imprisoned and abandoned as I am. 
You know all human need, 
You remain with me when no human being stands by me, 
                                                
131 “In me it is dark, but with you there is light. / I am lonely, but you do not abandon me. / I am faint-hearted, but 
from you comes my help. / I am restless, but with you is peace. / In me is bitterness, but with you is patience. / I do 
not understand your ways, but you know [the] right way for me.” (DWBE 8:195, 2/76). 
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You do not forget me and you seek me, 
You want me to recognize you and turn back to you 
Lord, I hear your call and follow. 
Help me! (DBWE 8:195, 2/76) 
This passage of his prayers illustrates Bonhoeffer’s own conformity to the Incarnate and 
Crucified Christ within his prison cell. Although weary of “religious blackmail” Bonhoeffer 
hoped that through these prayers his fellow prisoners would indeed experience a world ordering 
conformity by hearing the call of Jesus and following after (DBWE 8:195, 2/76); not in 
weakness or from the boundary of personal agency, but from the very centre of their bodily 
existence. He hoped that the incarnation and suffering of Christ would invoke strength and 
agency, not guilt or shame. This point is made clear in a letter to Bethge: “Perhaps you will have 
noticed in the prayers I sent you that they don't focus on asking for forgiveness of sins. From a 
pastoral as well as a practical viewpoint, I would consider a "methodist"132 way of proceeding 
entirely inappropriate here” (DBWE 8:296, 2/112).  
As Feil (1985:189) indicates, Bonhoeffer held that “God’s power always resides in what, in this 
world, is called weakness, and in his solidarity with the weak.” Through his prayers, Bonhoeffer 
encouraged his fellow prisoners to trust in the God who is found in weakness and powerlessness. 
The constant theme is a call for God to accompany and protect the one who prays from the 
underside of life, where Christ too remains when no human being stands by.133 It is a plea of 
commendation and accompaniment, commending oneself to the God who knows the place of the 
imprisoned and abandoned and who promises to accompany us through human suffering and 
liminality. These prayers are a plea for assurance of God’s presence in weakness and in the 
experience of abandonment, freeing us “from fear and despondency” so that we can live before 
                                                
132 Regarding the use of the term “Methodist,” Feil (1985:189) declares: “Bonhoeffer rejected the temptation to lead 
people to God by reminding them of their weakness [i.e. sinfulness]. He called that course the way of Methodism, 
since behind it there lurks once again our human power, albeit our alleged power, for forcing others to come to 
God.” Aware of the power dynamics operative in the prison and within Germany at the time, Bonhoeffer rejected 
the method of communicating God as just another power broker dishing out punishments and artificially elevated 
privileges.  
133 Kelly and Nelson (2003:233) suggest that the constant theme of the prayers “was trust in God’s love and 
acceptance of whatever God has permitted in their regard.” However, I consider this interpretation overly simplistic, 
because it focuses primarily on a position of submission, rather than the dynamic interplay between resistance and 
submission present throughout the prayers. 
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God and others (DBWE 8:196,2/76),134 protecting us from the “assaults of darkness” and 
allowing our “body and soul to come to rest” (DBWE 8:197, 2/77). They aim to strengthen the 
prisoner in bearing the hardships of life, so that one might stand firm in service of the world and 
others. 
This brief examination of some of the themes of Bonhoeffer’s liberating prayers also draws our 
attention to their defiance or resistance function. In the context of the prison cell, prisoners are 
discursively fixed and “othered” subjects, clinically ordered and accounted for by the carceral 
mapping of the state and its systems of domination and power that seeks to isolate and 
interrogate personal identity. Yet, the carceral map of Tegel did not fully account for the 
surviving creativity and tactical capacity of Bonhoeffer’s liberating spirituality. In the section of 
Bonhoeffer’s prayer to the Lord Jesus Christ, the axis of narrative power is relocated; from the 
ominous and ever present gaze of the prison guards, to the powerless, poor, miserable, 
imprisoned, and abandoned Christ. Within the theology of Bonhoeffer’s prayer, power is 
relocated to the one who has tasted the experience of being fixed as an “othered” subject. 
Because Christ too has been “othered,” he knows the depths of human need experienced by the 
prisoner, and in this way, he is the one who remains when all other human beings have 
abandoned the prisoner. Not only is this prayer an early expression of Bonhoeffer’s theology of 
“Jesus the man for others,” but it is the indispensable site of resistance within Bonhoeffer’s 
spirituality. And he offers it now to his fellow prisoners. Having been previously banned from 
the public distribution of written material, his voice had been silenced and his language 
destroyed by the coercive power of the state, yet through the public distribution of prayers 
Bonhoeffer returns to language to offer a communal resistance to the depersonalisation of the 
prison system.  
In addition, the Trinitarian language of his prayers acts as a de-isolation and de-territorialisation. 
By participating in the community of God, prayer is an act of resurrection, a re-envisioning of 
reality and of the narrative of power and justice: God is Judge, not the Reich War Court. In this 
way, prayer functions as a translation of the daily suffering of the individual into a higher vision 
of the self as participating in the suffering of God. In this way, his prayers form the starting point 
                                                
134 “Grant me freedom again / and in the meantime let me live in such a way / that I can give account before [you] 
and others. / Lord, whatever this day may bring – your name be praised” (DBWE 8:196, 2/76). 
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for anticipating the resolve that is given voice in his poems “Christians and Heathens” (DBWE 
8:460-461,3/174) and “Who Am I?” (DBWE 8:459-460, 3/173) and in his prison theology. In 
these prayers we can see the de-territorialisation of the self; as the self who suffers is 
imprisonment and abandonment, and is finally constructed anew in an act of de-isolation, 
through the prayerful construction of a Trinitarian audience: God in three persons hears the cry 
of the sufferer. This associative constituency or community hears and offers the gift of the true 
self, only now self-consciously other than that demanded by the prison regime (Larson 
2010:147). From the perspective of a prisoner, Bonhoeffer crafted these prayers not only to 
speak to the prisoners’ existential situation, but also to lift the prisoner’s perspective beyond the 
isolating individuality that characterises the survival instincts of life in prison.  
In conclusion, Bonhoeffer’s transitioning role from imprisoned-pastor to pastor-to-prisoners, 
indicates a transition at the heart of liminality, opening him up to an experience of the threshold 
self. Through the performance of spiritual care for others, Bonhoeffer not only experiences a 
fragmentation of the self, but he also learns to give his authentic self (light and darkness, strength 
and weakness) to others through the language of prayer, which is grounded in the powerlessness 
of God, as experienced in the prison context, and in a world orienting conformity to the Incarnate 
and Crucified Christ. Bonhoeffer’s prayers are the crystallisation of his prison experience and his 
emerging pastoral role within Tegel, coming to a transformative climax as they invite the 
suffering community of prisoners, wardens, and chaplains to participate in the community of 
God. This threshold experience clearly represents a formative movement in Bonhoeffer’s own 
spiritually and in many ways it acts as a catalyst for Bonhoeffer’s construction of a theological 
and poetic anticipation of resolve, which we will examine in the fourth chapter of this study.   
From Object of Carceral Regulations to Subject of Boundary Creation 
In contrast to Bonhoeffer’s “Prayers for Prisoners,” his prison reports135 remain a vastly 
unexplored part of DBWE 8. The present thesis, however, brings them in to focus. As a prisoner, 
                                                
135 Bonhoeffer’s reports consist of a ‘Report on Experiences during Alarms’ (DBWE 8:205-206, 2/80), proposing 
protective measures after the November 26, 1943, air raid which hit Tegel prison; and a ‘Report on Prison Life after 
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writing a critical analysis of the prison environment, these reports again foreground Bonhoeffer’s 
privileged existence. Furthermore, they accentuate Bonhoeffer’s capacity to assess reality,136 to 
decide, and then to act in responsibility and responsiveness to a given concrete situation (DBWE 
6:221). Featuring certain humanistic themes,137 the reports represent his decision to act in 
responsibility for other human beings138 as a continued resistance to the depersonalisation and 
dehumanisation of incarceration. Having surveyed Bonhoeffer’s pastoral role and the themes of 
resistance and submission through prayer in the previous section, this section will analyse the 
salient themes of his reports, foregrounding the place of resistance and his concern for the 
preservation of life in “doing justice among human beings” (DBWE 8:389, 3/145). Here I 
suggest a final transition at the heart of liminality, in which Bonhoeffer breaks through the 
objectification of carceral regulations and positions himself as a subject of boundary creation, 
protector of human boundaries, and preserver of life. This final transition is set as the last 
document of the awaiting trial period, and as such it represents a threshold in Bonhoeffer’s 
formative prison experience. In connection with his observations of the prison system and his 
pastoral ministry and prayers for prisoners, these reports, although not theological, illuminate the 
prison context as a place of insight and an ever deepening concern for the suffering of human 
beings and those who inhabit the below of world history. 
The first report – “Report on Experiences during Alarms” – was provoked by a particularly 
traumatising air raid on November 26, 1943. In a letter to Bethge, Bonhoeffer describes the 
aftermath of an aerial bomb or explosive that hit the infirmary, severely demolishing the prison 
walls, doors, windows, roofing and leaving “prisoners crying for help yet without anyone caring 
for them except us from the infirmary” (DWEB 8:202, 2/79). He recounts that while helping the 
effected prisoners “one constantly has to be careful” when opening the doors of serious offenders 
that “they don’t crack you over the head with the leg of a chair in order to run away” (DBWE 
                                                
One year in Tegel’ (DBWE 8:343-347, 2/131), written for General Hase, around April, 1944, which unveils the 
degrading methods of punishment and living conditions of Tegel prison. 
136 For analysis of Bonhoeffer’s notion of reality, see Nissen, U.B. 2011. Letting Reality Become Real: On Mystery 
and Reality in Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Ethics. Journal of Religious Ethics, 39(2): 321-343. 
137 For an analysis of Bonhoeffer as Christian Humanist, see de Gruchy (2009:2-24), Zimmermann (2010:25-48), 
Nissen (2010:187-190), and the collection of articles in Zimmermann and Gregor’s (2010) Being Human, Becoming 
Human. 
138 See DBWE 6 (220, 283-85) and Nissen (2009:197-98). “This means that a human being necessarily lives in 
encounter with other human beings and that this encounter entails being changed, in ever so many ways, with 
responsibility [Verantwortung] for the other human being” (DBWE 6:220). 
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8:202, 2/79). Though he first told Bethge that this experience was simply “unpleasant” (DBWE 
8:202, /79), he later indicated that while “lying on the floor in utter darkness,” he had little hope 
for a good outcome (DBWE 8:204, 2/79). This baptism by fire ultimately led him “back to 
prayer and the Bible” (DBWE 8:204, 2/79).  
Although this event confirmed the sustaining importance of prayer and daily meditation on 
Scripture, his report on this event indicates a certain refusal to withdraw from “responsibility for 
the whole,” into an isolated and private monastery (DBWE 6:220). Entering into public 
discourse surrounding the preservation of life, Bonhoeffer’s report questions the security 
concerns of the Tegel prison system. While he suggests that the primary consideration should be 
“safeguarding lives,” the ellipsis that ends the report, implicitly implies that the opposite is true 
(DBWE 8:206, 2/80). Locked behind the doors of their cells Bonhoeffer hears agonising screams 
and cries for help from wounded awaiting trial prisoners (DBWE 8 205, 2/80); cries he could not 
silence, nor comfort. Ultimately, the structural parameters of the prison rendered immediate 
treatment of wounded prisoners impossible. Bonhoeffer deduces four necessary measures from 
his experience during the air raid; each related to the successful and immediate treatment of 
seriously wounded prisoners, and the physical and psychological preservation of bodily life. 
With this report, he hoped he could “make some difference” and that he would again be of “some 
assistance” to the wider community (DBWE 8:202, 2/79). Thus the report is not merely the 
testimony of an isolated individual, but incorporates the selves of the entire community, publicly 
resisting the life threatening deprivations of incarceration during severe air raids and insisting 
upon the preservation of life, both physically and psychologically (DBWE 6:220). Led back to 
prayer and the Bible, Bonhoeffer’s reports, as with his prayers, are a representative act on behalf 
of the cries of the suffering community of Tegel. 
His second report, which focuses on ‘Prison Life,’ serves two primary functions. The first is an 
empowering function. As a kind of narrative testimony of his experience in Tegel, it offers 
detailed documentation of prison life, providing a validation of responsibility and potential 
agency and freedom139 in a context where “prisoners have practically no possibility of asserting 
                                                
139 Regarding “freedom” in relation to responsible action, Bonhoeffer writes: “To act out of concrete responsibility 
means to act in freedom – to decide, to act, and to answer for the consequences of this particular action myself 
without the support of other people or principles. Responsibility presupposes ultimate freedom in assessing a given 
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their rights when they are treated unjustly” (DBWE 8:344, 2/131). Secondly, it serves a defiant 
or resistance function. As a public record intended for the desk of General Hase, it seeks to make 
visible the hidden mechanisms of depersonalisation and dehumanisation inherent in the material 
conditions of Tegel. Bonhoeffer foregrounds the violation of regulations, the “nasty and brutal” 
behaviour of wardens toward prisoners, the inadequate provision of food and meaningful 
participation, and the psychological effects of solitary confinement and extended humiliation 
(DBWE 8:344-346, 2/131). As a resistance document the report is aimed at influencing prison 
policy and the just maintenance of regulations. It uncloaks and assesses the hidden conditions of 
injustice within the Tegel prison system by publicising particular material conditions of 
incarceration, as experienced by an individual as well as the collective prison population.  
The salient themes of the report (overall treatment, food, occupation, lighting, air raids, and 
sickness) represent humanistic concerns that insist upon the necessary preservation of human life 
and the well-being of prisoners both physically and psychologically. Doing his homework to 
compile the report, Bonhoeffer indicates that the prisoners’ food portions are below regulation 
(15g of sausage instead of 25g). Their food, in staggering contrast to food eaten by the staff, has 
had all the “goodness” cooked out of it and on some days, it is “beneath contempt,” completely 
devoid of substance, lacking any trace of fat, meat, or potatoes (DBWE 8:345, 1/131). He 
concludes that this diet is “completely inadequate” for young prisoners serving long sentences 
(DBWE 8:345, 2/131). In addition, there is no meaningful work to be done, no games to be 
played, no “common projects” that “could benefit the whole community, … no religious 
services” (DBWE 8:345-346, 2/131). In these conditions, the younger prisoners “are bound to 
suffering in body and soul from the lack of occupation and supervision” (DBWE 8:346, 2/131). 
Though the prisoners have the right to light in their cells, they often sit in darkness during the 
winter months, because of the indifference of the staff. They are unnecessarily exposed to the 
dangers of bombing raids “without any protection,” only because the wardens refuse to put the 
more than ample labour force of prisoners to productive and communal work, in carrying out the 
recommendation of his pervious report (DBWE 8:346, 1/131). For these and various other 
reasons, Bonhoeffer concludes that the material conditions and the indifference and brutal 
                                                
situation, in choosing, and in acting. Responsible action is neither determined from the outset nor defined once and 
for all; instead, it is born in the given situation.” (DBWE 6:221). 
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intolerance of the wardens, causes only bitterness and psychological depression amongst the 
almost seven hundred prisoners of Tegel.  
Collectively, Bonhoeffer’s reports are concerned with the well-being of human beings, both 
prisoners and wardens alike.140 As such they represent what de Gruchy (2006:18) calls a “critical 
humanism.” In stressing the necessary requirements of a meaningful bodily life in Tegel, his 
reports strive for “human well being in all its dimensions” (de Gruchy 2006:30-32); access to 
rights, just treatment and the right to appeal, adequate food and nutrition, meaningful work, play, 
and a common cause within community; the right to light, to the protection of life from 
unnecessary dangers, and to adequate and timely treatment for the sick or injured. Insisting upon 
the right to human well-being, Bonhoeffer implicitly counters the dehumanising and 
depersonalising tendencies of the prison system and casts a critical judgement on its refusal to 
honour the common humanity of its prisoners (de Gruchy 2006:30-31). In and through these 
documents, Bonhoeffer actively takes on responsibility for other human beings and for the entire 
community of Tegel.  
Embodying his Ethics, as well as the fruitfulness of his prison experience, these reports confirm 
a growing sense that “[i]dividuals do not act merely for themselves alone; each individual 
incorporates the selves of several people, perhaps even a very large number” (DBWE 6:220). 
Through an encounter with the suffering of fellow prisoners – his concrete neighbour, given to 
him by God – he takes on responsibility and is changed through encounter. In the “moment” of 
writing these reports, Bonhoeffer chooses to live in reality and is no longer an isolated 
individual, “but the one who is responsible for other people” (DBWE 6:221). Amidst the 
transition from object of carceral regulations to subject of boundary creation, Bonhoeffer 
deepens his humanistic concerns for the common cause of the humanity of the Tegel community, 
taking on responsibility for those who suffer within its walls and calling the powers that be to 
account. This transition can be seen as a major turning point in Bonhoeffer’s experience of 
liminality, moving him from a repetitive state of limbo, toward a momentum gaining anticipation 
of life it all it multidimensionality and worldliness.   
                                                
140 “I must not fail to mention that there are also a number of wardens whose conduct toward the prisoners is calm, 
matter-of-fact, and when possible kind; but for the most part these men remain in subordinate positions” (DBWE 
8:345, 2/131). 
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Conclusion: Learning to Live In-Between 
The above exposition of Bonhoeffer’s spirituality and his developing pastoral role within 
liminality, underlines the formational quality of liminality amidst the struggle to maintain a 
balance while living suspended in-between resistance and submission. Grounded in Christian 
Humanism and in responsibility for other human beings, his spiritual life and his practice of 
spiritual care are simultaneously “embodied in this world, and yet driven by a sense of the 
transcendent” (de Gruchy 2006:31). He refuses to escape from the corporal or material into the 
transcendent beyond or other-worldly monastic enclosure of his cell, but rather turns towards his 
prison experience and other prisoners, discovering in and through an encounter with the other, a 
deeper and more constant ordering of creation, self, and genuine sociality. As painful and 
disorienting as liminal displacement was, it offered a remarkably open window into the spiritual 
life and the meaning of being human. In and through Bonhoeffer’s turn toward the liminal 
quality of the view from below, he experiences God as the beyond in the midst of his life, 
although he had not yet conceptualised its meaning as such (DBWE 8:367, 3/137).  
Drawing together the threads that have been explored throughout this chapter, we can now say 
that Bonhoeffer’s spirituality is indeed grounded in the experience of a “worldly transcendence” 
(de Gruchy 2010:29), in which faith endures concrete hardships and remains in love, truth, and 
connection to this life and this earth.141 In fact, it is the concrete hardships of imprisonment 
themselves, which create the catalysing space for the fruitfulness of the spiritual life. At the heart 
of liminality, Bonhoeffer experiences a sense of being led through the contrasting tensions of 
betwixt space (between home and prison, absence and communion, dislocation and located-
ness), discovering in this movement, a “dialogical self becoming,” in which the self becomes 
through others, participates in radical openness, and is conformed to the life, suffering, and death 
of Jesus Christ. As Bonhoeffer learned to live in the in-between space of the prison, the horizons 
of his vision for humanity and the Christian life expand, risking new imaginative possibilities 
that would begin to take shape in theological, poetic, and metaphorical anticipation (themes we 
                                                
141 For further analysis of transcendence in Bonhoeffer’s thought, see Vosloo, R. 2012. Bonhoeffer, Transcendence 
and the ‘Turn to Religion.’ In Culture and Transcendence: A Typology of Transcendence. Stoker, W & van der 
Merwe, W.L. Eds. Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 45-61. 
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will explore in the next chapter) of life in all its worldliness. Located in this betwixt space, of 
contrasting light and dark, despair and hope, exile and home coming, Bonhoeffer discovers the 
“Thou” amidst the “it” of his prison experience, and learns to participate in the life of Jesus 
Christ. As such, these distinctive turning points become part of Bonhoeffer’s final turning from 
the phraseological to the real, taking their distinctive place in the narrative of his formative life 
and work.  
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Chapter 4: Liminality as Anticipation 
Suffering 
Wondrous transformation. Your hands, strong and active, are fettered. 
Powerless, alone, you see that an end is put to your action. 
Yet now you breathe a sigh of relief and lay what is righteous 
calmly and fearlessly into a mightier hand, contented. 
Just for one blissful moment you could feel the sweet touch of freedom, 
Then you gave it to God, that God might perfect it in glory.142 
 
Being a Christian does not mean being religious in a certain way, making oneself into something or 
other (a sinner, penitent, or saint) according to some method or other. Instead it means being 
human, not a certain type of human being, but the human being Christ creates in us. It is not a 
religious act that makes someone a Christian, but rather sharing in God's suffering in the worldly 
life.143  
Introduction 
Throughout this study I have attempted to show the ways in which the prison space functions as 
a liminal place of formation for Bonhoeffer. Examining the different phases of liminality, I have 
argued that separation provoked a particular sense of temporal, ethical, and spatial disorientation 
associated with the leaving behind of old structures of identity and order (above and below); and 
that inner and outer transitions at the heart of liminality facilitated the possibility of breaking 
through betwixt space toward new and surprising encounters with the self, with others, and with 
God. Each of these sections sought to articulate different nuances of liminality and highlight 
Bonhoeffer’s formative engagement with the prison space. We have seen how the borders of 
liminality remain particularly porous and open to the convergence of new meaning that emerges 
from within the tensions between life and death, truth and reality, profane and sacred space, 
home and prison, absence and communion, dislocation and located-ness, and resistance and 
submission. It has been concluded, thus far, that these tensions, although experienced in a 
disorienting and repetitive state of liminality, over time contributed to a cumulative and 
concretely transformative new vision of reality and the Christian life. 
                                                
142 Third Stanza of Bonhoeffer’s poem ‘Stations on the Way to Freedom’ (DBWE 8:513, 4/191).  
143 Letter to Eberhard Bethge, July 18, 1944 (DBWE 8:480, 3/177). 
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In the present chapter, I will attempt to take this line of analysis one step further by showing how 
liminality sharpens Bonhoeffer’s sense of longing and focuses his attention on positioning the 
extremes of prison life within the human context of this world, through creative anticipation of 
the future. Here I will show how turning toward the reality of prolonged liminality, a space of 
convergence is opened, in which longing (the penultimate) is transformed through anticipation of 
alternative ways of interpreting future realities (the ultimate), into a new state of being human. 
“[N]ot a certain type of human being,” as Bonhoeffer concludes, “but the human being Christ 
creates in us” (DBWE 8:480, 3/177). In Bonhoeffer’s words, this generative liminality is a space 
in which “high tension gives off big sparks” (DBWE 8:351, 3/132). These “big sparks,” so to 
speak, both emerge from the creative space of liminality, as well as offering navigational 
direction for living in-between the tensions of continued imprisonment and the struggles of his 
country and church in the midst of war. In what follows I will examine the highly creative space 
of liminality, which gives rise to theological, poetic, and polyphonic anticipation.  
Before proceeding, however, two theoretical distinctions must be made. Firstly, although seminal 
theorisations of liminality have largely understood liminal space as a negative, ambiguous phase, 
many scholars have begun to conceptualise how liminality can be experienced positively. Franks 
& Meteyard (2007:220), for instance, argue that between spaces ultimately provoke “[t]he need 
to let go of, leave behind or even be forcibly expelled from old ascendant forms of self-definition 
and identity so that God can be found in ways never before experienced.” The texts quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter indicate such a process, in which familiar structures of meaning, 
support, and security – i.e., actions or efforts to make “oneself into something or other (a sinner, 
penitent, or saint)” – are stripped away, leaving the prisoner and God free to “encounter each 
other in new and life changing ways” (Franks & Meteyard 2007:220). In this way, liminality is 
experienced positively, as a spiritually and theologically formative event, in which the prisoner is 
freed enough from past structures to reflect on his life and theology, “envision new ideas and 
ways of doing, and dreaming new dreams… with ultimate meaning, new and old insights, and 
alternative ways of interpreting reality” (Lee 2001:98). Liminality remains just porous enough 
and open to new possibility that new illumination and transformation can produce fresh vision 
for life.   
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Secondly, in traditional theorisations of liminality, the third phase of the liminal transition has 
been understood as a phase of incorporation, in which the liminar arrives or enters into a new and 
stable social status, on the other side of liminality. In Bonhoeffer’s case, however, a liberating 
passage out of liminality and into a new social status only occurs once he knows himself as a 
death row prisoner, and concretely in his death. It can easily be argued that he remains in a state 
of limbo throughout the course of his imprisonment, until his untimely execution at the hands of 
the Nazis. I will argue, however, that he does not remain in the same phase of liminality, but 
rather, experiences a movement toward a new state of stability and being, through anticipation of 
formative resolve within betwixt space. Therefore, I contend that Bonhoeffer experiences a sense 
of wholeness within the confines of his prison cell, through anticipation of creative resolution, 
thereby incorporating certain elements of past liminality and future possibility into his present 
liminal reality. This creative process arises from within the anti-structural space of liminality and 
yet it also offers stability and structure to his experience as he seeks to navigate the continued 
betwixt space of imprisonment and give thought to alternative interpretations of reality. 
In light of these distinctions, I have characterised the third period of Bonhoeffer’s imprisonment 
(April to July 1944) as a highly creative phase of liminality, in which anticipation produces 
theological, poetic, and polyphonic possibilities that bridge the tensions of liminality and ground 
Bonhoeffer in a wholehearted “sharing in God’s suffering in the worldly life” (DBWE 8:480, 
3/177). The argument as it proceeds will briefly examine these three areas of anticipation, 
theological anticipation, poetic anticipation, and polyphonic anticipation.  
Theological Anticipation 
In the face of prolonged imprisonment and impending death Bonhoeffer sought to discern how 
and where God could be found. Prison life presented him with two similarly unsatisfying 
options, an escape into a metaphysical beyond (hoping in resurrection as a way of escaping the 
hardships of prison life) or a turn toward an inner life (resigning to the mystical life of his 
monastic enclosure). Bonhoeffer saw in each of these options, a false escape from reality. 
Rejecting metaphysics and inwardness Bonhoeffer turns instead to concepts of life and the 
world, in which “God is the beyond in the midst of our lives” (DBWE 8:367, 3/137). This 
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“beyond,” as Reichold (2013:240) indicates, “is not a metaphysical entity” or an “individualist 
category” but points to the other human being and to human life itself. I will attempt to show 
how liminality produces a space in which God and indeed Jesus Christ can be encountered in 
new and liberating ways, not at the edge of human boundaries – “at the point where human 
knowledge is at an end… or when human strength fails” – but in-between these boundaries at the 
centre of “human life and human goodness” (DBWE 8:366-367, 3/137). While I do not claim to 
give a proper interpretation of Bonhoeffer’s notion of a “worldly interpretation,”144 I will attempt 
to show how liminality opens the space for a deconstruction of false notions of God, freeing 
Bonhoeffer to anticipate a fresh encounter with “the God of the Bible, who gains ground and 
power in the world by being powerless” (DBWE 8:478-479, 3/177). My contention is that by 
reframing liminality as an encounter with the “suffering God,” Bonhoeffer learns to live in-
between, sharing in “God’s suffering in the life of this world” (DBWE 8:486, 4/178). Through 
theological anticipation, Bonhoeffer learns to watch in a Gethsemane-like displacement with 
Christ. 
Bonhoeffer’s first few letters in April 1944, preface the developments that take place in his 
“theological letters.”145 As such, they ground his “theological turn” in what has emerged from a 
year spent in prison.146 Writing to Bethge on 11 April 1944, Bonhoeffer remarks, “I have been 
                                                
144 Bonhoeffer scholars, not least of all Bethge (2000:853-892), followed notably by Feil (1985:99-205) and 
Wüstenberg (1998:68-157), have explored Bonhoeffer’s notion of a “worldly interpretation,” particularly in regard 
to relation to “the world come of age” and the development of a “nonreligious interpretation.” Other notable works 
dealing with the development of this line of thought include Dumas (1968:163-214), Selby (1999:226-245), and 
Reichold (2013:229-241). My intention in this section is not to retread this clearly worn path, but rather to point 
toward a largely overlooked element in Bonhoeffer’s “worldly interpretation.” That is to say that seminal works on 
this period have largely focused on Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the world and religion, and the development or 
turn that occurs in Tegel prison as a result of his prison readings, notably the influence of Wilhelm Dilthey. While I 
do not dispute this well defended line of argument, I do content that the most obvious of influences, Bonhoeffer’s 
experience of prison and the fragmentary tensions he endures in his cell, have been widely neglected as contributing 
to the fruitfulness of his prison theology. 
145 Bonhoeffer’s first explicitly “theological letter” to Bethge was on 30 April 1944 (DBWE 8:361-367, 3/137). 
Followed in quick succession by other “theological letters:” May 5, May 29, June 8, July 16, July 18, July 21. de 
Gruchy (2010:15) comments that “[t]ogether with his ‘Thoughts on the Baptism of Dietrich Bethge’ in May and the 
‘Outline for a Book,’ they embody Bonhoeffer’s ‘new’ theology from prison.” 
146 Due to a fundamental change in the style and content of his letters (revealing a new excitement for his work) 
(Schlingensiepen 2010:349; DBWE 8:505, 4/188), Bonhoeffer scholars have conceptualised a “theological turn” 
beginning with Bonhoeffer’s letter to Bethge on 30 April 1944 (DBWE 8:361-367, 3/137). A number of 
interpretations exist for understanding this “theological turn.” They are listed here only in brief form. The first and 
most immediate response of “commentators after the Second World War, including Karl Barth,” was to “ascribe 
Bonhoeffer’s new theological ideas to the shock of his arrest and imprisonment” (Schlingensiepen 2010:350). This 
interpretation, however, has largely been rejected due to an acknowledgement that Bonhoeffer was well in control of 
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told not to expect any change in my current situation for the time being, and this comes after 
having fresh promises made to me once a fortnight until now” (DBWE 8:352, 3/132). This event 
marks a decisive shift in Bonhoeffer’s prison experience, indicating “that he should no longer 
count on a court trial, but should rather adjust to the idea of staying in Tegel for sometime to 
come” (Schlingensiepen 2010:349). In the letters that follow Bonhoeffer begins to reflect on the 
past year of imprisonment and its meaning for his life: “It certainly makes a great difference 
being in prison for a year instead of a month; one gains not only interesting or strong impressions 
but a huge new dimension in one’s life” (DBWE 8:360, 3/136). Although he feared he was 
becoming less sensitive to the deprivations of imprisonment and that this might lead to 
forgetfulness (DBWE 8:360, 3/136), he also observed the potential fruitfulness which arises from 
carrying around a sense of longing amidst the tensions of liminality (DBWE 8:351, 3/132). In 
this reflective space he noted that “things that we have worked out for ourselves” – i.e., 
separation, hardships, tensions, disorientations, suffering, transitions – whether “consciously or 
unconsciously, will never be forgotten, since they have changed from being powerful 
experiences to taking definite shape as clear insights, purposes, and plans, and as such will keep 
their meaning for our future life” (DBWE 8:360, 3/136).  
The transformation described here, of powerful experiences taking shape as clear insights and 
meaning points toward the formative possibilities that betwixt space opens for the prisoner. In 
this space, as hope for release faded, Bonhoeffer faced the boundary of his own limitations and 
strength (death). In the “theological letters” that follow we see a tension in his writing, between a 
powerful God who acts and a God who acts in powerlessness. Here he faced a number of 
competing options; wait for God to act in power, look for escape in a better life beyond, or turn 
                                                
his situation by the time he started formulating these new theological ideas. The second interpretation is observed in 
a change in his reading partners, turning from Stifter, to “philosophers and scientists like Carl Friedrich von 
Weizäcker, José Ortega y Gasset and Wilhelm Dilthey, and instead of theological books he read The Homeric Gods 
by W.F. Otto and Die Geschichte der preußischen Akademie (History of the Prussian Academy) by his teacher, 
Adolf von Harnack” (Schlingensiepen 2010:349). It is believed that a great deal of this material (specifically 
Dilthey), influenced Bonhoeffer’s new theological direction (Feil 1985:99-205 & Wüstenberg 1998:68-157). 
Thirdly, and more practically, we can observe a shift in his overall outlook on his situation. During this period, he 
received word from Sack’s “that he should no longer count on a court trial, but should rather adjust to the idea of 
staying in Tegel for sometime to come” (Schlingensiepen 2010:349). This is believed to have shifted his outlook and 
thinking – no longer hoping for a quick conclusion to his imprisonment, but rather, making the most of his time in 
light of his continued imprisonment. And finally, in connection with a shift in Bonhoeffer’s outlook on his present 
situation, it is believed that he started to look forward in anticipation to the success of the conspiracy and its plot to 
assassinate Hitler. 
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toward the brokenness and pain that accompanies liminality, viewing it not as an unwelcomed 
intrusion, but as the very place where God is found. Although it is clear that Bonhoeffer chose 
the later of these options, there are some indications that he didn’t start there. 
While not forming a prominent theme in his “theological letters,” it does appear that Bonhoeffer 
contemplated the first option, for a time: wait for God to act in power. In his letter to Bethge on 
30 April 1944, he indicates a longing for God to “arise and accomplish something,” thereby 
saving him from his impending death. Here God’s action is almost certainly tied to his hope that 
the resistance would make its move on Hitler, shaking the world and changing his personal 
circumstances (DBWE 8:361, 3/137). Longing to be free he continued to wonder, “how God will 
go about solving what seems beyond any solution” (DBWE 8:361, 3/137). Whether or not this 
was simply a cryptic reference to his hope that the coup would succeed or an actual longing for 
God to act in power, we may never know. However, his reference to Psalms 58:11147 and 9:19-
20148 in this regard seem to validate his lamenting desire for God to act on earth and judge his 
accusers.  
Held in tension with a desire for God to act in power, however, is Bonhoeffer’s deconstruction of 
the “deus ex machina” (DBWE 8:366. 3/137). Although, he directs his critique at “religious 
people,” it is clear that Bonhoeffer – himself on the liminal boundary between life and death – 
hoped that God would indeed “appear to solve insoluble problems or to provide strength when 
human power fails” (DBWE 8:366, 3/137). This must have been at the heart of his experience, 
longing for God to show God’s self in power and judgement. He quickly resolves, however, that 
this is “a dubious proposition,” and that it leaves room for God “only out of anxiety” (DBWE 
8:366, 3/137). Bonhoeffer’s own liminal experience opens up a space for future criticism of 
religion and metaphysical conceptions that no longer correspond to reality.  
Turning his attention to belief in the resurrection, he concludes that anticipation of the 
resurrection “is not the ‘solution’ to the problem of death” either (DBWE 8:367, 3/137). Rather, 
one must find God in the “beyond” that lies “in the midst of our lives” (DBWE 8:367, 1/137). 
Here we can see Bonhoeffer turning toward liminality and the darkness and death that 
                                                
147 “People will say, ‘Surely there is a reward for the righteous; surely there is a god who judges on earth.” 
148 “Rise up, O Lord! Do not let mortals prevail; let the nations be judged before you. Put them in fear, O Lord; let 
the nations know they are only human.” 
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accompany it. Reaching his own limit to change the outcome of his fate, he resolves to leave that 
which cannot be solved unsolved and focus rather on living in-between the limits and tensions of 
liminality, at the centre where God and the church reside (DBWE 8:367, 3/137). 
Searching for a justification for his developing conception of a worldly redemption (in a letter to 
Bethge on 27 June 1944), Bonhoeffer turns to the Old Testament, drawing on two scriptural 
metaphors, which capture something of the reality of his own experience of liminality: exodus 
and exile. Here Israel is redeemed “out of Egypt and later out of Babylon” so that they “may live 
before God, as God’s people on earth” (DBWE 8:447, 3/169). In contrast, to these Old 
Testament images of redemption, Bonhoeffer argues that the emphasis of Christianity and its 
redemptive proclamation of resurrection have come to be understood as lying on the other side of 
“death’s boundary,” and as such have been sought as a means of “being redeemed out of 
sorrows, hardships, anxieties, and longings, out of sin and death, in a better life beyond” (DBWE 
8:447, 3/169). Disputing this understanding, Bonhoeffer insists, “Christian hope of 
resurrection… refers people to their life on earth” (DBWE 8:447, 3/169). Drawing them ever 
deeper into the reality of sorrows, hardships, anxieties, and longings as a way of encountering 
God in the midst of their lives.  
Bonhoeffer’s theological reflections on exodus, exile, and resurrection, anticipate an alternative 
images or perspective of liberation and redemption, one that offers no escape route out of earthly 
tasks and difficulties, but rather turns towards the shadowy reality of death as a participation in 
the life of Christ in this world.149 Grounding resurrection in the worldly life of Christ, Bonhoeffer 
re-frames liminality as an anticipation of a liberating new encounter with God this side of the 
boundary of death. Writing of Christians in the plural, Bonhoeffer casts his own experience of 
liminality in the scriptural image of Gethsemane:  
Like Christ (“My God why have you forsaken me?”), they have to drink the cup of earthly life to 
the last drop, and only when they do this is the Crucified and Risen One with them, and they are 
crucified and resurrected with Christ. This-worldliness must not be abolished ahead of its time; 
on this, NT and OT are united. Redemption myths arise from the human experience of 
                                                
149 “I find it a tremendously liberating thought that Christ is not at all dulled to the suffering and sin in the world as 
we are, but rather that he experienced and bore it all unceasingly” (DBWE 16:359, 1/202). 
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boundaries. But Christ takes hold of human beings in the midst of their lives (DBWE 8:448, 
3/169). 
Here we can see the truly formative nature of liminality, in that it opens a space of conformation 
and indeed participation in the life of Jesus Christ (Incarnate, Crucified, and Resurrected). Jesus’ 
resurrection does not somehow rescue him from the reality of imprisonment and death but rather 
draws him ever more deeply into the heart of his experience, “in a wholly new way” (DBWE 
8:447, 3/169). This journey of formation involves a certain leave of letting go or leaving behind 
of the powerful illusion of God as the deus ex machina, creating a new space for encountering 
the real God, “the biblical God of the cross” (Dahill 2009:95).  
Herein lies the true experience and purpose of Gethsemane, that like Christ, God might lead “us 
to a truer recognition of our situation before God” (DBWE 8:478, 3/177). The God who we 
encounter in Gethsemane is the “God who is with us” and at the same time “the God who 
forsakes us (Mark 15:34!)” (DBWE 8:478, 3/177). Within a Gethsemane-like displacement we 
are free to encounter the God who “consents to be pushed out of the world and onto the cross;” 
the God who “is weak and powerless in the world and in precisely this way, and only so, is at our 
side and helps us” (DBWE 8:479, 3/177).  
Taking up the imagery of Gethsemane a further time, Bonhoeffer notes Jesus’ question to the 
disciples, “Could you not stay awake with me one hour?”150 Here the profound discovery of the 
Gethsemane like displacement is that God not only stands by our side in our suffering, but that 
we too are called to “stand by God in God’s own pain” (DBWE 8:480, 3/177).151 At the heart of 
liminality, Bonhoeffer encounters this startling reality, which is an inversion of “everything a 
religious person expects from God” (DBWE 8:480, 3/177). Although the notion of the suffering 
God was not a new idea in Bonhoeffer’s theology, the call to companion God through God’s 
own pain and suffering was a newly liberating encounter with the suffering God.152 Here we can 
                                                
150 Matt 26:40b. 
151 This notion later forms the second stanza of Bonhoeffer’s poem ‘Christians and Heathens’: 
People go to God when God’s in need, 
find God poor, reviled, without shelter or bread, 
see God devoured by sin, weakness, and death. 
Christians stand by God in God’s own pain (DBWE 8:461, 3/174). 
152 “God suffered on the cross. Therefore all human suffering and weakness is a sharing in God’s own suffering and 
weakness in the world. We are suffering! God is suffering much more. Our God is a suffering God” (DBW 13:412). 
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see the development of a new sense of agency and a renewed invitation to be “worldly,” 
precisely at a point in which he had more reason than ever to withdraw from the reality of the 
world.  
Dahill (2009:96) notes that “[a]lthough he does not explicitly use the term ‘formation’ here, 
these letters are very much concerned with how Christians develop.” I would add to this that they 
are reflective of Bonhoeffer’s own transformational experience taking shape as a result of 
liminality. Within this space Bonhoeffer’s self-definition and identity are thrown off balance – 
“not thinking first of one’s own needs, questions, sins, and fears” – and he allows himself “to be 
pulled into walking the path that Jesus walks, into the messianic event” (DBWE 8:480, 3/177). 
This “worldly transcendence” (de Gruchy 2010:28) truly captures the essence, meaning, and 
fruitfulness of liminality, and leads Bonhoeffer to the conclusion that: 
Being a Christian does not mean being religious in a certain way, making oneself into something 
or other (a sinner, penitent, or saint) according to some method or other. Instead it means being 
human, not a certain type of human being, but the human being Christ creates in us. It is not a 
religious act that makes someone a Christian, but rather sharing in God's suffering in the worldly 
life. (DBWE 8:480, 3/177). 
In conclusion we can clearly see that Bonhoeffer proposed this alternative understanding of 
Christian faith, as a means of anticipating God’s own pain in the suffering of the world and in 
this way allowing himself to be drawn into the world as a companion and participant in the life 
of Christ. Liminality opens this creative and transformative space, forcing him to let go of and 
leave behind old self-definitions (saint, sinner, church leader, so-called priestly figure, unjust 
person) and throw himself “completely into the arms of God” (DBWE 8:486, 4/178). So that he 
might discover how to live fully in the midst of the world and all of its “tasks, questions, 
successes and failures, experiences, and perplexities” (DBWE 8:486, 4/178). Reframing his 
prison cell in this way, he experienced the transformative power of staying awake with Christ in 
Gethsemane. Herein lies the true meaning and purpose of liminality as theological anticipation, 
in that it opens a space for a new world orienting construal of life and reality. Concluding his 
first letter to Bethge after the failure of coup, July 21, 1944, Bonhoeffer expresses his 
gratefulness for his prison experience and its theologically formative power: “I am grateful that I 
have been allowed this insight, and I know that it is only on the path that I have finally taken that 
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I was able to learn this. So I am thinking gratefully and with peace of mind about past as well as 
present things” (DBWE 8:486, 4/178).  
Poetic Anticipation 
Above I argued that anticipating a theological resolution to his experience of liminality, 
Bonhoeffer reframed his life in prison as a Gethsemane-like participation in the life of Christ and 
the sufferings of God in the world. It is clear that this theological anticipation presented the 
possibility of a threshold (between metaphysical and inward escapes from reality), grounding 
him in life and in the world, in all its hardships and perplexities. Building upon this insight I will 
seek to further nuance the role of anticipation within liminality by turning to the development of 
poetry in Bonhoeffer’s prison writings.153 Here I argue that his poetry calls specific attention to 
the formative tensions and borderlines of his experience, further marking transitional points at 
the heart of liminality that anticipate a threshold or passage through betwixt space and into 
transformative moments of resolution in God’s presence and the presence of others. My 
contention here is twofold: that liminality provides the very “catalyst for the creative impulse” 
(Wry 2009:198)154 to write poetry, and that the creative production of poetic language itself 
opens a space for the tensions of liminality to find resolution in communion with God and others. 
My intention here lies not in challenging other prominent interpretations of the genesis of 
Bonhoeffer’s poetic venture,155 such as Brock’s (2009:61-67) persuasive argument, but rather in 
                                                
153 In the days between June and December 1944, Bonhoeffer began a surprising new venture into the realm of 
poetry; writing ten poems that covered a wide range of topics. De Gruchy (2010:30), I believe, rightly insists that 
Bonhoeffer’s poetry needs to be taken “as the most mature of his reflections arising out of his prison experience.” 
De Gruchy’s comment is particularly pertinent, not only because he points toward the depth of human maturity 
contained in these poems (which has often been overlooked), but also because he insists that Bonhoeffer’s poetic 
reflections arise from his prison experience. While this point may seem obvious, not all interpreters, as we will see, 
have noticed the latent carceral themes and references that emerge again and again in his poetry. 
154 Wry (2009) notes that Turner (1969:50) defined the “liminal phase or space as a catalyst for the creative impulse; 
it frequently generates ‘myths, symbols, rituals, works of art… periodical reclassifications of reality… [that] incite 
us to action as well as to thought.’” 
155 Brock (2009:65) notes that the development of poetic writing in Bonhoeffer’s prison letters is “susceptible to a 
range of interpretations.” He writes that the persuasive sociological account suggests that Bonhoeffer’s natural 
cultural reserve, which kept him from writing poetry, was ultimately “broken down under the increased pressure to 
maintain emotional contact with loved ones.” The equal persuasive psychological account argues “that the 
movement from more pedestrian letter writing into more revealing forms of writing is an artifact of a human craving 
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building on previous interpretations to offer the possibility of an alternative reading of his poetry 
that takes seriously the context of liminality experienced in the prison space. That is to say that 
stark attention has been given by other interpreters, to the role of the prison context in 
Bonhoeffer’s poetic venture or in understanding the formative nature of his poetry within his 
prison experience as a whole. I am not implying that other interpreters haven’t read his poetry 
against the backdrop of his prison experience, but rather that few have viewed it as the 
anticipated and transformative climax of his prison experience, which gives meaning to the 
whole. Working very closely with his prison experience as a whole, one can argue that his poetry 
functions as a reflective revisiting of his spiritual journey amidst liminality; bring to the fore 
many of the themes and motifs that have emerged throughout his experience (now in modified 
form) and converging with new meaning, significance, and resolve. In these poems Bonhoeffer’s 
evolving persona as “the poet” (Brock 2009:62), gives new voice to the conflicting tensions of 
separation and communion, success and failure, despair and hope. As such, these poems yield 
new meaning when read against the context of liminality, calling attention not only to the 
tensions of liminality, but more importantly to the borderlines and transitional spaces in which 
Bonhoeffer experiences a literal or conceptual anticipation of illumination and/or transformation 
(Wry 2009:197). In what follows, I will seek to ground Bonhoeffer’s poetry in this context, 
examining the emergence of what Wry (2009:iii) calls a “liminal poetics.”156 Following a 
discussion of how I see poetry emerging as the creative product of liminality, I will offer a 
reading of Bonhoeffer’s poem, “Stations of the Way to Freedom.” I do not claim to offer a 
comprehensive interpretation of this poem,157 but rather seek to illustrate how Bonhoeffer’s 
poetic venture emerges as a creative product of liminality, leading him out of a stasis and 
through threshold moments of transformation. 
                                                
for the deeper levels of contact which keep human souls alive.” A third and less persuasive account might suggest 
that the development of poetry in his writing was a “natural expression of an artistic genius” that had remained 
dormant until awakened by the extremes of his prison experience.  
 
156 Wry has analyzed the role of such liminal spaces in the poetry of Walt Whitman (Wry 2009) as well as the 
influence of Emerson and Thoreau on Whitman’s poetry (Wry 2010), highlighting the way in which a “liminal 
poetics” in their poetry functions to lead “a community of readers out of stasis and through threshold moments of 
conversion” (Wry 2010:iv). 
157 For a more comprehensive interpretation of this poem see Ulrich (2009:147-174). The editors of DBW 8 and 
DBWE 8 have also noted important interpretations of the poem in the original German language version of “Stations 
on the Way to Freedom”; see DBWE 8:512, 4/191, fn. 1. 
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Firstly, let me explain how I see liminality as the catalyst for Bonhoeffer’s poetic language. 
Brock (2009:66) notes that Bonhoeffer “may well have had an aptitude for poetry never before 
recognized, having been stifled under cultural and temperamental reserve.” Liminality, however, 
as we have scene, created a space in which past structures of self-identity and social and cultural 
order were suspended or abrogated, throwing the self off balance and opening an instant of pure 
potentiality and imaginative new risk. Within this betwixt space, Bonhoeffer had put on various 
performative personas to navigate the difficult tensions of liminality; the innocent imprisoned 
pastor, the strong son, the participant-observer, the prisoner-pastor, etc. Amidst these 
disorienting sociocultural transition he had learned a new kind of intimacy with God, not limited 
by the usual social and cultural self-conceptions; an intimacy, which Brock (2009:66) indicates, 
was also “learned from Luther and the Psalms” and from months spent in meditation, prayer, and 
reflection in the isolation of his prison cell. Now putting on the persona of the poet for the first 
time, Bonhoeffer risked a new kind of intimacy with God, in which God and the self encounter 
each other in images and forms not previously expected; as co-companions in the sufferings of 
the world (“Christians and Heathens”).  
In this context Bonhoeffer wrote poetry not only for “those he loved, who shaped him, and who 
he was shaped by” (his family, friends, fiancée, his church, and his God) (Brock 20009:66), but 
also as a means of giving further shape to the formfulness of his prison experience, so that he 
might position the symbolic meaning of his experience within the human context of relationality. 
As the catalyst for this poetic venture liminality provoked the salient themes of his poetry, the 
borderlines and transitions of which are rife throughout the poems. The cultural form of poetry, 
however, provided the template for anticipating a transformative resolve; healing the rift, 
bridging the gap, and restoring wholeness to the self, the world, and his relationships (Northcott 
2009:26). Emerging from the heart of liminality, poetry offered healing to the conflicting and 
unresolved tensions of betwixt space. This healing balm represented the ability “to find solace, 
comfort, connection, meaning, and purpose midst of suffering, disarray and pain” (Puchalski et 
all 2009:890) 
In this regard we might say that the symbolic nature of poetic language was particularly suited to 
both hold the conflicting tensions of liminal space and deepen the symbolic meaning of 
imprisonment that Bonhoeffer had previous only been able to hint at. Wannenwetsch (2009:4) 
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highlights this point, when he writes that “being of a somewhat apophatic nature,” poetic 
language is “suited to express the thought that can hardly be thought, the insight that is only just 
within reach.” Having searched and searched for the words to give meaning to the formfulness of 
his prison experience, Bonhoeffer found in poetry a form “capable of capturing the coincidence 
of opposites, of expressing harmonious tensions as well as demarcating rapture and fracture” 
(Wannenwetsch 2009:4). Poetic language, like nothing else allowed him to explore the 
unresolved tensions in his life without judgement or shame. It enabled new risks of imagination 
in order that he might restore the fragments of his own self, bridge the separation between family 
and friends, and risk the kind of intimacy with God and others that he had learned in the Psalter 
and through meditation and prayer in his prison cell (Brock 2009:66).  
As the creative product of liminality, Bonhoeffer’s poems revisit many of the themes prevalent 
throughout his prison letters and papers (not just his later letters): separation from the past, from 
loved ones, and from the self (“The Past,” “The Friend,” “Who am I?”); ethical liminality and 
vicarious responsible action (“Night Voice,” “Jonah,” “The Death of Moses”); pastoral care for 
other prisoners (“Night Voices”); an inner/outer self-concept discrepancy (“Who am I?”); 
transitioning from object of carceral regulation to subject of boundary creation (“Night 
Voices”);158 the various phases of liminality (“Stations on the Way to Freedom”); reframing 
suffering as companioning God in God’s own suffering in the world (“Christians and 
Heathens”); and facing death (“Night Voices,” “Jonah,” “The Death of Moses,” “Stations on the 
Way to Freedom”). Searching for resolution in the face of death, these poems risk imaginative 
resolution to the tensions of liminality. As a fresh articulation of many of the themes and motifs 
of his prison experience, his poems re-frame separation, disorientation, and suffering as a 
spiritual displacement, in which false notions of existence and comfort are deconstructed, 
creating space for considerable personal growth and formation; reshaping his self-concept and 
willingness to inhabit liminality as a sacred space of “wonderous transformation” (DBWE 8:513, 
4/191), even in the face of death. 
                                                
158 The stanza which most prominently illustrates this liminal move from accused to accuser reads as follows:  
“Harassed and hunted by humans, 
rendered defenseless and accused; 
bearers of unbearable burdens, 
it is we who now accuse” (DBWE 8:466, 3/175). 
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Bonhoeffer’s poem “Who Am I?” (DBWE 8:459-460), by way of introduction, beautifully 
illustrates this capacity of poetry to capture the unresolved tension of liminality and anticipate 
resolve without collapsing or disregarding the context from which this resolve arose. The 
question of “who,” which runs throughout the poem and also forms the centre of Bonhoeffer’s 
Christology,159 emerges here, not in Christological form per se, but from the liminal borderlines 
of a conflict between the outer or public face of the self and the inner struggle for self-identity 
that was provoked by his transitioning pastoral role in the prison space: “Who am I? This one or 
the other?” (DBWE 8:460, 3/173). This “question of transcendence” (DBWE 12:302, 2/12) 
points toward an ongoing search for a worldly transcendence that offers a threshold in the midst 
of liminality. Unable to resolve this tension through letters or radical openness with Bethge, 
Bonhoeffer had pushed it aside.160 Determined to find resolution he returned to explore its 
meaning through poetry. This time, with the tensions of the threshold self raised in poetic 
anticipation, and previous attitudes and actions deconstructed, Bonhoeffer “can more truly come 
to find God as the true and ultimate sources of security and life” (Frank & Meteyard 2007:219): 
“Who am I? They mock me, these lonely questions of mine. Whoever I am, thou knowest me; O 
God, I am thine!” (DBWE 8:460, 3/173). At the heart of liminality, Bonhoeffer experiences this 
liminal moment in time, free and unbound by social norms that define and psychologise the 
conflicted self, and he is drawn across the threshold into communion with the “Thou,” no longer 
disguised as an “it.” Here poetic anticipation risks imagination that it might bridge the gaps and 
offer healing to the threshold self. Seeking to further illustrate the role of poetic anticipation let 
me now turn to offer a more in-depth reading of Bonhoeffer’s poem “Stations on the Way to 
Freedom” (DBWE 8:512-514, 4/191), as it further highlights the potentiality of liminal poetics in 
moving the liminar out of a stasis and into a transformational communitas with God and others. 
                                                
159 The question of “who” forms a prominent theme in Bonhoeffer’s Christological reflections; from his summer 
semester lectures of 1933, through his essay on “telling the truth” and his letters to Bethge (DBWE 8:362, 3/137), 
and on into his “Outline for a Book” (DWBE 8:499-504). Pangritz (1999:134) claims that this question in fact 
“forms the cantus firmus of Bonhoeffer’s theological development from beginning to end” and the centre of his 
Christological thought. 
160 It is clear, however, that Bonhoeffer had begun to come to a more appreciative perception of the inner/outer 
conflict of the self, sometime just before or after he wrote this poem: “Since human beings live as much from their 
“outer” to their “inner” selves as from their “inner” to their “outer” selves, the assumption that one can only 
understand the essence of a human being by knowing his most intimate psychological depths and background is 
completely erroneous” (DBWE 8:457, 3/172).  
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Stations on the Way to Freedom 
De Gruchy (2010:17) notes that this poem “was written immediately after Bonhoeffer heard the 
news of the failed coup attempt and realized that his fate was sealed.” As such, it comes from the 
fourth and final period of Bonhoeffer’s imprisonment and represents what I believe to be a 
reflective revisiting of the overall meaning and purpose of his prison experience. I included it 
here, as it represents the most powerful expression of the capacity of poetic anticipation and 
weaves together many of the themes that have emerged throughout this study.  
First let me draw a few distinctions between my approach to the poem and the approaches taken 
by Ulrich (2009:150-174) and Robertson (1999:75-80), as I believe this speaks to the formative 
nature of the poem within liminality. Ulrich (2009:150) clearly states that “Bonhoeffer’s writings 
cannot be separated from his life, especially his letters from prison to which some of the poems 
belong.” The approach he offers for reading the poem, however, in many ways betrays this 
connection, as it often points away from rather than pointing toward the poems groundedness in 
Bonhoeffer experience of imprisonment. Attempting to avoid the biographical manner of 
Robertson’s reading, which he claims views the poem as “a blueprint for the Christian life,” 
Ulrich (2009:152) instead reads the poem “as a schedule for God’s presence.” The poem, he 
claims, “indicates the places of God’s acting, of God’s presence” in the life of the disciple: 
He is present where discipline is lived 
He is present where we really do what is right, 
He is present where we suffer because of our dedication to Him, 
and he is present where all earthly bounds and blindness dissolve to reveal his will. (Ulrich 
2009:152) 
As such, Ulrich (2009:152) sees the primary subject matter of the poem, as Bonhoeffer’s 
description of a life lived in submission and dedication to “God’s will and action in any walk of 
life.” The poem points, as he indicates, toward “specific places for submission: discipline, action 
and suffering” (Ulrich 2009:153). Here I am in agreement with Ulrich’s emphasis on specific 
places of God’s presence, but believe that his overall approach betrays this emphasis when it 
turns toward reading Bonhoeffer’s particular “stations” as “public places” in light of 
Bonhoeffer’s “orders” or “mandates” and the poem as a whole as intending “a message – to the 
Church” (Ulrich 2009:153-154). This I believe betrays the particularity and concreteness of 
“specific places” fore-grounded by the poem, in an effort to universalise these places in the life 
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of discipleship. In addition, Bonhoeffer’s preliminary notes, which sketch the theme of the poem, 
seem to indicate a personal rather than a public correlation between the various stages of his 
imprisonment and the process of learning or more appropriately being taught to submit to the 
presence of God in and through these distinctive places or stations: 
Discipline 1: Learn to control yourself 
Action 2: Learn to act. Reach for the real, not / hover over the possible 
Suffering 3. Learn to suffer – put in another’s hands. 
Death 4. Learn how to die. Highest of feasts on the way to freedom (NL. A 67,6; DBWE 8:512, 
4/191 ft. 1) 
 
Read against the backdrop of Bonhoeffer’s prison letters, the rough themes of the poem sound 
like a manual with instructions for surviving a long imprisonment, in body and with one’s spirit 
and soul intact. As such they correspond closely with the various phases of his imprisonment and 
his guarded response to liminality (as outlined in this study). Taking up Ulrich’s initial insistence 
on the concrete and specific particularity of places of God’s presence, I will approach the poem 
as Bonhoeffer’s own reflective revisiting of his prison experience and the specific places or 
spaces in which he learned or was taught to submit to the presence and will of God: discipline, 
action, suffering, and death. Here I intend to draw a connection between Bonhoeffer’s particular 
response to the various phases of liminality and his conceptualisation of stations on the way to 
freedom. I will also examine how the poem anticipates freedom in death as a resolution to 
liminality, without collapsing the tension of betwixt space.  
Though my approach offers a biographical reading of the poem, it also differs from Robertson’s 
(1999:75-80) in scope and intention. Roberton’s biographical reading of the poem views the 
stations of Bonhoeffer’s poem as distinctive periods throughout his life, from his early practice 
of discipline to his eventual death. This biographical reading, I believe, overshoots the limits of 
the poem and misses the anticipatory power of the poems resolve. Ulrich’s (2009:151) valid 
criticism of this reading rests in its suggestion that Bonhoeffer’s poem might be made into a 
“catechetical teaching” to be taken as a pattern for the Christian life, on the way to achieving 
some goal – perhaps “the goal to become a saint.” The tendency, however, of both Ulrich and 
Robertson, is to universalise the particularity of Bonhoeffer’s spirituality for the universal church 
or for the life of discipleship. It is my belief that it is only by focusing on the value of 
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Bonhoeffer’s particular experience amidst imprisonment – as it emerges in this poem – that the 
non-universality of the poem becomes relevant for the life of the Christian disciple. 
Let me now turn to the poem itself. Reading the first stanza against the backdrop of Bonhoeffer’s 
earlier letters we can immediately hear echoes of his struggle to navigate the profound sense of 
separation he had experienced during the interrogation period. With the privilege of some 
distance from that early struggle the poet has a clearer vision of what once was a tormenting and 
isolating time. His question – “[w]hat is freedom?... formally love… [r]egarding freedom in 
prison…” (DBWE 8:72, 1/11) – posed in his fragmentary notes on time, clearly grounds his 
search for freedom concretely in the prison experience and in the disorientation of separation. 
Likewise the instruction, learn to control yourselves, from his early sketch of the poem, points 
toward his response to the context of competing senses and desires, which sought to lead him 
astray. Back then, as he wrote to his parents in April 1944, all of his “impressions were fresh and 
vivid; deprivations and pleasures were more intense” (DBWE 8:359, 3/135). He had feared that 
his senses and desires might betray him, compromising either his ability to withstand his 
interrogations or to maintain a sense of order in his spirit and body. The temporal, ethical, and 
spatial separation brought on by imprisonment and the liminal transition into the prison space 
had forced him to instil a strict order and discipline in his daily routine.  
Now, almost a year and half later he is able to see that a disciplined life of obedience had formed 
and shaped him (“Keusch” the German word for “chastity”), grounding him in a secret freedom, 
in spite of his continued incarceration and inability to act or be with his loved ones. A key 
element of learning to control oneself in this way lies in the transformation of the prison space 
into a monastic like displacement and enclosure. Within this very place, in the tension of the 
prison cell/monastic enclosure, Bonhoeffer had experienced the presence of God; and it is amidst 
this continued liminality that he anticipates a resolution to his earlier question about freedom in 
prison: “[o]nly through discipline does one learn the secret of freedom” (DBWE 8:512, 4/191).  
The second stanza, which focuses on action that reaches for the real rather than hovering over the 
possible, echoes the tensions between contemplation and action experienced during the awaiting 
trial period. Its language points to one letter in particular, written to his parents on 13 September 
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1943. Contemplating the “stormy world events” that were racing by outside the prison,161 as well 
as the “incessant waiting” that hovered in the background of the awaiting trial period, 
Bonhoeffer wished that he could “accomplish something useful” (DBWE 8:155, 2/57). He knew 
that he must learn how to act, but was resigned to the fact that: “at the moment that place can 
only be the prison cell, and what one can do here plays itself out in the realm of the invisible, and 
there of all places the expression ‘doing’ is quite inappropriate” (DBWE 8:155, 2/57). Restricted 
from participating in the storm of events racing by on the outside world, Bonhoeffer wrote: I 
sometimes think of Schubert's "Münich" and his crusade. (DBWE 8:155, 2/57). 
This brief reference to Schubert’s Münich (monk), casts a vivid image of Bonhoeffer standing 
alone in the solitude of his cell, as the outside world with its colours, songs, and crusades, moves 
past at rapid speed. Dahill (2006:11) helpfully points out that Schubert’s monk is “imprisoned in 
a new cell not because of his monasticism (per se) but because of the worldliness and political 
investment of his profoundly monastic spirituality.” Likewise, in this place of submission, 
Bonhoeffer continues to experience a disjunction between the freely chosen monastic life and the 
chained and confined enclosure of his cell. He does not willingly embrace imprisonment as a 
submissive retreat from life into asceticism, but rather continues to long for home, for open skies 
and fields of flowers, for nights of music with family and friends, and for an ongoing part to play 
in solidarity with the suffering of his family, his Church, his country and its victims. And yet, the 
monastic life, which he cultivated in his prison cell, helped to ground him in concrete reality. 
Transforming the space of his cell into a monastic enclosure, he had discovered the true meaning 
of boldly reaching for the real. He learned to enter the “storm of events” (DBWE 8:513, 4/191) 
taking place within liminality, transitioning between various roles of responsibility and action as 
a spiritual anchor for other prisoners. Casting judgement on the carceral system, he had 
envisioned an alternative system, calling the powers that be to account for their deprivation of 
life and human freedom. Through poetic reflection on the tensions between contemplation and 
action Bonhoeffer here anticipates the true meaning of freedom, which is not sought but rather 
will come and “embrace your spirit, rejoicing” (DBWE 8:513, 4/191). Here in the betwixt space 
                                                
161 In his 13 September 1943, letter to his parents, he wrote of “[t]he stormy world events in recent days,” possibly 
referencing “the Allied landing on Sicily on July 10; the overthrow of Mussolini on July 25; the capitulation of Italy 
on September 3; and the Allied landing in southern Italy on September 9 (‘Operation Overlord’) (DBWE 8:155, 
2/57 ft. 5).  
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of the prison cell Bonhoeffer encounters the embrace of real freedom in the presence of God; a 
freedom that is not limited or restricted by the walls of the prison nor by separation from loved 
ones.  
Although the majority of Bonhoeffer’s personal reflections on suffering (the theme of the third 
stanza) were explored during the awaiting trial period, where he was still uncomfortable talking 
about his own suffering, we can see a new development taking place as he begins to see his own 
suffering as a continuation of action and a consummation of freedom (DBWE 8:493, 4/183). The 
third stanza echoes in resounding harmony with Bonhoeffer’s theological anticipation of finding 
resolve in the suffering of God. In this way, his poem anticipates a “[w]ondrous transformation” 
as he learns to suffer; “[p]owerless” and “alone,” he relinquishes his own action and breathes a 
“sigh of relief” as he “calmly and fearlessly” lies his own suffering “into a mightier hand, 
contented” (DBWE 8:513, 4/191). On the liminal borderlines between fettered action and 
powerless suffering, the poet anticipates laying what is righteous in the hands of God and 
experiencing the blissful and unmediated touch of freedom. Here he anticipates that what 
remains unfinished and unresolved, “might be perfected… in glory” (DBWE 8:513, 4/191). In 
this stanza, as in the third period of Bonhoeffer’s imprisonment, we can begin to see how poetry 
offers a resolution to liminality in communion with God. God does not rescue the poet from the 
task of learning to suffer, but rather promises to perfect it. The abstract nature of this perfection 
is given a face in the following stanza.    
The fourth stanza, of Bonhoeffer’s verse clearly locates the poem in the prison context, not only 
because it awakens the motif of death that seems to bookend his entire prison experience, but 
more importantly in its carceral imagery used to personify death; “chains,” “earthen enclosures,” 
and “walls” that deceive and contain the body. Freedom, which has remained illusory throughout 
his imprisonment, coming only in glimpses and in shifting streams of light – “sought through 
discipline, action, and suffering” – is now anticipated in life’s final station, death. Here the poet 
crosses the threshold of transformation, in which death that is initially encountered as the prison 
walls, chains, and enclosures, is welcomed as the “highest of feast” and the one whose face is 
discerned in the very face of God. “In this sense” Bonhoeffer resolves, “death is the epitome of 
human freedom” (DBWE 8:493, 4/183). One could say that framed in this light, Bonhoeffer saw 
his own submission to death as his final act of resistance.  
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In death Bonhoeffer anticipates a poetic passage through transformative moments of resolution 
in God’s presence; having sought freedom through discipline, action, and suffering, he now 
anticipates resolution in God. The poem simultaneously represents both the creative space that 
liminality produces and the world orienting capacity of poetic language in re-framing and 
anticipating a whole life amidst a fragmented liminality. This death, however, is no longer a 
solitary death, but shared with Jesus Christ and with God in the sufferings of the world. Through 
poetic anticipation of his own death Bonhoeffer experiences full communitas with Jesus Christ 
and God. Boudewinjse (1990:10) explains,that “liminality engenders communitas” as it suspends 
the patterned arrangements of roles and status “regularly operative in given society.” 
Communitas represents “a relationship between concrete, historical, idiosyncratic individuals” 
and thus “[t]he bonds of communitas are anti-structural in that they are undifferentiated, 
equalitarian, direct, nonrational (although not irrational) (Boudewinjse 1990:10). In death 
Bonhoeffer anticipates the dissolve of all existing social barriers, walls, and earthen enclosures 
and further anticipates encountering God face to face on equal terms. In radical openness to God 
Bonhoeffer anticipates a mystical resolve of fragmented liminality. Nowhere is the power of this 
resolve within liminality more poignantly expressed than in his letter to Bethge, which directly 
follows the poem:  
“Everything we may with some good reason expect or beg of God is to be found in Jesus Christ. 
What we imagine a God could and should do – the God of Jesus Christ has nothing to do with all 
that. We must immerse ourselves again and again, for a long time and quite calmly, in Jesus’s 
[sic] life, his sayings, actions, suffering, and dying in order to recognize what God promises and 
fulfills. What is certain is that we may always live aware that God is near and present with us and 
that this life is an utterly new life for us; that there is nothing that is impossible for us anymore 
because there is nothing that is impossible for God; that no earthly power can touch us without 
God's will, and that danger and urgent need can only drive us closer to God…. what is certain is 
that in suffering lies hidden the source of our joy, in dying the source of our life; what is certain is 
that in all this we stand within a community that carries us. To all this, God has said Yes and 
Amen in Jesus. This Yes and Amen is the solid ground upon which we stand.” (DBWE 8:514-
515, 4/192). 
 
In conclusion, Bonhoeffer’s poetic anticipation represents threshold moments of transformation 
that are grounded in the life, sayings, actions, suffering, and dying of Jesus Christ. Through 
continual immersion in the liminality of discipline, action, suffering, and death, Bonhoeffer 
learns to participate in the life of Christ and live with a full awareness of God’s presence. This 
illumination or transformation would not be possible without the catalyst of liminality breaking 
down barriers of separation and driving him ever closer to the reality of God in the world. In this 
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way the prison experience has a meaning and a purpose. Its meaning is given shape through 
poetic anticipation that the tensions of life will resolve in communion with those who stand with 
us and carry us conceptually, if not literally, through displacement. To this God has said Yes and 
Amen in the life of Jesus Christ and it is this Christological reality, which is the ground of all 
reality, that offers a “solid ground upon which we stand” (DBWE 8:515, 4/192). Having passed 
over the threshold of liminality, Bonhoeffer finds solid ground in conformity to and participation 
in the life of Jesus Christ (Incarnate, Crucified, Resurrected). 
Polyphonic Anticipation 
Having examined the role of theological and poetic anticipation, I will now seek to add one final 
piece to our understanding of anticipation within liminality: polyphonic anticipation. Amidst the 
fragmentation of his life, Bonhoeffer continued to love and celebrate the created world in all of 
its multidimensionality; the light and the shadow, the joys and the sorrows, the longings and the 
passions, the success and the failures. This is likely the most startling aspect of Bonhoeffer’s 
prison experience. That after nearly a year and a half in an ugly prison cell and in the face of 
almost certain impending death, he continued to be grounded in the fullness of life, in earthly 
love for others, and in wholehearted love for God. Through poetic anticipation Bonhoeffer had 
sensed that the fragments of his life would find their resolve in God at the end of life. Yet he 
longed to find a connection between the ultimate and penultimate, so that living in the here and 
now he might experience resolve this side of death. Conceptualising this longing and its 
meaning, Bonhoeffer searched for a metaphor or image that might hold the multidimensional 
tensions between the fullness of life and the fragmentation of liminality. As a lover of music and 
an accomplished musician, it is not surprising then that Bonhoeffer turned to musical metaphors 
as a way of weaving together the fragmentary tensions of his experience of liminality. Here 
Bonhoeffer’s use of the Art of Fugue162 and the development of the “polyphony of life,” together 
anticipate how “the fragments of life can enrich our lives today [in the penultimate] even if their 
ultimate significance and recapitulation remains hidden” (de Gruchy 2001:160). It is my 
                                                
162 Although Bonhoeffer’s thought on the Art of Fugue emerge during the awaiting trial period, I have included them 
here for thematic purposes. 
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contention that through the use of musical metaphors, Bonhoeffer was able to articulate and give 
shape to the formfulness of his prison experience, anticipating that even in the midst of his 
fragmentary existence, facing the impending threat of death, “the polyphony will resolve” (Smith 
2006:205). 
Again I do not claim here to offer a comprehensive interpretation of Bonhoeffer’s use of musical 
metaphors.163 My intention is rather to show how these musical metaphors anticipate a resolution 
to liminality, this side of death. In what follows I will examine Bonhoeffer’s use of the Art of 
Fugue and the “polyphony of life” as two liminal metaphors that bridge the gap created by 
liminality and restore wholeness to life. 
De Gruchy (2001:158) writes that the Art of Fugue provided Bonhoeffer “with a way of 
understanding the fragmentary nature of life and the ambiguities of the ethics of free 
responsibility.” His thoughts in this regard were prompted by his own awareness of 
fragmentation within his country, culture, and within his own professional and personal life. 
Writing to Bethge on 23 February 1944, he contemplated: “What matters, it seems to me, is 
whether one still sees, in this fragment of life that we have, what the whole was intended and 
designed to be, and of what material it is made” (DBWE 8:306, 2/115). Bonhoeffer’s intention 
lies in anticipating how the penultimate fragments of his life might contribute to the whole of the 
ultimate. Although he considered some fragments fit for the trash, others would remain 
meaningful “because only God could perfect them, so they remain fragments – I am thinking, for 
example, of the Art of Fugue” (DBWE 8:306, 2/115). The Art of Fugue functions here as a 
symbolic analogy helping Bonhoeffer to make sense of the contrasting and fragmentary themes 
of his prison experience and life, and how they might be woven together into a greater harmonic 
resonance even if they fail to come to conclusion or remain uncompleted like Bach’s Art of 
Fugue (Pangritz 2002:36). He continues:  
If our life is only the most remote reflection of such a fragment, in which, even for a short time, 
the various themes gradually accumulate and harmonize with one another and in which the great 
                                                
163 Regarding a comprehensive interpretation of Bonhoeffer’s use of musical metaphors in relation to his theological 
development in prison, see Smith (2006:195-206); Pangritz (2002:28-42); de Gruchy (2001:158-168); Ford (1999); 
Begbie (2000); and Kemp (1976). 
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counterpoint is sustained from beginning to end… then it is not for us, either, to complain about 
this fragmentary life of ours, but rather to be glad of it (DBWE 8:306, 2/115). 
Here the margins and borderlines of his fragmented experience become the very site of 
productive inquiry, gradually culminating in harmony with the great counterpoint. At this stage, 
however, Bonhoeffer had not yet conceptualised what held these fragmentary themes together. 
Nearly four months later, at a time when he felt most alone, separated from his family and 
friends during the celebration of the Baptism of Dietrich Bethge, Bonhoeffer risked new 
imaginative creativity, coining the phrase “polyphony of life” (de Gruchy 2001:160). His 
thoughts in this regard were originally prompted by concerns for Bethge and Renate who would 
be separated again when Bethge returned to the Italian front. He wrote to Bethge attempting to 
comfort him: “[w]hen you are in love, you want to live, above all things, and you hate everything 
that represents a threat to your life” (DBWE 8:393, 3/147). Although his starting point here is 
crafted for Bethge, it is almost certainly intensified by his own separation from Maria. The 
passage that follows is grounded in earthly love and the desire to live so that one might 
experience the fulfilment of this love. He continues by introducing a further musical metaphor:  
there is a danger, in any passionate erotic love, that through it you may lose what I'd like to call 
the polyphony of life. What I mean is that God, the Eternal, wants to be loved with our whole 
heart, not to the detriment of earthly love or to diminish it, but as a sort of cantus firmus to which 
the other voices of life resound in counterpoint … Where the cantus firmus is clear and distinct, a 
counterpoint can develop as mightily as it wants (DBWE 8:394, 3/147). 
In this risk of metaphorical imagination Bonhoeffer discovers a threshold for passions and 
desires that until now had remained contained and disciplined for fear of transgressing the 
boundary of the self. In this context, the polyphony of life reframes the “sensual, and glowing 
love” in the Song of Solomon, as “contradicting all those who think being Christian is about 
tempering one’s passions” (DBWE 8:394, 3/147). Here life’s polyphony breaks open the stasis 
of the disciplined life reflected in Bonhoeffer’s first stanza of “Stations on the Way to Freedom” 
and grounds the body and its passions in the human nature of Christ, as a counterpoint to Christ’s 
divine nature. Or as de Gruchy (2001:161) writes “[the] Christian life is a blending of the bodily 
and the spiritual without their confusion, eros and agape.” It is not coincidental that this kind of 
erotic love is evoked by the polyphony of life (de Gruchy 2001:161); as no other art form than 
music can evoke such bodily and ecstatic resonance, involving all the senses of the person. 
Bonhoeffer claims that if the cantus firmus resounds within early love, “only then will it sound 
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complete and full, and the counterpoint will always know that it is being carried and can’t get out 
of tune or cut adrift, while remaining itself and complete in itself” (DBWE 8:394, 3/147).  
Read against the context of Bonhoeffer’s continued experience of liminal space, the polyphony 
of life not only directs life’s emotions, desires, and passions toward its firm foundation in the 
cantus firmus (Jesus Christ), but it also offers a threshold for awakening them, validating them, 
and allowing them their own contrapuntal independence and integrity within the full spectrum of 
the human context of relationality. As such, Bonhoeffer concludes that “[o]nly this polyphony 
gives your life wholeness, and you know that no disaster can befall you as long as the cantus 
firmus continues” (DBWE 8:393-394, 3/147). This is, I believe, a transformative moment in 
which the penultimate counterpoint is given wholeness and meaning in anticipation of the 
ultimate cantus firmus. Polyphonic anticipation breaks open liminality in wholehearted 
participation in the life of this world and the life of Christ, with all of its contrasting tensions. In 
addition, as this metaphor continues to develop, emerging in Bonhoeffer’s prayer and in his later 
letters, it gradually comes to describe not only love, but also happiness and danger, sorrow and 
pain alongside joy (DBWE 8:397, 3/148), daily threats, and finally the full multidimensionality 
of the Christian faith (DBWE 8:404, 3/152).  
In conclusion, the musical metaphors through which polyphonic anticipation took shape, allowed 
Bonhoeffer to articulate the formfulness of life amidst liminality and confusion. Anticipating this 
liminal harmonic resonance, he came to understand how “Christianity puts us into many different 
dimensions of life at the same; in a way we accommodate God and the whole world within us. 
We weep with those who weep at the same time as we rejoice with those who rejoice” (DBWE 
8:405, 3/152).  This kind of metaphorical anticipation knows how to lament and how grieving for 
changing, but it also knows how to celebrate change that has already been wrought in human 
love and in the fullness of life. The metaphorical language of polyphonic anticipation moves 
Bonhoeffer to see the ordinary fragments of life in an extraordinary way, giving further voice to 
“what he meant by belonging ‘wholly to the world’ while still knowing by faith the truth of one’s 
rootedness in Christ” (Smith 2006:205). In this way the conflicting tensions and dissonance of 
liminality find their anticipated resolution or coherence in the polyphony of life. And thus in the 
midst of betwixt life, confined to his prison cell, bereft of family, friends, and his fiancée, and 
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distinctly aware of the fragmentary nature of life, Bonhoeffer anticipates the unseen restoration 
and resolve of life’s fragmented themes.  
Conclusion: Anticipating and Embracing Resolve 
From his arrest and imprisonment through to the failure of the coup, Bonhoeffer experiences, 
articulates, and attempts to live within the tensions of liminality in Tegel prison. By the third 
period of his imprisonment, this struggle to live in-between became the catalyst for an expansive 
Christian vision of life in all it multidimensionality; dark and light, despair and hope, success and 
failure, dying and living, suffering and resurrection. Here the overarching contours of separation 
and transition that accompanied him through the first year of imprisonment and opened a huge 
new dimension in his life, began to take definitive shape as theological, poetic and polyphonic 
anticipation of a surprising and liberating encounter with the God of the cross. Tracing the 
contours of this formative journey, I have argued that the boundaries of liminality remain just 
porous enough for the possibility of transformation and new insights, which risk alternative new 
ways of understanding and participating in the life of this world, in the life of Jesus Christ 
(Incarnate, Crucified, and Resurrected) and in the sufferings of God in the midst of the ugliness 
of a prison cell.  
Bonhoeffer’s prison experience, although devastatingly tragic in its trajectory toward death, 
prepared a fertile ground for theological, poetic, and polyphonic anticipation to germinate, take 
root, and to grow into a captivating new vision of God and the Christian life. In summary, let me 
draw together these three movements of formational fruitfulness, through which Bonhoeffer 
articulates different nuances of liminality and finds resolve amidst the fragmentary tensions of 
life.  
Through theological anticipation, Bonhoeffer reframed his prison experience as a Gethsemane-
like displacement, in which the Christian is conformed to the sufferings of Christ and 
experiences redemption in this world; not by escaping it or being preserved from pain, but by 
being drawn ever more deeply into the hardships of this world and the sufferings of God in the 
concrete lives of those who inhabit the view from below. Through poetic anticipation, Bonhoeffer 
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found a space in which he could risk imaginative resolve of the threshold self, in the worldly 
embrace of God. Emerging from within liminality, poetry offered a way of structuring, 
reframing, and giving meaning to the tensions of his prison experience, so that through poetic 
liminality he might transcend unresolved tensions, anticipating a threshold or passage through 
betwixt space and into transformative moments of resolution in God’s presence and the presence 
of others. Though polyphonic anticipation, he discovered a way of framing the formfulness of 
life amidst fragmented liminality and began to anticipate how these ordinary fragments find their 
coherence in extraordinary contrapuntal participation in the polyphony of life, whose cantus 
firmus is Jesus Christ.  
Within the betwixt space of his prison cell, Bonhoeffer experienced both the fullness and 
emptiness of presence and absence and anticipated theological, poetic, and polyphonic resolution 
in the worldly embrace of the “Thou;” discovered and experienced in the ugliness of the “it.” In 
this way, he learned to live wholeheartedly in the midst of life’s trials and perplexities, grounded 
in the sure and true knowledge that his life (penultimate) was but a fragment of some larger 
whole (ultimate). Liminality offered a space in which he could let go of former structures of 
identity and order, and throw himself into the arms of God, discovering in this embrace what it 
means to be the human being that Christ creates in us.  
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Conclusion 
I have endeavoured throughout this study to take Bonhoeffer’s prison experience seriously as a 
place of formation. Through a detailed and close reading of his prison writings a unique picture 
of the prisoner-theologian has emerged, which traces the contours of his engagement with the 
prison space and its impact on his life and thought. Having journeyed with Bonhoeffer through 
liminal displacement, I now intended to take a step back and observe the wider landscape of this 
formative experience. From the loneliness and separation of the interrogation period, Bonhoeffer 
moved quite a distance during his time in prison; from his early attempts to counter temporal, 
ethical, and spatial separation through discipline and spiritual practices; through transitional 
turning points in his spiritual life and active pastoral ministry, which helped him to find a centre 
of gravity between resistance and submission, and remain his complete self; to letting go of what 
could not be resolved and throwing himself into the arms of God, anticipating – through 
theological, poetic, and polyphonic resolution – the embrace of the suffering God in the midst of 
the world’s pain. This movement through liminal displacement drew Bonhoeffer ever more 
deeply into the reality of his own life, as well as an ever increasing relationality with others, with 
God, and with the suffering of those who inhabit the world below.   
Amidst these contrasting tensions – suspended between home and prison, hope and despair, 
absence and communion, life and death – Bonhoeffer experienced a privileged “period of 
reflection,” in which former structures of meaning and identity were suspended, forcing him to 
think about the meaning of the Christian life and the ultimate powers that “generate and sustain” 
it (Turner 1967:105). The prison space provided a unique location for this task, as it broke down 
default modes of perception and brought into sharper focus the meaning and value of being 
human before God that so often goes unnoticed, unappreciated, or is simply inaccessible in 
normal life. Within this space Bonhoeffer articulates a transformational encounter with the God 
of Jesus Christ, who is nothing like what the “religious person expects from God” (DBWE 
8:480, 3/177), nothing like “[w]hat we imagine a God could and should do” (DBWE 8:524, 
4/192). Liminality provoked a certain deconstruction and criticism of false notions of God, 
which no longer corresponded with the God of the Bible or with the formative nature of his 
liberating encounter with the Incarnate, Crucified, and Resurrected Christ, “whose presence in 
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his life” and in the confines of his prison cell, “provided release from the confines of lonely self-
imprisonment.” (Dahill 2009:30). 
Reflecting on the formative nature of liminality within the prison space, we can now see that the 
trajectories of incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection, as fundamental dimension of 
conformation to Christ, each weave their way throughout Bonhoeffer’s prison experience, 
empowering the reality of his life in a prison cell; helping him to come to terms with his 
existential struggles and to rest in the affirmation of a true and authentic self (Incarnate). The 
prison cell provided a view of the incarnation that was striped of all sentimentality, leaving the 
radical poverty and liberating reality of the Incarnation bare. Within this Gethsemane-like 
displacement, the very same door that represented the limit of his liminal existence became the 
transcendent threshold of the “One who alone can open our prison doors” (Dahill 2006:12). In 
this new location and view, immersion in the life, sayings, actions, suffering, and death of Jesus 
Christ (DBWE 8:515, 4/192), broke open a liberating encounter with life, driving him ever closer 
to God in the midst of the world. Through discipline, sociality, suffering, death, freedom, and 
wholehearted love for this world, Bonhoeffer experienced the extraordinary transformation of his 
prison cell, as the very place where Christ is present and where God can be found. Far from 
preserving him from pain, this process of formation thrust Bonhoeffer, willingly and unwillingly 
into “walking the path that Jesus walks” (DBWE 8:480, 3/177), staying awake with Christ in 
Gethsemane, and participating in the sufferings of God in the sufferings of the world (Crucified). 
In the final days of his imprisonment, as the threat of death loomed large, his uniquely formative 
prison experience opened him up to the fullness of freedom and life, as he was conformed in 
radical trust and anticipation of new encounters with God in the “multidimensional, polyphonic” 
of life  (Resurrected) (DBWE 8:405, 3/152). Here, in cell 92, he had learned and was still 
learning to completely renounce “making something of oneself” (DBWE 8:486, 4/178) and to 
throw himself fully into “the midst of life’s task, questions, successes and failure, experiences, 
and perplexities” so that he might “become a human being, a Christian” (DBWE 8:486, 4/178). 
Through theological, poetic, and polyphonic anticipation, Bonhoeffer risked imaginative resolve 
by reframing liminality as a Gethsemane-like displacement, stations on the way to freedom, and 
participation in the polyphonic nature of life. 
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Bonhoeffer’s prison writings offer us a glimpse into a life of faith that sustains the long and 
lonely path of liminal displacement.  We can see how his changing social location as a prisoner, 
correlates with liberating turning points at the heart of his liminal experience, discovering in and 
through an encounter with the otherness of his prison cell, a deeper and more constant ordering 
of creation, self, genuine sociality, and a final turning from the phraseological to the real. This 
study has sought to offer a fresh perspective on Bonhoeffer’s prison experience and the ways in 
which his experience acts as the catalyst for the most interesting and lasting of his theological 
insights. I believe it has yielded a possible new avenue for reading Bonhoeffer’s LPP; 
contributing both to a portrait of the “historical” Bonhoeffer as well as to the task of interpreting 
his life alongside his witness and theology. Bonhoeffer the prisoner resists being the suffering 
martyr or the glorified saint, but rather points toward a complete and authentic identity as 
the companion of God and participant in the life of Christ. In this way, he learned to become a 
human being, even in the mist of the dehumanising ugliness of his prison cell.  
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Appendix A: A Privileged Prisoner 
From the outset, it is clear that Bonhoeffer was an unusual prisoner. Although his prison writings 
and his eventual end share a striking resemblance to the life and writings of other political 
prisoners,164 the overall character of his life in prison was very different from other political 
prisoners of the Third Reich. Understanding the unusual nature of his privileged position is 
critical for understanding his experience; setting his prison writings firmly within a social and 
historical context. Failure to do so would lead either to an exaggeration of his suffering or an 
undervaluation of the specific context in which his writing took place – the prison cell.  
The following spheres of privilege offer important qualifications for understanding Bonhoeffer’s 
social location. Firstly, Bonhoeffer was a military political prisoner. When initially arrested on 
the charge of “subversion of the armed forces,” the Gestapo were unaware of his involvement in 
the conspiracy against Hitler, however, they remained confident that he was engaged in 
subversive activities (de Gruchy 2007:18).  It was his connection to the Abwehr office under the 
command of Admiral Canaris that interested the Gestapo and the Reich Central Security Office. 
As a member of the Abwehr, he came under the jurisdiction of the military War Court and was 
held as a military/political prisoner at Tegel Prison. 
Bethge (2000:799-800) suggests, that Bonhoeffer’s role in the Abwehr was of secondary 
importance. The primary object of the prosecutors' investigation “sought to strike at Canaris’s 
entire Abwehr office” by breaking Hans von Dohnanyi,165 the chief defendant in the trial. Interest 
in Bonhoeffer was secondary, so his interrogations and overall treatment in prison were less 
severe than that of other political prisoners. Schlingensiepen (2010:342) remarks that, “When 
one considers how political prisoners were treated in Adolf Hitler’s Germany from 1933 onward, 
and what Hans von Dohnanyi was made to suffer, it is clear that Bonhoeffer’s lot in Tegel was 
unusual.”  
                                                
164 See Millies (2011:113-134) for a comparison of the striking similarities between Bonhoeffer and Alfred Delp’s 
prison writings and their responses to the experience of imprisonment in Tegel.  
165 Hans von Dohnanyi, Bonhoeffer’s brother-in-law and fellow conspirator. 
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Although specific gaps in our knowledge of Bonhoeffer’s treatment persist,166 it is widely 
acknowledged that it was “unusual.” Other political prisoners arrested for subversive acts 
reported torturous treatment when interrogated by the Gestapo: “Prisoners were met with the 
usual ‘passive’ torture: bright lights shining in their eyes at all hours, a meagre diet of bread and 
water, and sleep deprivation … [t]hen there was verbal torture … the prisoner often stood for 
hours, having had little sleep or nourishment” (Coady 2003:75). In Bonhoeffer’s case, we have 
no indication that he was ever tortured. Bonhoeffer was either spared this kind of treatment or 
concealed it from the recipients of his letters.  
Although Bonhoeffer had been arrested and taken to Tegel under top-secret conditions, his 
situation changed radically after family connections were made known (DBWE 8:344, 2/131).167 
What little we do know of his first few days, was recorded by him in a later “Report on Prison 
Life’ written for his uncle General Hase (DBWE 8:343-347, 2/131).168 
After twelve days, General Hase made a phone call to prison commander Captain Maetz to 
indicate his concern for his nephew Dietrich. Overnight, Bonhoeffer became a “privileged 
prisoner,” with whom Maetz went for daily walks in the courtyard, and for whom other 
privileges were afforded: the offer of a cooler and more spacious cell,169 which was cleaned for 
                                                
166 Particularly in regard to the interrogation period and his last few months after he was transferred to the detention 
centre in the cellar of the Reich Central Security Office building. 
167 General Hase was Paula Bonhoeffer’s brother and Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s uncle. He was the Major General and 
military commander of Berlin at the time, and thus had jurisdiction over Tegel, its commander, and its military staff.  
168 “For the first night I was locked in a reception cell; the blankets on the cot stank so abominably that in spite of 
the cold, it was impossible to cover oneself with them. The next morning a piece of bread was thrown into my 
cell, so that I had to pick it up off the floor…. For the first time from outside my cell came the foul curses 
inflicted on those detained for interrogation by the prison staff; since then I have heard the abuse daily from 
morning till night. When I had to line up for inspection with the other new arrivals, we were addressed as 
"scoundrels," etc., etc. by a warder. Each of us was asked why he had been arrested, and when I said I did not 
know, the warden answered with a jeering laugh, "You'll find out soon enough!" It was six months before I 
received the warrant for my arrest. […] I was taken to the most isolated single cell on the top floor, and a sign 
was hung outside forbidding anyone to enter without special permission. I was told that I was not permitted any 
correspondence until further notice and that, unlike the other prisoners, I was not to be allowed outdoors for half 
an hour each day, although I was entitled to it according to the prison regulations. […] Otherwise, during the 
next twelve days the cell door was opened only to bring me food and take out the latrine bucket. Not a single 
word was exchanged with me. I was given no information about why I had been imprisoned or for how long. 
[…] I had been put in the section for the worst cases, with prisoners who were condemned to death and were 
kept shackled hand and foot.” (DBWE 8:342-344, 2/131).  
169 On August 3, 1943, Bonhoeffer wrote to his parents, indicating that he did not “want to request transfer to 
another floor” as he “didn’t consider that decent with regard to the other prisoner who would then have to move” 
into his cell, “presumably without tomatoes and such” (DBWE 8:127, 2/40). He was later moved from the third floor 
where he was initially held, to cell 92 on the first floor, “because of the increased risk of bombing raids” (Bethge 
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him every day; larger portions of food; and the extension of visiting times with his family and 
fiancée, where possible (DBWE 8:344, 2/131; Schlingensiepen 2010:342).170 
This change in Bonhoeffer’s situation highlights a second sphere of social, cultural and political 
privilege: Bonhoeffer was a high profile prisoner from the educated elite bourgeoisie, with 
important family and political connections and means of securing legal and material privileges. 
Much of Bonhoeffer’s experience in prison only makes sense in this light. His existence as a 
prisoner in Tegel was at times different from that of his fellow prisoners.171 Nevertheless, it is 
clear that while Bonhoeffer welcomed certain privileges that stemmed from his family 
connections, he was embarrassed by public reactions to his privileged status.172 He sought 
wherever possible to use his privileges in service of others or to refuse privileges that might 
come at the “expense of the other prisoners” (DBWE 8:344, 2/131). 
A third sphere roots Bonhoeffer’s privilege in Tegel in his cultural and intellectual formation 
among the Protestant Bildungsbürger. Karl Bonhoeffer had always had “high expectations” of 
his children “as if it were their inherent duty to fulfil the potential they had been given” (Nelson 
1999:24). Dietrich's formation and education had prepared him to be a practiced writer and 
public leader, skills that gave him a privileged social and cultural position among his fellow 
prisoners. Although Bonhoeffer was willing to transgress or redefine the boundaries of the 
Bürgertum – as reflected in his involvement in the conspiracy, in certain themes of his Ethics, 
                                                
2000:799; see also DBWE 8:151, 2/54). Although Bonhoeffer rarely reflects self-critically on his privileged position 
in Germany society, in prison he begins to recognise that his privileges at times have consequences on his fellow 
prisoners. 
170 Poelchau (1964:223) recounts another event that explicitly elevated Bonhoeffer’s status in Tegel. In June of 
1944, General Hase paid a visit to Bonhoeffer in prison, he “stayed for five hours, drank champagne with him and 
thus raised Bonhoeffer’s position officially” – a position, however, that “he had already secured in the hearts of men 
through his very personality.”  
171 The contents of a package delivered to Bonhoeffer at Tegel during a visit from his family may further 
substantiate the case for understanding Bonhoeffer’s privileged existence as a prisoner, as well as the social status 
and wealth of his family during time of war. On May 8th a package was delivered containing the following “— 1 
brown suit, 1 pair of black boots — 1 blue shirt — 1 pair of socks — 1 handkerchief — 1 washcloth — 1 hairbrush 
— 2 pipes, 1 cleaner — 1 packet of tobacco — 3 boxes of matches — 50 cigarettes — 60 Recresal tablets — 1 Haag 
Cola — 125 g butter — 125 g bacon fat — 125 g cheese — 200 g sausage — 1 tin of pork fat — 1 container of malt 
extract spread — 1 box of cookies and sweets — 2 hard-boiled eggs — 1 loaf of bread, 1 small bag of sugar cubes 
— 1 package of pumpernickel" (fn. 1, DBWE 70, 1/11). The contents of this package would have been rarely found 
in any working class home during WW II let along in the cell of a military prisoner.  
172 Bonhoeffer writes: “The result [of his family connections being known] was that the staff treated me with 
exceptional politeness, and some even came to apologize, saying, ‘Of course we didn’t realize,’ and so on…. How 
embarrassing!” (DBWE 8:344, 2/131).  
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and in aspects of his imprisonment – he was also prepared to endure the challenges of prison 
with calm composure, as if it were part of his civic duty.173  
Bonhoeffer’s competence in political matters, his commanding grasp of language and his 
experience over the past few years in the realm of political espionage,174 allowed him to make 
use of his writing, his speech, and his leadership qualities, to navigate his experience, concealing 
certain information, and securing certain privileges for himself and fellow prisoners. The 
collection of archival material from this period is a testament to Bonhoeffer’s capacity for 
writing, as well as his mastery of persuasion and misdirection (Martin 2005). Skills that helped 
him to protect the secrecy of the conspiracy and mobilise alternative forms of communication 
with the outside world; convincing a sympathetic prison guard to risk his life to smuggle out 
illegal letters so he could maintain contact with his friends and family, and send and receive 
important information regarding the conspiracy.  
On a psychosocial level, Bonhoeffer's situation was eased, through his instilled hospitality and 
manner towards others. Guards and prisoners alike were attracted to his personality and 
demeanour, and feeling that he was someone with whom they could talk. He maintained clear 
boundaries with guards and prisoners and exuded a level of mutual respect not characteristic of 
the prison environment. “When guards took the liberty of speaking disrespectfully to him, he 
corrected them sharply and had some success in doing so” (Schlingensiepen 2010:342). He even 
attempted to reason with guards who used excessive force, venturing to alter their treatment of 
other prisoners.175 
Bonhoeffer’s privileged status was not limited to his familial relations or socio-cultural status. 
His privileges were also hard won as he inverted the structural roles demanded by the prison 
                                                
173 This point is clearly illustrated by Bonhoeffer’s reflection in Tegel, on a statement he attributed to Adolf 
Schlatter. Bonhoeffer writes: “[f]rom my student days I recall Schlatter telling us in his ethics lectures that one of 
the civic duties of a Christian was to endure a pretrial detention with calmness. At the time these were empty words 
for me. Over the past weeks I have sometimes thought of them. And now, with the same calmness and patience as 
we have had thus far, let us continue to endure the remaining time imposed on us” (DBWE 8:115, 1/33). 
174 Reflecting on his involvement in the conspiracy he wrote in his essay ‘After Ten Years’: “We have become 
cunning and learned in the arts of obfuscation and equivocal speech” (DBWE 8:52, Prologue).  
175 “The same people who take out their frustrations on other prisoners bow and scrape to me, and attempts to reason 
with them about how they treat the others don’t get far. They will agree with what I’m saying at the moment, but an 
hour later they are carrying on the same as before” (DBWE 8:345, 2/131).  
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system, through hidden and public acts of resistance (Scott 1990).176 The success of this 
depended entirely upon leaving his guards with the misguided perception that their power 
remained intact.  
Bonhoeffer's delicate game of privilege and trickery came with obvious limitations. Due to the 
constant surveillance of his actions and censorship of his letters, he had to be extremely careful 
as to how far he could push the boundaries of privilege and resistance. He was keenly aware of 
the extent of his surveillance just as he was of the concrete and steel that restricted his body.177 
He knew that one misstep would spell the end for himself and his fellow conspirators. 
Bonhoeffer's privilege mustn’t be overstated, for it did not spare him the grueling interrogations 
of the War Court, the isolating despair of the prison cell, the psychological effects of separation 
from family and friends, the daily threat of bombing raids, nor death on the hangman’s gallows. 
The last years of Bonhoeffer’s life were lived amidst these contrasting continuities and 
discontinuities of prison life, between a privileged status and a status as an awaiting trial 
prisoner; between resistance and submission, above and below.   
  
                                                
176 See Scott, J.C. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven, NJ: Yale 
University Press.  
177 An aspect that Larson (2010:146) highlights in regard to skilled prison writers. 
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